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Abstract
There are many examples of cooperation in action in society and in nature. In some cases
cooperation leads to the increase of the overall welfare of those involved, and in other cases
cooperation may be to the detriment of the larger society. The presence of cooperation seems
natural if there is a direct benefit to individuals who choose to cooperate. However, in exam-
ples of cooperation this benefit is not always immediately obvious. The so called prisoner’s
dilemma is often used as an analogy to study cooperation and tease out the factors that lead
to cooperation.
In classical game theory, each player is assumed to be rational and hence typically seeks to
select his strategy in such a way as to maximise his own expected pay-off. In the case of the
classical prisoner’s dilemma, this causes both players to defect. In evolutionary game theory,
on the other hand, it is assumed that players have limited knowledge of the game and only
bounded rationality. Games in evolutionary game theory are repeated in rounds and players are
afforded the opportunity to adapt and learn as this repetition occurs. Past studies have revealed
that cooperation may be a viable strategy if the prisoner’s dilemma is placed in an evolutionary
context, where the evolutionary fitness of a strategy is directly related to the pay-off achieved
by the player adopting the strategy. One of the mechanisms that promote the persistence of
cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma is structured interaction between players.
A mathematical framework for representing the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (ESPD) is de-
veloped in this thesis. The mathematical framework is used to undertake an analytical approach
(i.e. avoiding the use of simulation) towards investigating the dynamics of the ESPD with a
path, cycle, plane grid or toroidal grid as underlying graph. The objective of this investigation
is to determine the likelihood of the emergence of persistent cooperation between players. The
ESPD on a path or a cycle admits two fundamentally different parameter regions; large values
of the temptation-to-defect parameter are not capable of inducing persistent cooperation, while
small values of this parameter allow for the possibility of persistent cooperation. It is found that
the likelihood of cooperation increases towards certainty as the order of the underlying graph
increases if the underlying graph is a path or cycle.
The state space of the ESPD with a plane or toroidal grid graph as underlying graph grows
very quickly as a function of the graph order. The automorphism classes of game states are
enumerated to determine exactly how fast the size of the state space of the game grows as a
function of the order of the underlying graph. Finally, the dynamics of the ESPD is investigated
for a grid graph as underlying graph (in cases where the state space is small enough) by means
of constructing the corresponding state graphs of the ESPD.
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Uittreksel
Daar is baie voorbeelde van samewerking in the gemeenskap en in die natuur. In sommige
gevalle lei samewerking tot ’n toename in die algehele welvaart van die betrokkenes, terwyl
samewerking in ander gevalle tot nadeel van die bree¨r gemeenskap mag wees. Die voorkoms van
samewerking blyk natuurlik te wees indien daar ’n direkte voordeel vir die individue is wat kies
om saam te werk. In voorbeelde van samewerking is so´ ’n voordeel egter nie altyd voor-die-
hand-liggend nie. Die sogenaamde prisoniersdilemma word dikwels as voorbeeld in die studie
van samewerking gebruik om die faktore wat na samewerking lei, te ontbloot.
In klassieke speleteorie word daar aangeneem dat elke speler rasioneel is en dus poog om sy
spelstrategie op so´ ’n manier te kies dat sy eie verwagte uitbetaling gemaksimeer word. In die
geval van die klassieke prisoniersdilemma veroorsaak dit dat beide spelers mekaar verraai. In
evolusioneˆre speleteorie, daarenteen, word daar slegs aangeneem dat elke speler oor beperkte
kennis van die spel en begrensde rasionaliteit beskik. Spele in evolusioneˆre speleteorie word in
rondtes herhaal en spelers word die geleentheid gebied om gedurende hierdie herhalingsproses
aan te pas en te leer. Vorige studies het getoon dat samewerking ’n lewensvatbare strategie
is indien die prisoniersdilemma in ’n evolusioneˆre konteks gespeel word, waar die evolusioneˆre
fiksheid van ’n strategie direk afhang van die uitbetaling van ’n speler wat die strategie volg.
Een van die meganismes wat volhoubare samewerking in die evolusioneˆre prisoniersdilemma
voortbring, is gestruktureerde interaksie tussen spelers.
’n Wiskundige raamwerk word vir die voorstelling van die evolusioneˆre prisoniersdilemma in
hierdie tesis ontwikkel. Hierdie wiskundige raamwerk word gebruik om ’n analitiese studie (met
ander woorde sonder die gebruik van simulasie) van die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma op
’n pad, siklus, rooster in die vlak, of rooster op die torus as onderliggende grafiek van stapel te
stuur. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die waarskynlikheid vir die ontstaan van volhoubare
samewerking tussen spelers te bepaal. Die prisoniersdilemma op ’n pad of siklus as onderliggende
grafiek het twee fundamenteel verskillende parametergebiede tot gevolg; groot waardes van die
versoeking-om-te-verraai parameter lei nie tot volhoubare samewerking nie, terwyl volhoubare
samewerking wel vir klein waardes van hierdie parameter moontlik is. Daar word gevind dat die
kans vir volhoubare samewerking toeneem tot sekerheid namate die orde van die onderliggende
grafiek groei.
Die toestandsruimte van die prisoniersdilemma met ’n rooster in die vlak of ’n rooster op die
torus as onderliggende grafiek groei baie vinnig as ’n funksie van die orde van die grafiek. Die
outomorfismeklasse van die speltoestande word getel met die doel om te bepaal presies hoe vinnig
die toestandsruimte van die spel as ’n funksie van die orde van die onderliggende grafiek groei.
Die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma met ’n rooster in die vlak of ’n rooster op die torus
as onderliggende grafiek word laastens deur middel van konstruksies van die ooreenstemmende
toestandsgrafieke ondersoek (in gevalle waar die toestandsruimte klein genoeg is).
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1.1 Background
There are numerous examples of cooperation in society and in nature. Often such cooperation
leads to an improvement in the overall welfare of those involved. The emergence of cooperation
seems to be natural if there is a direct benefit to individuals who choose to cooperate. However,
in many examples of cooperation this benefit is not always immediately obvious. In some cases
there may be a greater benefit to an individual seeking to exploit any cooperative behaviour by
others. Furthermore, cooperation may even be to the detriment of the larger society. Consider
the following examples of cooperation observed in society and in nature.
During the First World War spontaneous co-operative behaviour developed between the op-
posing troops, especially during prolonged trench warfare [2]. Soldiers refrained from shooting
enemies even when their enemies were well within range. Artillery units deliberately aimed their
rounds to miss the opposing forces, overshooting their supposed targets or having their rounds
land harmlessly in no man’s land.
The many examples of cleaning symbiosis found in nature, and particularly in the ocean, is
another example of cooperation. In such a cleaning symbiosis within the ocean, one organism
cleans another organism, usually a larger fish, of ectoparasites. The cleaner sometimes even
enters the gills and mouth of the host being cleaned. These cleaner/host relationships are by no
means a rare occurrence; there are more than 45 species of fish and six species of shrimp known
to be cleaners, cleaning a wide variety of fish species. It would seem the most beneficial to a
host to be cleaned, and then to make a meal of the cleaner once it has completed its cleaning
job. However, host fish avoid eating cleaners; they typically go to great lengths not to do so,
even at a cost to themselves [52].
Cooperation, however, does not always result in positive outcomes. In mid-November 2007,
Tiger Brands was fined R98,8 million by the South African Competition Commission for colluding
1
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with other bread producers to inflate the price of bread by between 30c and 35c per loaf. Pioneer
Foods, another partner involved in the price fixing scandal, was the subject of the largest settle-
ment in the history of the Competition Commission when they were fined R1-billion in penalties
[16, 47]. One of the interpretations of this scenario as that the bread producers cooperated for
their mutual benefit with a negative consequence to the larger society.
Cooperative behaviour typically evolves over many generations in nature, while in human soci-
eties people adapt and learn new strategies according to the perceived success of their previous
strategies. This adaptation or learning process may be considered a form of evolution. The
following five theories have been proposed to explain the evolution of cooperation: kin selection,
direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, graph selection and group selection [35, 36].
Kin selection, first proposed by Hamilton [19], occurs when evolution is driven by the interaction
between related individuals. The cooperation is observed when a donor pays a cost c to a
recipient in order to gain a benefit b. The cost and benefit is measured in terms of the impact
that the act of cooperation has on reproductive success of the individuals involved. It has
been suggested that it is possible for natural selection to favour kin selection if the coefficient of
genetic relatedness r is greater than the cost/benefit ratio, that is if r > c/b. Related individuals
are more likely to have many genes in common, therefore an act of cooperation, while incurring
a cost to one individual, may still benefit the set of genes.
The theory of direct reciprocity, put forward by Trivers [52] as an alternative to kin selection,
can explain cooperative situations where organisms are not related. The prisoner’s dilemma
(PD), attributed by Durlauf & Blume [11] to A.W. Tucker, is often used as a tool for studying
this kind of cooperation.
Indirect reciprocity is explained by Nowak & Sigmund [35] as follows: “Whereas direct reci-
procity embodies the idea of you scratch my back I scratch yours, indirect reciprocity suggests
that you scratch my back I scratch someone else’s.” Reputation plays a part in enforcing this
kind of cooperation. Individuals are not directly punished in their act of defection, but may be
punished later by a third party for a previous defection.
Selection not only acts on individuals, but may also do so in a group context. This form of
cooperation is called group selection. A group of cooperators may be more successful than a
group of defectors. It is acknowledged that group selection is a controversial theory [28].
Structured interactions in populations have been shown to facilitate cooperation in certain cases.
This form of cooperation is called network reciprocity (or graph selection). Many populations (or
societies) demonstrate a network-like structure in which certain individuals interact more with
some individuals than with others. Graph theory may be used to study the effect of the spatial
structure on the emergence of cooperation. This is the mechanism promoting cooperation which
will form the focus of investigation in this thesis.
There has been a flurry of interest from the research community over the last decade in the
study of games on graphs. This interest is evident by the number of citations that the review
article [51] has received. The article has been cited 489 times in the literature according to
Scopus [12] and 742 times according to Google Scholar [18] at the time of writing.
Understanding the factors that facilitate cooperation may allow one to install a mechanism
that is capable of promoting cooperation where it is the preferred outcome, or to discourage
cooperation, as in the case of price fixing, when cooperation is not desirable. Predicting where
cooperation is likely to occur may also prove useful to businesses looking for effective strategies
to increase their income, or governments looking to create policies that promote cooperation.
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Simulation is a popular technique for studying games on graphs. The following quote by Nowak
eludes to a reason why simulation is the preferred tool of investigation in this context: “Games
on graphs are easy to study by computer simulation, but they are difficult to analyse mathe-
matically because of the enormous number of possible configurations that can arise” [36].
1.2 Problem description
The examples of cooperation mentioned in §1.1 may be translated into games with player strate-
gies and pay-offs. Possibly the simplest analogy used to investigate the emergence of cooperation
is the well-known PD [2], as mentioned above. The PD is considered within an evolutionary
context with structured interaction in this thesis, referred to as the evolutionary spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma (ESPD). The aim of the research in this thesis may be captured by the two key
questions:
1. What conditions facilitate the persistence of cooperation in the ESPD?
2. Given an underlying spatial structure to the ESPD, what is the likelihood that cooperation
will persist?
As noted by Nowak [36], the mathematical analysis of games on graphs is a complicated task
due to the large number of different configurations that a game can exhibit if the underlying
graph is large. It is, however, possible to investigate the complete game dynamics of the ESPD
on small, simple graph structures, such as paths or cycles. Three steps are required to compute
the probability that cooperation will persist. The first step involves enumerating all the pos-
sible configuration that a game can exhibit. The second step is to characterise those starting
configurations of the game that lead to persistent cooperation. The final step is to enumerate
these ‘special’ cases that allow for the persistence of cooperation.
1.3 Scope and objectives
The following five objectives are pursued in this thesis:
I To perform a literature survey of previous research related to the ESPD on various un-
derlying graph structures.
II To establish a mathematical framework in aid of the study of games on graphs.
III To determine the size of the state space of the ESPD on a grid graph.
IV To determine analytically the likelihood that cooperation will persist in the ESPD on a
cycle or path.
V To determine the likelihood that cooperation will persist in the ESPD on small instances
of grid-like graph structures.
The underlying graphs which are considered in this thesis are paths, cycles, grid graphs in the
plane (referred to as without wrapping) and toroidal grid graphs (referred to as with wrapping).
The ESPD with deterministic update rules and isomorphic graphs for the update and interaction
structures of the game, is considered. The focus of this thesis is on the use of analytical
techniques (i.e. without the aid of simulation) to study the game dynamics of the ESPD.
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1.4 Thesis organisation
A number of basic mathematical concepts are introduced in the second chapter of this thesis.
These concepts form the mathematical foundation upon which arguments later in the thesis are
built. The first section of the chapter is a short introduction to basic notions in graph theory,
while the second section is a brief introduction to basic notions in group theory. The third
section contains a description of the notion of a generating function and how such a function
may be applied to counting the number of paths in a directed graph.
The literature related to classical game theory, evolutionary game theory and games on graphs
is briefly reviewed in the third chapter. The first section is devoted to classical game theory. A
brief historical account of the development of game theory is given and important concepts and
terminology are established. In the second section the focus of the literature review turns to
important concepts in evolutionary game theory. In this section, the development of the field
of evolutionary game theory and important results in this field are discussed. The final section
is devoted to detailed descriptions of the prisoner’s dilemma and its variations.
A mathematical framework for representing evolutionary games on graphs is developed in the
fourth chapter. This includes defining the concept of the state of a game and defining the rules
which govern how players update their strategies from round to round in such games. Finally,
the notion of a state graph is introduced as a means of visually representing the game dynamics
of the ESPD.
In the fifth chapter, an analytical approach (i.e. avoiding the use of simulation) is adopted to
investigate the dynamics of the ESPD on a path or cycle as underlying graph. The likelihood
of the emergence of persistent cooperation is determined. Since the game state graph captures
the complete dynamics of a game, it is of interest to determine properties of the state graph
without having to simulate the entire game. A number of theorems are established in this regard,
describing the properties of the state graph of the ESPD with a path or cycle as underlying
graph.
In the penultimate chapter, the dynamics of the ESPD with a small grid-like structure as
underlying graph is investigated. The symmetries on square and rectangular grids are reviewed
and the corresponding automorphism classes are enumerated. A phase plane is constructed for
the ESPD with both grids with and without wrapping. It is possible to visualise the complete
game dynamics for the EPSD on small grids by drawing the state graphs of the game. State
graphs are constructed for the ESPD on grid graphs of dimensions 2×2, 2×3, 2×4 and 3×3 for
each region in the phase plane. However, as the dimensions of the underlying graph increases
the number of state automorphism classes increases exponentially and a complete analysis of
the game is no longer possible if the underlying graph is sufficiently large.
The thesis closes in Chapter 7 with a summary of the work contained therein, an appraisal of
the contributions of the thesis, as well as a discussion on various possibilities for future work in
the area of evolutionary games on graphs.
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A number of basic mathematical concepts which will be used in later chapters are defined and
illustrated by means of examples in this chapter. The first section of the chapter is a short
introduction to basic notions in graph theory, while the second section is a brief introduction
to basic notions in group theory. The third section contains a description of the notion of a
generating function and how such a function may be applied to counting the number of paths
in a directed graph. This chapter therefore serves as a mathematical foundation on which the
rest of this thesis is built.
2.1 A primer in graph theory
This section contains a number of basic definitions from graph theory in order to facilitate a
description of the work presented later in this thesis. The primary source of definitions and
terminology in this section is [54].
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2.1.1 What is a graph?
A graph G is a finite, non-empty set of objects, called vertices, together with a (possibly empty)
set of unordered pairs of distinct vertices, called edges. The set of vertices of a graph G is called
the vertex set and is denoted by V (G). The set of edges is called the edge set and is denoted by
E(G). An edge e = {u, v} is said to join the vertices u and v. If e = {u, v} (or simply e = uv)
is an edge of G, then u and v are adjacent vertices, while u and e are incident, as are v and
e. Two distinct edges e1 and e2 of G are adjacent edges if they are incident with a common
vertex. The cardinality of the vertex set of a graph G is called the order of G and is denoted
by n(G), or more simply n when the graph under consideration is obvious, while the cardinality
of its edge set is the size of G, denoted m(G) or m. An (n,m)-graph has order n and size m.
A graph is often represented by a diagram in which each vertex is represented by a point and
each edge e = uv is represented by a line or curve joining the points corresponding to u and
v. To illustrate the concepts introduced above, consider the graph G1 defined by the vertex set
V (G1) = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5} and edge set E(G1) = {v1v2, v1v3, v2v3, v3v4} shown in Figure 2.1.
The graph G1 has order n = 5 and size m = 4. The vertices v1 and v3 are the only vertices
adjacent to vertex v2. The edges v1v2 and v2v3 are adjacent edges.
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
Figure 2.1: The graph G1.
A subgraph of a graph G is a graph all of whose vertices belong to V (G) and all of whose edges
belong to E(G). If H is a subgraph of G then we write H ⊆ G. If a subgraph H of G contains
all the vertices of G, then H is called a spanning subgraph of G. For example, the graphs shown
in Figure 2.2 are all subgraphs of G1, but only G1.3 is a spanning subgraph of G1.
v1
v2
v3
(a) G1.1
v1
v2
v3
v4
(b) G1.2
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
(c) G1.3
Figure 2.2: Subgraphs of the graph G1.
Let v be a vertex of a graph G. The degree of v is the number of edges of G incident with v
and is denoted by dG(v), or simply d(v) if G is clear from the context. The minimum degree of
G, denoted by δ(G), is the minimum degree among all the vertices of G, while the maximum
degree of G, denoted by ∆(G), is the maximum degree among all the vertices of G. A vertex is
called odd or even depending on whether its degree is odd or even. A vertex of G with degree
0 is called an isolated vertex (while also being considered even) and a vertex of degree 1 is
an end-vertex of G. To illustrate these concepts, again consider the graph G1 in Figure 2.1.
The minimum degree and maximum degree of G1 are δ(G1) = 0 and ∆(G1) = 3, respectively.
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The vertex v4 is an end-vertex of G1 while v5 is an isolated vertex of G1. The vertex v1 of G1
has degree d(v1) = 2.
In a graph G, the open neighbourhood of a vertex v ∈ V (G) is the set of all vertices adjacent
to v, denoted by N(v) = {u|u ∈ V (E) and uv ∈ E(G)}. The closed neighbourhood of a vertex
v ∈ V (G) is its open neighbourhood together with the vertex v itself, denoted N [v] = N(v) ∪
{v}. The sets of vertices {v1, v3} and {v1, v2, v3} are the open and the closed neighbourhoods,
respectively, of the vertex v2 of the graph G1.
The degree distribution P of a graph is the function where P (k) the fraction of nodes in the
graph with degree k. The graph G1 in Figure 2.1 has degree distribution
P (k) =

1/5 if k = 0,
1/5 if k = 1,
2/5 if k = 2,
1/5 if k = 3,
0 otherwise.
2.1.2 Special graphs
Certain graphs occur often in various applications, including modelling games on graphs. In
this section a number of these graphs and their respective notations are described.
A graph G is called r-regular or regular of degree r if the degree of every vertex of G is r. A
graph is regular if it is r-regular for some r ∈ N0. A 3-regular graph is also sometimes called a
cubic graph. An example of a cubic graph is the graph G2 shown in Figure 2.3(a).
(a) G2 (b) K5 (c) K5 (d) K5,3
Figure 2.3: Examples of special graphs. (a) A 3-regular graph, (b) the complete graph K5, (c) the
empty graph K5 and (d) the complete bipartite graph K5,3.
A complete graph or clique is a graph in which every two distinct vertices are adjacent. A
complete graph of order n is denoted by Kn and is also sometimes called an n-clique. A
complete graph of order n has size
m =
(
n
2
)
=
n(n− 1)
2
.
The empty graph is a graph containing no edges. An empty graph of order n is denoted by Kn.
Consider, as examples, the complete graph K5 shown in Figure 2.3(b) and the empty graph K5
shown in Figure 2.3(c).
A bipartite graph is a graph whose vertex set can be partitioned into two disjoint sets, V1 and V2
(called partite sets), in such a way that each edge of the graph joins a vertex of V1 to a vertex of
V2. Hence there is no adjacency amongst vertices of the same partite set. A complete bipartite
is a bipartite graph with partite sets V1 and V2 having the added property that every vertex of
V1 is adjacent to every vertex of V2. If |V1| = r and |V2| = s, such a graph is denoted by Kr,s.
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(a) C6〈1〉 (b) C8〈1, 2〉 (c) C8〈4〉
Figure 2.4: Examples of circulants.
A complete bipartite graph of the form K1,s is called a star, while a complete bipartite graph
Kn,n is called an n-biclique. An example of the complete bipartite graph, namely the graph
K5,3, is shown in Figure 2.3(d).
The circulant Cn〈i1, . . . , iz〉 is defined as a graph of order n with vertex set
V (Cn〈i1, . . . , iz〉) = {v0, . . . , vn−1}
and edge set
E(Cn〈i1, . . . , iz〉) =
{
vαv(α+β) (mod n)|α ∈ {0, ..., n− 1} and β ∈ {i1, . . . , iz}
}
where 1 ≤ z < n and 1 ≤ i1, . . . , iz ≤ n − 1 are z distinct integers. The graph may be drawn
by arranging the vertex set {v0, . . . , vn−1} on the edge of an imaginary circle and then joining,
by means of an edge, every j-th vertex to the (j + i)-th vertex for each i ∈ {i1, . . . , iz} [54, 58].
Examples of circulants are shown in Figure 2.4.
2.1.3 Operations on graphs
In the following definitions it is assumed that F and H are two graphs with disjoint vertex sets.
The union G = F ∪H of two graphs F and H has vertex set V (G) = V (F )∪V (H) and edge set
E(G) = E(F ) ∪E(H). A graph G consisting of k (≥ 2) disjoint copies of a graph H is written
as G = kH.
The cartesian product G = F ×H of F and H has vertex set V (H) = V (F ) × V (H) and two
vertices (u1, u2) and (v1, v2) are adjacent if and only if either u1 = v1 and u2v2 ∈ E(H), or
u2 = v2 and u1v1 ∈ E(F ). An example of the cartesian product of two graphs is shown in
Figure 2.5.
(a) G3 (b) G4 (c) G3 ×G4
Figure 2.5: The Cartesian product of two graphs.
The complement G of a graph has vertex set V (G) = V (G) and edge set E(G) such that an
edge in G joins two vertices if and only if the vertices are not adjacent in G. The graph G1 and
its complement G1 are shown in Figure 2.6.
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v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
(a) G1
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
(b) G1
Figure 2.6: The graph G1 and its compliment G1.
2.1.4 Connectivity
A u-v walk in a graph G is a finite, alternating sequence of vertices and edges of G that begins
with the vertex u and ends with the vertex v, and in which each edge in the sequence joins
the vertex that precedes it in the sequence with the vertex which follows it in the sequence.
The number of edges in the walk is called the length of the walk. Edges and vertices may be
repeated in a walk. A path is a walk with the restriction that if an edge or a vertex occurs in
the sequence, it occurs only once. Two vertices u and v are connected if u = v, or if u 6= v and
a u-v path exists in G. The edges are often omitted when indicating a path, since the edges
are implied. Consider, as an example, the v1-v3 path v1, v6, v5, v3 of length 3 contained in the
graph G5 shown in Figure 2.7.
v3 v2 v1
v4 v5 v6
Figure 2.7: The graph G5.
A u-v walk is closed if u = v and open otherwise. A closed walk in which all the edges are
unique is a closed trail. A closed trail which contains at least three vertices is called a circuit.
A circuit in which no vertices are repeated (except the first and the last) is called a cycle. The
length of a cycle is the number of edges in the cycle. A cycle of length n is also sometimes called
an n-cycle, while a 3-cycle is sometimes called a triangle. A cycle is even if its length is even,
or odd otherwise. A graph is called acyclic if it contains no cycles. For example, the graph G5
in Figure 2.7 is not acyclic and contains the even cycle v2, v3, v4, v5, v2 of length 4.
A graph G is connected if there exists a path in G between any two of its vertices, and is
disconnected otherwise. Every disconnected graph can be partitioned into a number of connected
subgraphs, called components. A component of a graph G is therefore a maximal connected
subgraph of G. The number of components of G is denoted by k(G). Note that k(G) = 1 if
and only if G is connected. The distance dG(u, v) between two vertices u and v in a connected
graph G is the minimum of the lengths of the u-v paths of G. As an example of these concepts
consider the graph G5 in Figure 2.7. There is a v1-v3 path in G5, the vertices v1 and v3 are
thus connected with the distance between them dG5(v1, v3) = 2. The graph G5 is a connected
graph, while the graph G1 in Figure 2.6(a) is disconnected, containing k(G1) = 2 components.
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2.1.5 Isomorphisms
If H can be obtained from G by relabelling the vertices, then H and G are said to be isomor-
phic, written G ∼= H. Stated alternatively, G and H are isomorphic if there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the vertices of G and those of H such that an edge joins any pair of
vertices in G if and only if an edge joins the corresponding pair of vertices in H. An isomor-
phism is a one-to-one mapping φ from V (G) onto V (H) such that φ preserves adjacency, that
is uv ∈ E(G) if and only if φ(u)φ(v) ∈ E(H). If two graphs are not isomorphic, then they are
non-isomorphic, written G  H. The graphs G6 and G7, shown in Figure 2.8, are isomorphic
and the mapping φ : V (G6) 7→ V (G7) defined by
φ(v1) = u1, φ(v2) = u2, φ(v3) = u3, φ(v4) = u4, φ(v5) = u5
is an isomorphism from V (G6) to V (G7). An isomorphism between a graph G and itself is called
an automorphism of G.
v3v4
v1 v2
v5
(a) G6
u4 u3
u5
u2
u1
(b) G7
Figure 2.8: Two isomorphic graphs.
2.1.6 Directed graphs
A directed graph, or digraph, is a finite non-empty set of objects, called vertices, together with
a (possibly empty) set of ordered pairs of distinct vertices of D, called arcs (or directed edges).
The definitions made for graphs extend naturally to digraphs. The order m and size n of a
digraph D is the cardinality of its vertex set V (G) and arc set E(G), respectively. The digraph
D1 shown in Figure 2.9 has order m = 5 and size n = 5.
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
(a) D1 (b) G1
Figure 2.9: The digraph D1 and its underlying graph G1.
An arc (u, v) of a digraph D is said to be incident from u and incident to v. Furthermore, u
is adjacent to v and v is adjacent from u. The outdegree of a vertex v in D is the number of
vertices adjacent from v, and the indegree of v is the number of vertices adjacent to v. For
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example, in Figure 2.9 the vertex v3 of the digraph D1 is adjacent to v4, adjacent from v2, has
an outdegree of 1 and an indegree of 3.
For each digraph D, there is an associated graph G called the underlying graph of D. The
underlying graph G of D has the same vertex set as that of D and is obtained by removing the
directions from all the arcs, or equivalently replacing each arc (u, v) by an edge uv. The digraph
D1 and its underlying graph G1 are shown in Figure 2.9.
A directed u-v walk in a digraph D is a finite, alternating sequence u0, a1, u1, a2, . . . , uk−1, ak−1,
uk of vertices and arcs that begin with the vertex u and ends with the vertex v, such that
ai = (ui−1, ui) for all i = 1, . . . , k. Again it is possible to omit the arcs from the specification
of a u-v walk since the arcs are implied. A directed path in a graph is a directed walk with the
restriction that if an arc or a vertex occurs in the sequence, it occurs only once. The digraph
D1 in Figure 2.9 contains the path v1, v2, v3, v4.
A digraph D is called symmetric, if whenever (u, v) is an arc of D, then (v, u) is also an arc of
D, while D is called asymmetric if whenever (u, v) is an arc of D, then (u, v) is not an arc of
D. Note that a digraph can therefore be neither symmetric nor asymmetric.
2.1.7 Pseudographs and multigraphs
When there is more than one edge between some pair of vertices, the structure is called a
multigraph. Two or more edges in a multigraph that join the same pair of vertices are called
parallel edges. A loop is an edge that joins a vertex to itself. A graph containing loops (and/or
parallel edges) is called a pseudograph. A pseudodigraph is defined in a similar fashion, but with
directed edges. An example of each a multigraph, a pseudograph and a pseudodigraph is shown
in Figure 2.10.
(a) A multigraph (b) A pseudograph (c) A pseudodigraph
Figure 2.10: Different generalisations of graphs.
2.1.8 Trees
A connected graph that contains no cycles is called a tree. A forest is a graph that has no
cycles. Each component of a forest is therefore a tree. An end-vertex of a tree is called a leaf. In
Figure 2.11, the graphs T1 and T2 are trees, while F1 is a forest consisting of two components.
(a) T1 (b) T2 (c) F1
Figure 2.11: Examples of trees and forests.
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A directed tree is an asymmetric digraph for which the underlying graph is a tree. A directed
tree T with a vertex r such that, for every vertex v 6= r, there exists a directed r-v path T ,
is called a rooted tree. The vertex r is called the root of the tree. When representing rooted
trees graphically the root is usually placed at the top, labelled as the only vertex at level 0,
the vertices adjacent from the root are then placed below the root at level 1, and so forth. The
height of the tree is the largest integer h for which there are vertices at level h. Since all arcs
are directed downwards, the arrows indicating the direction of the arcs may be omitted. The
tree T3 shown in Figure 2.12 is a rooted tree in which the vertex v1 is the root. This rooted tree
has height h = 4.
v1
v2
v3 v4
v5 v6
v7
v8
v9
v10
v11
v12
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Figure 2.12: The rooted tree T3.
In a rooted tree T , a vertex u adjacent to a vertex v is called the parent of v and the vertex v
is a child of u. A vertex w ∈ V (T ) is a descendant of u if there exists a directed u-w path in
T . In such a case u is called an ancestor of w. To demonstrate these concepts, consider once
again the tree T3 in Figure 2.12. The vertex v7 is an ancestor of v9, but not of v3. The vertices
v9, v12, v10 are all descendants of v8. The vertex v2 is the parent of its two child vertices v3 and
v4.
2.1.9 Edge and vertex weighted graphs
An edge-weighted graph is a graph in which each edge e is assigned a positive real number, called
the weight of e. The weight of an edge e is denoted by wG(e) or simply by w(e) if the graph G
is clear from the context. Similarly, a vertex-weighted graph is a graph in which each vertex has
v3
v1
v4
v5
v2
v6
2.1
1.1
0.5 4.0
2.1 4.0
3.0
1.0 0.0
(a) G8
2.3 1.0 5.3
1.2 4.02.1
(b) G9
Figure 2.13: (a) The edge-weighted graph G8. (b) The vertex weighted graph G9.
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been assigned a weight. Examples of an edge-weighted graph and a vertex-weighted graph are
shown in Figure 2.13.
2.2 A primer in group theory
This section contains an introduction to some basic concepts from group theory in order to
facilitate a description of the work presented later in this thesis.
2.2.1 What is a group?
A group is a set G together with a binary operation ◦ : G × G → G that satisfies the following
four properties:
1. For any two elements g, h ∈ G, g ◦ h ∈ G (closure).
2. For any three elements g, h, k ∈ G, (g ◦ h) ◦ k = g ◦ (h ◦ k) (associativity).
3. There exists a unique identity element ι ∈ G such that, for all g ∈ G, g ◦ ι = ι ◦ g = g
(identity).
4. For every element g ∈ G there exists a unique element h ∈ G, called the inverse of g, such
that h ◦ g = g ◦ h = ι (inverses).
For the sake of brevity the expression h ◦ g is abbreviated as hg. An abelian group (G, ◦) is a
group satisfying ab = ba for any two elements a and b of G. The order of G, denoted |G|, is the
number of elements contained in G. The order, n, of an element g in G is the smallest natural
number n for which gn = ι, if such a number n exists, where gn = g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ g (n factors). If
such a number n does not exist, then g has infinite order, written n =∞. It is well known that
for a finite group G, the order |g| of each g ∈ G divides |G| [27, Corollary on p. 78].
The set of integers Z4 = {0, 1, 2, 3}, together with the binary operation of addition modulo 4,
is an example of an abelian group of order 4. The result of taking any two elements of Z4 and
adding them together modulo 4 is again an element of Z4; as an example 3 + 2 = 1 (mod 4).
The associative law holds for addition and therefore also for addition modulo 4. The identity
element is 0 and there exists a unique element b for each member a of Z4 such that ab = 0 given
by b = 4− a.
The Cayley table of a group (G,◦) of order n is an n× n table for which the rows and columns
are indexed by the elements of G and for which the entry at the intersection of the row indexed
by a and the column indexed by b is the group product ab. The Cayley table of the group
(Z4,+) is given in Table 2.1 as an example.
+ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 2 3 0
2 2 3 0 1
3 3 0 1 2
Table 2.1: The Cayley table of the group (Z4,+).
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A group G with identity element ι is said to act on set a X if, for each element g in G, there is an
associated map pig from X into X such that piι(x) = x for every x in X and pihg = pih(pig(x)) for
every g, h in G and for every x in X [27]. The natural action of G on X is defined by pig(x) = g(x)
for each x in X , where G is a group symmetries of a euclidean space E and X is a set of points
of E [27]. Let G be a group acting on a set X . If g(x) = x for some x ∈ X and g ∈ G, it is said
that x is fixed by g.
2.2.2 Symmetry groups
Symmetry groups are considered in this section within the context of two-dimensional euclidean
geometry. An isometry is a mapping between metric spaces that preserves distances. An
isometry that maps a set of points to itself is called a symmetry for that set of points. As an
example, consider a square with its centre at the origin and corner points at (1, 1), (1,−1),
(−1, 1) and (−1,−1). The square has eight symmetries: clockwise rotations by 90◦, 180◦and
270◦, reflections in the horizontal, vertical and two diagonal axes and the identity that maps
every point in the plane to itself. Let ρ denote a counter clockwise rotation of 90◦about the
origin, let σ be the reflection in the x-axis and let ι be the identity mapping. Then the set
of symmetries, {ι, ρ, ρ2, ρ3, σ, σρ, σρ2, σρ3}, of the square forms a symmetry group, often
denoted by D4. It holds in general that the set symmetries of a regular n-polygon forms a
symmetry group called a dihedral group, which is denoted by Dn.
A proof of the following well-known theorem may be found in [27, Theorem on p. 92].
Theorem 2.1 (Frobenius-Cauchy lemma, also known as Burnside’s lemma) If a group
G acts on a set X , then the number of equivalence classes into which X is partitioned by the
action of G is the given by
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|,
where Fg = {x ∈ X |pig(x) = x} is the set of elements of X fixed by g.
As an example of how to apply the Frobenius-Cauchy lemma, consider counting the number
of ways of colouring the four cells of a 2 × 2 checkerboard using two colours. The group D4
acts on the colourings. The identity is a symmetry of all the possible colourings, therefore
|Fι| = 24. The operation ρ maps the first cell to the position of the second, the second to the
position of the third and the third to the position of the fourth. For ρ to be a symmetry, all
cells must be the same colour, so that |Fρ| = 21. Consider next those colourings that have ρ2
as a symmetry. The positions of the first and third cells are interchanged by ρ2 and hence have
to be the same colour. The positions of second and the fourth cells are also interchanged by ρ2
and hence they too must have to be the same colours. There are thus 22 colourings that have ρ2
as a symmetry, and so |Fρ2 | = 22. The symmetries of the remaining actions may be calculated
in a similar fashion with the result |Fι| = 24, |Fρ| = 21, |Fρ2 | = 22, |Fρ3 | = 21, |Fσ| = 22,
|Fσρ| = 22, |Fσρ2 | = 23 and |Fσρ3 | = 23. It follows by the Frobenius-Cauchy lemma that there
are 18(16 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8) = 6 ways of colouring a 2×2 checkerboard with two colours.
The six colourings are shown in Figure 2.14.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.3. Generating functions and the transform matrix method 15
(a) (b)
Figure 2.14: (a) A 2 × 2 checkerboard. (b) The six colourings of a 2 × 2 checkerboard, which has D4
as a symmetry group.
2.3 Generating functions and the transform matrix method
This section contains a basic introduction to and definitions related to generating functions in
order to facilitate a description of the work presented later in this thesis.
2.3.1 What is a generating function?
The generating function for a sequence 〈ai〉 = a1, a2, a3, . . . is the power series F (x) in an
indeterminate x with the sequence as its coefficients [27], that is
F (x) =
∞∑
n=0
anx
n.
If a generating function F (x) can be written as the ratio of two polynomials, that is F (x) =
P (x)Q−1(x), then F (x) is called a rational generating function. As an example, (1 + x)n is a
rational generating function for the sequence
(
n
0
)
,
(
n
1
)
,
(
n
3
)
, . . . ,
(
n
n
)
, 0, 0, . . .
2.3.2 The transfer matrix method
A method for determining the number of directed walks of a length n in a directed graph is
described in this section. The method is called the transfer matrix method [50].
A recurrence relation for a sequence 〈ai〉 is a formula that defines an in terms of a0, a1, . . . , an−1
for all n greater than some k [27]. The terms a0, a1, . . . , ak are called the initial conditions. A
linear recurrence relation is an equation of the form an = c1an−1 + c2an−2 + · · ·+ cdan−d, where
c1, c2, . . . , cd ∈ R for some d ∈ N not exceeding n. It is well known that the generating function
of a sequence is rational if and only if the sequence is a linear recursive sequence, as stated in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 ([50], Theorem 4.1.1) Let α1, α2, . . . , αd ∈ R with αd 6= 0 and d ≥ 1. The
following statements are equivalent:
1.
∑∞
n=0 anx
n = P (x)Q(x) where Q(x) = 1 + α1x + α2x
2 + · · · + αdxd and P (x) is a polynomial
in x of degree less than d.
2. For all n ≥ 0, an+d + α1an+d−1 + α2an+d−2 + · · ·+ αdan = 0.
3. For all n ≥ 0, an =
∑k
i=1 Pi(n)λ
n
i , where 1+α1x+α2x
2+ · · ·+αdxd = Πki=1(1−λix)di, the
λ’s are distinct, and Pi(n) is a polynomial in n of degree less than di for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
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The result of the following lemma allows for the enumeration of the number of paths of length
n between two vertices of a digraph.
Lemma 2.2 ([50], Theorem 4.7.1) Let A be the adjacency matrix of digraph D.1 The entry
(An)ij is the number of walks of length n starting at vertex vi and ending at vertex vj.
Proof: It follows from the definition of matrix multiplication that
(An)ij =
∑
Aii1Ai1i2 · · ·Ain−1j ,
where the sum is over all sequences (i1, . . . , in−1). The summand is 1 if vivi1vi2 · · · vin−1vj is a
directed walk from vi to vj and 0 otherwise. 
The next lemma provides an explicit formula for determining the generating function that counts
the number of closed walks in a digraph. The proof of the lemma makes use of the identity
∞∑
n=1
(ax)n =
ax
1− ax,
where |ax| < 1.
Lemma 2.3 ([50], Theorem 4.7.3) Let CD(n) be the number of closed walks in the digraph
D of length n. Then ∑
n≥1
CD(n)x
n =
−xQ′(x)
Q(x)
,
where Q(x) = det(I − xA).
Proof: By Lemma 2.2, CD(n) =
∑p
i=1(A
n)ii = tr A
n. Let ω1, ω2, . . . , ωq be the non-zero
eigenvalues of A. Then tr An = ωn1 + ω
n
2 + · · ·+ ωnq and it follows that
∞∑
n=1
CD(n)x
n =
∞∑
n=1
ωn1x
n +
∞∑
n=1
ωn2x
n + · · ·+
∞∑
n=1
ωnq λ
n
=
ω1x
1− ω1x +
ω2x
1− ω2x + · · ·+
ωqx
1− ωqx
=
ω1x(1− ω2x) · · · (1− ωqx) + · · ·+ ωqx(1− ω1x) · · · (1− ωq−1x)
(1− ω1x)(1− ω2x) · · · (1− ωqx)
=
−xQ′(x)
Q(x)
. 
It follows by Lemmas 2.1 and 2.3 that there exists a recurrence relation for the number of
directed walks in a digraph. Consider, as an example, the digraph D2, shown in Figure 2.15,
with associated adjacency matrix
A =

0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
 .
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v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
Figure 2.15: The digraph D2.
The number of closed walks of length n may be enumerated by finding the associated generating
function. Taking Q(x) = det(I−xA) = 1−x2−x3, it follows by Lemma 2.3 that the generating
function is given by F (x) = −x(−2x−3x
2)
1−x2−x3 =
2x2+3x3
1−x2−x3 . The Taylor expansion of this generating
function is F (x) = 2x2+3x3+2x4+5x5+5x6+ . . . The coefficient of the term xn is the number
of closed walks of length n. There are thus two closed walks of length 4; they are v3, v4, v3, v4, v3
and v4, v3, v4, v3, v4. By Lemma 2.1 the recurrence relation is given by an = an−2 + an−3 with
the initial conditions a1 = 0, a2 = 2, a3 = 3.
2.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, various basic mathematical concepts were reviewed. In §2.1, some fundamentals
from graph theory were considered, including basic terminology in graph theory, various types
of graphs and a number of operations on graphs. §2.2 contained a brief introduction to some
basic concepts from group theory. The Frobenius-Cauchy lemma, in particular, is a very useful
tool in enumerative combinatorics as will become evident in later chapters. The concept of a
generating function was introduced in §2.3. Generating functions may be used to enumerate
the number of directed walks of a certain length in a digraph. The concepts introduced in this
chapter form the mathematical building blocks for the work that is to follow later in this thesis.
1Aij = 1 if (vi, vj) is an element of E(D), or Aij = 0 otherwise.
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The literature related to game theory, evolutionary game theory and games on graphs is reviewed
in this chapter. The first section concerns classical game theory. A brief historical account of
the development of game theory is given and important concepts and terminology are defined.
In the second section the focus is on the literature related to important concepts in evolutionary
game theory. In this section the development of the field of evolutionary game theory and
important results in this field are discussed. The third section concerns the prisoner’s dilemma
and its variations.
3.1 Classical game theory
Game theory is a subdiscipline of operations research concerned with modelling and predicting
the behaviour of decision makers, also called players, when facing the problem of selecting
19
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strategies from a set of alternatives [11]. These strategy decisions affect other players’ choices
and the resulting interactions are analysed from a rational point of view. A player’s strategy
determines the choices a player will make for any given scenario in a game. Each player in a
game receives a pay-off, determined by the strategy employed in the game by the player himself
and all other players involved in the game. Each player typically seeks to select his strategy
in such a way as to maximise his own expected pay-off. Fields in which game theory is often
applied include economics, political science, tactical and strategic military science, computer
science and evolutionary biology.
3.1.1 A brief history of classical game theory
Originally, game theoretical analyses focused on a class of simple, strictly competitive games,
more commonly known as two-person zero-sum games [11]. Chess and two-sided poker are
examples of strictly competitive games in this class. In these games there is no point in coop-
eration; if one outcome is preferred to another by one player, then the preference is reversed
for the other player. Although strictly competitive games seem inappropriate for applications
to economic and political scenarios, concepts and results in the literature related to this simple
class of games have become the cornerstone of general game theory [11].
The extensive form of the game was introduced in 1928 by von Neumann [53] and later gener-
alised by Kuhn [26]. Other concepts developed during these early stages of game theory are the
fundamental concepts of strategy, the strategic form of a game, mixed strategies and individ-
ual rationality [11]. The strategic form, often represented as a pair of matrices for two-person
games, is considered one of the most significant contributions to game theory [11].
Zermelo’s Theorem, published in 1913 [60], is considered the first theorem of Game Theory [11].
The original article was published in German, which led to contradictory statements in the
English literature as to what Zermelo claimed in his proof. In his paper, Zermelo considered two-
person zero-sum games based on perfect information and without stochastic strategic elements,
called moves [45]. The games considered allow only a finite number of positions, but potentially
infinite sequences of moves. Zermelo formalised what is meant by a winning position as the non-
emptiness of a certain set containing all possible sequences of moves such that a player wins
independently of how the other player plays. Zermelo went on to prove, given that a player is in
a winning position, that it will never take more moves than there are positions available for that
player to win the game. The statement was proved by means of contradiction. Zermelo used
chess to illustrate his proofs. Although he proved that chess is a strictly determined game1, the
proof does not construct the winning strategy.
The Minimax Theorem is another corner stone theorem in game theory. The theorem was
first proved by von Neumann [11, 53]. According to the Minimax Theorem, every two-person
zero-sum game with finitely many pure strategies for each player is determined. When mixed
strategies are allowed, the game has precisely one individually rational pay-off vector [11]. The
Minimax Theorem paved the way for the well-known notion of a Nash-equilibrium [33]. In zero-
sum games the so-called minimax solution is the same as the Nash-equilibrium. The prediction
of the minimax theory was confirmed experimentally in [40] where the authors showed that, on
average, human players played as predicted by the Minimax Theorem, but with high variability
among players.
1A strictly determined game is a two-player zero-sum game that has at least one Nash-equilibrium, also
sometimes called a strategic equilibrium.
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A solution concept is a function that associates sets of outcomes with games. Solution concepts
are often indicators of how a player may play in a game, but not necessarily predictions of the
outcome of a game [11]. In the case of zero-sum games there is an easy answer to the question
of what the solution is, namely the unique individually rational solution, but in most other
cases there is not a unique solution to a game. Different solutions may be proposed for a game,
depending on the assumptions made.
The 1950s was an exciting period for game theory [11]. John Nash laid the groundwork for the
general non-cooperative theory and for cooperative bargaining, while Al Tucker formulated the
prisoner’s dilemma. Towards the end of the decade the first studies of repeated games appeared.
The 1980s saw the rise of game theory applied to biology. John Maynard Smith had a significant
impact on the field when it was in its infancy [28, 29, 30]. Ordinary utility maximising rationality
is easier to observe in animals and even plants than in human beings [11]. As an example, rats are
found to perform better than humans in a probability matching experiment. In the experiment
the subject must predict the outcome of a binary event, where each event occurs with a certain
probability. The rational solution would be to always pick the variable that is most likely to
occur. While rats are not especially advanced, they were found to predict the correct event
significantly more often than humans [11].
3.1.2 Representing games
In classical game theory, two key assumptions are (1) that players are perfectly rational and
(2) that this is common knowledge. Perfectly rational players have full knowledge of their
own and their opponents’ potential strategies and pay-off values, they always act in a way to
maximize their own pay-off, and are able to deduce the best way to play the game no matter
how complex the computations required to do so may be. Common knowledge implies that all
players know that all players are rational, and all players know that all players know that all
players are rational, and so on.
A game in classical game theory consists of a finite number of players, a (possibly unique)
strategy space for each player, and a set of rules that determines the pay-off that each player
receives at the end of the game.
Let Σi = {s(i)1 , . . . , s(i)mi} be the set of strategies available to player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In the
strategic form of a game, a pay-off pii(s
(1)
j1
, . . . , s
(N)
jN
) is associated with each possible profile
S = (s
(1)
j1
, . . . , s
(N)
jN
) of strategies, where s
(i)
ji
∈ Σi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, to form a pay-off profile
Π(S) = (pi1(S), . . . , piN (S)).
The strategic form of a two-person game is often represented as a pair of matrices. Consider a
game with two players, p1 and p2, and with strategy sets Σ1 and Σ2. If m1 is the number of
strategies in Σ1 and m2 is the number of strategies in Σ2, then the m1×m2 pay-off matrix M1
for player p1 is formed by labelling the rows by means of the elements of Σ1 and the columns by
means of the elements of Σ2. The entry in the row labelled s
(1)
i ∈ Σ1 and the column labelled
s
(2)
j ∈ Σ2 is defined to be pi1(s(1)i , s(2)j ). The pay-off matrixM2 for player p2 is formed in a similar
fashion. Table 3.1 shows the matrix representation, called the strategic form, for an example of
a two-person game. In this example, the strategies available to p1 are Σ1 = {s(1)1 , s(1)2 , s(1)3 } and
those available to player p2 are Σ2 = {s(2)1 , s(2)2 , s(2)3 , s(2)4 }. If p1 plays strategy s(1)2 and p2 plays
s
(2)
4 then the pay-off to player p1 is M1(2, 4) = 1 and the pay-off to player p2 is M2(4, 2) = 3.
A two-player game may be succinctly represented by merging the two matrices above into a
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
22 Chapter 3. Literature review
M1 s
(2)
1 s
(2)
2 s
(2)
3 s
(2)
4
s
(1)
1 1 1 5 1
s
(1)
2 2 4 2 1
s
(1)
3 4 3 1 1
(a) The pay-off matrix for player p1.
M2 s
(1)
1 s
(1)
2 s
(1)
3
s
(2)
1 3 1 1
s
(2)
2 2 5 3
s
(2)
3 4 3 1
s
(2)
4 1 3 1
(b) The pay-off matrix for
player p2.
Table 3.1: An example of a game in strategic form.
single bimatrix. Let B be the m1 ×m2 bimatrix representation of a game. Then each entry bij
of B is an ordered pair of numbers. The entries of this ordered pair represent the pay-offs to
the two players, p1 and p2, playing the strategy profile represented by row i and column j of
the bimatrix. The game shown in Table 3.1 is presented in bimatrix form in Table 3.2.
B s
(2)
1 s
(2)
2 s
(2)
3 s
(2)
4
s
(1)
1 (1,3) (1,2) (5,4) (1,1)
s
(1)
2 (2,1) (4,5) (2,3) (1,3)
s
(1)
3 (4,1) (3,3) (1,1) (1,1)
Table 3.2: The game of Table 3.1 in bimatrix strategic form.
The extensive form representation of a game consists of a rooted tree. Each vertex of the tree
represents a possible state of the game and each edge represents an event. An event may either
be a move by a player or a stochastic event. The extensive form provides a complete formal
description of how the game is played, specifying the sequence in which the players move, what
they know at the times when they must move, how stochastic events are managed, and the pay-
off to each player at the end of the game. Although the extensive form is especially convenient
for representing a game consisting of sequential moves, it may also be used to describe games
allowing simultaneous moves. The information set S of a player P is a set of vertices with the
property that at a certain point in the game P knows that his position is described by one of
the vertices in S, but does not know which one. When drawing the game tree, vertices in the
same information set are connected by edges drawn as dashed lines.
Example 3.1 The well-known prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is often presented in the form of the
following parable [56]. Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police, having insufficient
evidence to secure a conviction, decide to offer each prisoner the same deal. Each prisoner is
told that if he testifies, while the other remains silent, he will be free to go, while the silent
accomplice will receive the full sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners will be sentenced
to a short term in jail for a minor charge. However, if each betrays the other, the sentence
will be shared between the prisoners, in which case each will receive a medium sentence. Each
prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. If each prisoner is assured that
the other would not know about the betrayal, if such a betrayal were to occur, before the end of
the investigation, the dilemma is that each prisoner should decide on a strategy to proceed.
The prisoner’s dilemma, attributed by [11] to A.W. Tucker, is therefore a two-person non-zero
sum game. A player has the option to play one of two strategies, either to cooperate with the
other (i.e. to remain silent), denoted by C, or to defect (i.e. to betray the other prisoner), denoted
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by D. Traditionally the pay-off parameters are named as follows: P , the punishment for mutual
defection; T , the temptation to defect; S, the sucker’s pay-off; and R, the reward for mutual
cooperation. The normal form of the game is given in Table 3.3 with the constraints on the
pay-off values T > R > P > S. The ‘dilemma’ arises from the expected result of the game. If
a player expects his opponent to cooperate, then he can gain the maximum possible pay-off by
defecting. On the other hand, if the player expects his opponent to defect, it is better to settle
for the punishment, P , by defecting rather than cooperating, which would result in the smallest
pay-off, S. By each following this reasoning, both players eventually defect, while they could
have done much better had they both cooperated.2
[ C D
C (R,R) (S, T )
D (T, S) (P, P )
]
Table 3.3: The PD in bimatrix strategic form.
The extensive form representation of the game is given in Figure 3.1. The vertices corresponding
to the second player form an information set, reflecting the fact that the players make their
choices simultaneously. 
DC
1
D
(S, T )
C
(R,R)
2
D
(P, P )
C
(T, S)
2
Figure 3.1: The PD in extensive form.
3.1.3 Classifying games
Games are often classified according to their pay-off structures and the types of rules employed.
A cooperative game is a game in which all agreements, promises and threats are fully binding
and enforceable [11]. Communication between players is allowed in cooperative games, but not
in noncooperative games.
2Models incorporating the PD often use a subset of the complete parameter space in order to simplify the
analysis. Nowak and May [37], for example, employed a parametrisation which gives rise to the so-called weak
prisoner’s dilemma, with parameter values T = b,R = 1, S = 0 and P = 0.
The so-called cost benefit parameterisation has the pay-off received in the PD interpreted in terms of the cost
associated with cooperating and the benefit that an opponent will receive. Let c be the cost of cooperating in
the PD and b the benefit one would receive if one’s opponent cooperated. The pay-offs are then given by T = b,
R = b− c, P = 0 and S = −c, or in matrix form, as
[ C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
]
.
In the scaled prisoner’s dilemma parameterisation, on the other hand, the temptation prize is fixed at 0 and the
reward for cooperation at 1. The other two parameters, T and P , are allowed to vary within the bounds T > 1
and 0 < P < 1. This parameterisation proves useful in games played on regular lattices and games on lattices
where each player’s score is scaled by the number of games played. The scaled prisoner’s dilemma is discussed in
more detail in the next chapter.
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In a symmetric game the pay-off to a player playing a particular strategy depends only on
the strategies adopted by the other players in the game, not on who is playing any particular
strategy. A game is called asymmetric if it is not symmetric. If M is the pay-off matrix to
player p1 in a symmetric game with two players, then the transpose M
′ is the pay-off matrix
to player p2. The game given in extensive form in Figure 3.1 is a symmetric game; the entire
game may be represented in strategic form by a single matrix, as shown in Table 3.4.
C D
C R S
D T P
Table 3.4: The PD in matrix strategic form.
If the pay-offs to all the players in a game sum to zero for all strategies, the game is called
a zero-sum game. Zero-sum games model situations where there is a constant resource, and
decisions made by players do not increase or decrease the total available resource. In other
words, if pii is the pay-off to player Pi in an N -person zero-sum game, then
N∑
i=1
pii
(
s
(1)
j1
, . . . , s
(N)
jN
)
= 0
for all possible strategy profiles S = (s
(1)
j1
, . . . , s
(N)
jN
). If there are only two players in a zero-sum
game, then the one player’s pay-off is the negative of the other player’s pay-off.
As mentioned previously, players can perform their moves simultaneously or sequentially. In a
game with sequential moves, players have some knowledge of the decisions made by other players
during earlier moves of the game. The extensive form is often used to represent sequential games.
A game may also incorporate a combination of sequential and simultaneous events.
A game in which all players know exactly the state of the game and which decisions are made at
all times is called a game of perfect information. An example of a game of perfect information is
chess — both players know all the rules of the game and a player can observe all the moves made
by the other player. If a game is not of perfect information, then it is of imperfect information.
An example of a game of imperfect information is bridge — each player has limited knowledge
of the cards held by other players. In a game of complete information, on the other hand, every
player knows the strategies and pay-offs available to other players, but not necessarily their
actions [17].
It is often useful to allow a player to choose to play each of his strategies with a certain prob-
ability; this is called a mixed strategy. When mixed strategies are allowed, a player’s goal is to
find the probabilities with which each strategy will be chosen in order to maximise his expected
pay-off. A mixed strategy for a player i is an mi-tuple p
(i) = (p
(i)
1 , . . . , p
(i)
mi) of probabilities, that
is p
(i)
j > 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} and all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and
∑mi
j=1 p
(i)
j = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
A player playing mixed strategy p(i) will play strategy j with probability p
(i)
j at each play of
the game.
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3.1.4 Solution concepts
A solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. A strategy
s
(i)
j in the strategy set Σi of player Pi is said to be dominated by a strategy s
(i)
k ∈ Σi if
pii
(
s
(i)
j , S
′
)
> pii
(
s
(i)
k , S
′
)
for all strategy profiles S′ =
(
s
(1)
j1
, . . . , s
(i−1)
ji−1 , s
(i+1)
ji+1
, . . . , s
(N)
jN
)
. To
find a dominated strategy in a two-person game in strategic form, one has to look for a dominated
row in the matrix representation of the game. In the game in Table 3.1, strategy s
(2)
4 is, for
example, dominated by the strategy s
(2)
2 .
Rational players seeking to optimise their scores would not play dominated strategies, since
playing any other strategy will lead to a higher pay-off. In some cases it is possible to find a
solution to a game by simply eliminating all strictly dominated strategies. As an example, the
strategy C is dominated by the strategy D in the game shown in Table 3.4. One may thus
eliminate C as a possible solution, leaving D as the only remaining rational strategy. Note that
a rational strategy does not necessarily optimise the total score in a game; it merely ensures the
best-case scenario from a selfish perspective.
Eliminating dominated strategies may not always be sufficient to reach a single, unique solution;
further refinements may be required. A very famous game theoretic notion is that of the Nash-
equilibrium. In a game played by two or more players, a set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium
if no player can do any better by changing his strategy while the other players keep to the same
strategy. If the strategy profile (s
(1)
i , s
(2)
j ) is a Nash-equilibrium in a two-person game, then s
(1)
j
is said to be the best response to strategy s
(2)
j . It is possible for a game to have more than one
Nash equilibrium. As an example, consider the game in Table 3.2 which has two Nash equilibria,
namely (s
(1)
1 , s
(2)
3 ) and (s
(1)
2 , s
(2)
2 ).
Backward induction is a technique used to solve a game by reasoning backward from the end
of the game, eliminating all sub-optimal choices. Backward induction is based on the principle
that at every decision point the player makes an optimal choice.
Example 3.2 Suppose three politicians are voting on whether or not to give themselves a pay
raise. Each stands a chance to benefit from the pay raise by an amount b, but will face a small
resentment c from the voters if they vote for the pay raise. The three politicians vote sequentially
and it is assumed that the benefit of the pay raise exceeds to cost of voting for it. The extensive
form of the game is shown in Figure 3.2 [32].
To solve the game using backward induction, politician 3’s strategy is considered first. In the
case where the first two politicians split their vote, one politician votes yes and the other no, in
which case politician 3 votes yes, since this gives him a pay-off of b− c which is greater than 0,
the pay-off he would have received had he voted no. If both previous politicians voted yes, then
politician 3 achieves the best pay-off by voting no, receiving b as opposed to b − c had he voted
yes. If the first two politicians both voted no, then politician 3 will vote no, receiving a pay-off
of 0.
Next the best choice for politician two is considered. Politician 2 knows that politician 3 will
play as described above. He can thus reduce the original game to the one shown in Figure 3.3.
Now, if politician 1 votes yes, then the best option is for politician 2 to vote no, receiving a
pay-off of b. If, however, politician 1 votes no, politician 2 gains the best pay-off b− c by voting
yes.
Finally, politician 3 anticipates how politicians 2 and 3 will vote. If politician 1 votes yes,
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n
y
1
n
y
2
n
y
2
n (b− c, b− c, b)
y (b− c, b− c, b− c)
3
n (−c, 0, 0)
y (b− c, b, b− c)
3
n (0,−c, 0)
y (b, b− c, b− c)
3
n (0, 0, 0)
y (0, 0,−c)
3
Figure 3.2: A three-person game in extensive form.
n
y
1
n
y
2
n
y
2
n
(0, 0, 0)3
y
(b, b− c, b− c)3
y
(b− c, b, b− c)3
n
(b− c, b− c, b)3
Figure 3.3: The reduced form of the three-person game in Figure 3.2, illustrating the use of backward
induction.
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then politician two will vote no and politician 3 will vote yes, resulting in a pay-off of b − c to
politician 1. However, if politician 1 votes no, politician 2 will vote yes and politician 3 will
vote yes, giving politician 1 a pay-off of b. Thus, in the expected outcome of the game, politician
1 votes no and politicians 2 and 3 both vote yes. It is interesting to note that it is best to vote
first. 
A subgame is a part of a game which starts at a point in the game at which the entire history of
the game up to that point is common knowledge and contains all the successors of some initial
node [32]. For a part of a game to be a proper subgame, all information sets must be preserved.
That is, if any node in the subgame is part of an information set, then all other nodes contained
in the information set must also be part of the subgame. A set of strategies is a subgame perfect
Nash-equilibrium if, for every subgame, the restriction of those strategies to the subgame forms
a Nash-equilibrium of the subgame.
Consider, as an example, the game in Figure 3.4, which has the two Nash-equilibria (R,R′)
and (L,L′) [17]. The Nash-equilibrium (L,L′) exists because the best response of player 1 to
player 2 playing L′ is to end the game by playing L. The equilibrium relies on the threat by
player 2 to play strategy L′ rather than strategy R′ if given the opportunity. But player 2 playing
rationally would not carry out this threat if given the opportunity to do so. Such a move is
called a non-credible threat. Assuming that a rational player will never carry out a non-credible
threat, it is possible to eliminate Nash-equilibria which rely on non-credible threats from the
possible solutions of the game. The subgame starting at the node belonging to player 2 has
strategy R′ leading to the only Nash-equilibrium; for an equilibrium to be a subgame perfect it
has to contain the strategy R′. Therefore (L,L′) is a Nash-equilibrium which is not subgame
perfect.
RL
(1, 2)
1
R′
(2, 1)
L′
(0, 0)
2 L′ R′
L (1,2) (1,2)
R (0,0) (2,1)
Figure 3.4: Two representations of a two-person game. The game exhibits a non-credible threat.
3.1.5 Applications of classical game theory
Game theoretical analyses sometimes lead to surprising or counter-intuitive results. One such
example is Braess’ paradox [5, 6]. The paradox states that the addition of extra capacity to a
network in which the entities selfishly choose their routes can in certain cases reduce the overall
performance of the network. Consider, as an example, the road network represented by the
digraph shown in Figure 3.5 and suppose a total of 4 000 cars wish to traverse the digraph
from vertex 1 to vertex 4. Cars enter the network at vertex 1 and may then choose to head to
vertex 4 via either vertices 2 or 3. The time it takes to travel from vertex 1 to vertex 2 depends
on the number of drivers, x1, choosing this route and is given by
x1
100 . It takes a fixed time of 45
minutes to travel from vertex 2 to vertex 4 and similarly from vertex 1 to vertex 3. The total
time needed to travel to vertex 4 along the top route is therefore x1100 +45 minutes. Similarly, the
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bottom route takes 45 + x2100 minutes, where x2 is the number of drivers who choose to take the
bottom route. A rational driver will choose the quickest route. At equilibrium each route has
the same number of cars, namely 2 000, and the average travelling time is therefore 65 minutes.
Suppose a road is built between vertices 2 and 3 with negligible travelling time. All drivers at
vertex 1 will choose the top route as this has a worst-case travelling time of 40 minutes, which
is better than 45 minutes for the alternate route. Upon reaching vertex 2, all drivers will choose
the road from vertex 2 to vertex 3 and continue along the path from vertex 3 to vertex 4, which
again has a worst-case travelling time of 40 minutes. It therefore takes drivers an average of 80
minutes to complete the route after the addition of the extra travel route. This is an example
where the individual rational strategies do not result in a globally optimal outcome.
1
2
4
3
45
45
x2
100
x1
100
Figure 3.5: A graph representing a simplified road network, illustrating Braess’ paradox.
Braess’ paradox is not just a theoretical notion, but has been witnessed in action in real-world
road networks. The closure of the congested 42nd street in New York City was expected to
wreak havoc on the already congested roads of Manhattan. But, contrary to the expected
results, the traffic flow actually improved when the road was closed [25].
Tactical military problems presented one of the major application areas for game theory at the
beginning of the 1950s [11]. Haywood [22] demonstrated that, under certain conditions, the
decision doctrine used by the United States military is equivalent to finding minimax strategies.
The author used varies battles which occurred during the Second World War as case studies,
drawing parallels between the decision processes followed by the generals and the methods used
by game theorists. The battles were modelled as two-person zero-sum games. The emphasis of
applications of game theory later shifted to deterrence and cold war strategies [11]. The largest
area of application and the field of study with which game theory is most often associated is
economics [11]. It was with applications in economics in mind that von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [34] published their book which is often credited as the single work that marks the origin
of game theory as a field of study in its own right [11].
Game theory has been applied very successfully in biology. It was through inspiration from
applications in biology that evolutionary game theory emerged. Evolutionary game theory is,
however, no longer limited to biological applications only, but has found relevance in other fields
such as economics [2]. In biology, evolutionary game theory is used, for example, to investigate
the evolution of altruism and cooperation [14, 19, 28, 36, 52].
Some of the earliest appearances of notions from game theory in the field of biology, occurs in
[30] and [52]. Maynard Smith and Price [30] defined the important and well-known concept
of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as “a strategy such that, if most of the members of a
population adopt it, there is no ‘mutant’ strategy that would give a higher reproductive fitness.”
Maynard Smith and Price [30] used game theory to investigate conflict in animals, employing the
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Hawk-Dove game3 as analogy. It is witnessed in nature that animals often fight without harming
each other, e.g. snakes fighting without using their fangs, buck pushing antlers against antlers,
but refraining from attacking when their opponents turn away. Using game theory it is possible
explain the occurrence of adaptation which may have negative impact on the individual’s fitness
at face value.
3.2 Evolutionary game theory
In evolutionary game theory it is assumed that players have limited knowledge of the game
and only bounded rationality. Games in evolutionary game theory are repeated and players
are afforded the opportunity to adapt and learn as this repetition occurs. Evolutionary game
theory started out as a refinement of classical static games, but has progressed and now deals
more with dynamic games of adaptation.
3.2.1 Evolution and natural selection
Evolutionary game theory has its origins in biology and is inspired by evolution, as observed
in nature [19, 28]. In biology, evolution is described as the physical, genetic or behavioural
change in populations of organisms from generation to generation. Natural selection is the force
driving this change. A wide range of variation exists in organisms, both within and between
species. This variation has the effect that some organisms are better adapted at surviving and
producing offspring than others. If an individual exhibits a heritable characteristic which gives
it a reproductive advantage over its peers, then it is likely that this trait will become more
common in the population in future. The characteristics of an individual are encoded in its
genetic makeup. Genes are the most basic heritable units. It is the combination of genes that
gives each individual its unique phenotypical characteristics. Generally, an evolutionary process
combines two basic elements: a mutation mechanism that provides variety and a selection
mechanism that favours some varieties over others [57].
The fitness of an individual is its ability to survive and reproduce. Wright [59] was the first
to introduce the concept of a fitness landscape. A measure of fitness is plotted against gene
frequency. Fitness landscapes were originally considered to be fixed. However, with the aid
of game theory it is possible to consider a changing fitness landscape, where the fitness of a
gene depends on a variety of changing factors, such as the frequency of other genes. The book
by Vincent and Brown [56] contains a detailed discussion on evolutionary game theory and its
application to studying natural selection.
3.2.2 Evolving games
Vincent and Brown [55, 56] described a game in evolutionary game theory as having two parts,
an inner and outer game. The inner game is a game similar to games in classical game theory
and defines the available strategies and pay-offs players receive. The outer game describes the
game dynamics; this is where the pay-offs are translated into changes in strategy frequencies.
As described in [56], there are a number of key features distinguishing evolutionary game theory
from classical game theory. In classical game theory the focus is on the players who strive to
3This game will be elucidated later in the chapter.
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choose strategies that optimise their pay-offs, whereas in the evolutionary game the focus is on
strategies and how these strategies persist through time. Through birth and death processes
the players can come and go, but their strategies pass on from generation to generation. In
classical game theory, players choose their strategies from a well-defined strategy set given as
part of the game definition. In evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, players generally
inherit their strategies and occasionally acquire a novel strategy as a mutation. In classical game
theory, each player’s rationality or self-interest serves as the agent of optimisation, whereas in
evolutionary game theory, the selection process serves as the agent of optimisation.
In an evolutionary game, a population consists of a number of players, each with a strategy
chosen from a set of available strategies. During one generation each player in the population
plays his strategy against one or more other players, receives a pay-off and updates his strategy
for play during the next generation. A player’s opponents are chosen according to the so-called
interaction rules and the structure underlying the population. Since the focus of investigation
is on the frequencies with which strategies occur, it is often convenient rather to refer to a
population of strategies, implying the players. It is then also natural to refer to a strategy
playing against another strategy.
3.2.3 The social structure of a game
Graphs are used to describe the social structure, or underlying topology of a game. Ohstuki et
al. [39] proposed using two graphs to describe the connectivity of players. One graph determines
how players interact to gain a pay-off, while the second graph describes the learning mecha-
nism. The vertices of the graphs represent the players, and edges joining vertices represent the
connections between players.
Underlying topologies commonly investigated in evolutionary game theory models include com-
plete graphs, lattices, small-world networks and scale-free networks. Mean-field games have the
complete graph as underlying topology, and in addition any player is equally likely to interact
with every other player.
A lattice is a regular grid-like structure or “an arrangement of points or particles or objects
in a regular periodic pattern in 2 or 3 dimensions” [31]. Lattice structures are often used in
spatial models. The lattice structure results from using a regular tiling pattern, and considering
the centre point of each tile as the representative of the tile area. Two tiling patterns often
encountered in spatial modelling are square and hexagonal tilings, as shown in Figure 3.6. In
game theoretical models each tile represents the position of a player (or possibly a group of
players) and each player usually interacts only with players located at the neighbouring tiles.
The graph describing the topology of the game for a given tiling is constructed by placing a
vertex at the centre of each tile and joining two vertices if the corresponding tiles share a common
border. Constructing a graph in this fashion on a hexagonal tiling pattern results in triangular
grid graph shown in Figure 3.7(a). Two different neighbourhoods are often investigated when
considering players on a square lattice. In the von Neumann neighbourhood, each square tile
neighbours each of the four nearest tiles directly north, south, east and west. A game on a square
lattice with a von Neumann neighbourhood has the underlying graph shown in Figure 3.7(b) —
this graph is the Cartesian product of paths. A square lattice with the Moore neighbourhood has
each tile connected to its eight nearest neighbours, the four tiles north, east, west and south,
as well as the four nearest diagonal tiles. A game played on a square lattice with a Moore
neighbourhood has the underlying graph shown in Figure 3.7(c).
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.6: (a) Hexagonal and (b) square tiling patterns.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.7: Different lattice graphs, also called grid graphs. (a) A triangular grid graph may be used
to model a landscape divided into hexagonal tiles. (b) A square grid graph over a square lattice with
the von Neumann neighbourhood. (c) A lattice graph with the a square lattice as underlying topology,
but including diagonal neighbours. This is the graph representation of a square lattice with a Moore
neighbourhood.
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A scale-free network is a graph whose degree distribution exhibits a power law distribution
P (k) ∼ k−λ, where P (k) is the fraction of vertices in the graph which have degree k. Many
real-world networks are scale-free, including the internet, citation networks and certain social
networks.
The clustering coefficient is a measure of the degree to which vertices in a graph tend to cluster
together. The local clustering coefficient C∗v of a vertex v, is the number of edges incident to
two vertices in the neighbourhood of v divided by the maximum number of edges that can exist
between vertices in the neighbourhood of v, that is
C∗v =
2|{euw}|
kv(kv − 1) ,
where euw is an edge joining two vertices in the neighbourhood of v and kv is the degree of
vertex v. The local clustering coefficient of a vertex measures how close its neighbours are
to forming a clique. Averaging over the local clustering coefficients gives rise to the average
clustering coefficient
C¯∗ =
1
|V (G)|
∑
v∈V (G)
C∗v
of a graph G with vertex set V (G).
The characteristic path length L of graph is the average distance between vertices, averaged over
all the vertex pairs in the graph. A small-world network is a graph which is highly clustered, yet
has a small characteristic path length [10]. They are named in analogy with the so-called small-
world phenomenon, popularly referred to as six degrees of separation. A graph is considered
small-world if its average clustering coefficient is significantly larger than that of a random graph
constructed on the same vertex set.
The first investigation involving an evolutionary game in a spatial context was done by Nowak
and May [37], who were able to show that it is possible for cooperation to persist if players taking
part in a PD occupy a two-dimensional array, interacting only with their nearest neighbours.
The weak prisoner’s dilemma was used and the model evolved complex Persian carpet-like
patterns and also chaotic-like behaviour. The authors demonstrated their results on a lattice
in which a player interacts with his eight nearest neighbours and himself, and stated that the
results also hold for square lattices with four nearest neighbours or hexagonal lattices and six
nearest neighbours, as well as whether or not self-interactions are included. The analysis focused
on the parameter values 1.8 < b < 2; in this region borders between clusters of cooperators are
unstable, and the results exhibit chaotic spatial arrays. The asymptotic fraction of sites occupied
by cooperators fluctuates around 0.318. The authors wrote a follow-up paper [38] exploring the
model in more detail. These two papers initiated the exploration by various authors of numerous
games in two-dimensions and many other structures connecting the players.
Games structured in this way are often referred to as spatial games, since it is convenient to
visualise the games as being played in a spatial arena with connections between nearby players.
The structure of a game may also be caused by, for example, a preference for players to interact
with certain opponents via social structures or physical networks such as road networks and
computer networks.
A systematic study of 2× 2 games4 on lattices was performed by Hauert [21]. Later Roca et al.
[43] further generalised the results of Hauert [21] by including random graphs and small-world
networks in their investigation. Two-dimensional regular lattices and random networks, each
4A game played by two players, where each player has two available strategies to choose from.
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of degrees 4, 6 and 8, were considered. Roca et al. [43] and Hauert [21] utilised a simulation
approach to investigate the two-person game with pay-off matrix
[ C D
C 1 S
D T 0
]
for values of the parameters in the ranges −1 < S < 1 and 0 < T < 2. Each quadrant in
the (S, T )-parameter plane represents a different known game in game theory. Roca et al. [43]
investigated each game adopting the replicator rule, the multiple replicator rule, the Moran rule
and the unconditional imitation rule as update rules.
Roca et al. [43] discussed their results for the PD, the stag hunt, snowdrift5 and the harmony
game. Their results related to the PD are briefly repeated here. On a complete network the
cooperation is not a viable strategy. It was found that all the other networks investigated
enhance the level of cooperation to a greater or lesser extent. It was also found that random
graphs promoted the evolution of cooperation. Random graphs and lattices of the same degree
produced very similar results. Increasing the graph order from 4 to 6 and 8 showed an increase in
likelihood that cooperation will persist with lattices exhibiting higher levels of cooperation along
a wide range of parameter values. These results confirmed the existence of phase transitions in
the (S, T )-plane, with clear boundaries between different regions in the plane. It was further
shown that the effect of spatial structure depends strongly on the update rule used. In certain
contexts, structure can be inhibiting to the evolution of cooperation.
The effect of the spatial structure in promoting cooperation is directly linked to the presence of
clustering in the underlying graph [43]. Small world networks have a high clustering coefficient,
and therefore promote cooperation. The existence of “shortcuts” in the network allow cooper-
ation to spread much quicker with the result that the game tends to reach equilibrium quicker
than when the game is played on a regular lattice [43].
Fowler and Christakis [15] studied cooperation in human social networks, while Du et al. [9]
considered the evolutionary PD on weighted scale-free networks. Analyses of spatial games and
evolutionary games are reviewed in [42, 44, 51].
3.2.4 Solution concepts
As mentioned, the focus in evolutionary game theoretical analyses shifts from players and how
they play the game, to strategies and how they persist through time. Axelrod [3] proposed a
set of three criteria for a strategy to be evolutionary viable:
• Robustness. A strategy must be able to survive in an environment with a variety of
strategies.
• Stability. A strategy must be able to resist invasion by another, mutant strategy.
• Invasiveness. A strategy must be able to invade an environment dominated by rival
strategies.
An important concept in evolutionary game theory, originally developed by Maynard Smith
and Price [30], is that of an ESS. An ESS is a strategy which, if adopted by a population of
5These games are all described in more detail later in this chapter.
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players, renders them immune to invasion by a rare mutant strategy. Such an ESS is relevant
when the mutation or experimentation rate is low. An ESS does not contain any reference to
the game dynamics and is a static concept. It is only necessary to assume that a strategy with
a higher pay-off has a higher growth rate. More specifically let, S and T be two strategies and
let E(S, T ) be the pay-off a player playing strategy S receives after playing against a player
playing strategy T . Then S is an ESS if either
E(S, S) > E(T, S) or
E(S, S) = E(T, S) and E(S, T ) > E(T, T )
is satisfied. An ESS is therefore a refinement of the notion of a Nash-equilibrium. All ESSs are
Nash-equilibria, but a Nash-equilibrium is not necessarily an ESS.
3.3 The prisoner’s dilemma and its variations
The PD, as described in Example 3.1, is attributed to Tucker, Dresher and Flood [11]. There
exist many variations on the prisoner’s dilemma, four variations are discussed in this section.
3.3.1 The hawk-dove game
Altering the constraints on the pay-off values in the PD results in variations on the PD, each
with its own interpretation and applications. Changing the constraints such that the pay-off P
for mutual defection is less than the sucker’s pay-off S results in the Hawk-Dove game. This
game is also sometimes referred to as the game of chicken [56] or the snowdrift game [51]. The
bimatrix strategic form of the game is similar to that of the PD, given in Table 3.3, but with
the distinction that the parameters are constrained by the inequality chain T > R > S > P .
The name hawk-dove game derives from the situation where there is competition for a shared
resource. Players have either the option to contest or to share the resource. If both players fight
for the resource, both players incur a large cost. If only one player contests the resource, referred
to as playing hawk, and the other retreats, referred to as playing dove, then the hawk gets the
entire resource and the dove nothing. If both players play dove, they share the resource. A
hawk will always fight for sole ownership of a resource, whereas a player playing dove is willing
to share the resource.
3.3.2 The stag hunt
The stag hunt is a symmetric two-person game. The game is often explained by means of the
following parable [48]. Two hunters go out on a hunt and each can choose to hunt a deer (stag) or
a hare. If one of the hunters decides to hunt a deer, he must have the cooperation of his partner
in order to succeed. A hunter can get a hare on his own, but a hare is worth less than a deer.
The game may be presented by the pay-off matrix in Table 3.3 with parameters restricted by
the inequality chain R > T > P > S. The stag hunt has two Nash-equilibria, one is where both
players cooperate and the other is where both players defect. The one equilibrium is considered
payoff-dominant while the other is risk-dominant. Like the PD, the stag hunt presents a context
in which to study cooperation and its problems.
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3.3.3 The iterated prisoner’s dilemma
Allowing for repeated rounds of the PD results in the so called iterated prisoner’s dilemma
(IPD). In the IPD a player’s strategy defines what his action will be during a particular round:
to defect or to cooperate. It is usually assumed that the number of rounds is unknown. In
the case where the number of rounds is known, it is best to defect during the last round. But
then, expecting one’s opponent to defect during the last round, it is best to defect during the
penultimate round. By backward induction it follows that it is best to defect during every
round. Therefore, the IPD in which the number of rounds is known has both players defecting
during every round as a solution. The case where the number of rounds is unknown represents
a more complex situation, in which the optimal strategy is unknown.
In order to investigate which strategies are successful in the IPD, Axelrod and Hamilton [3]
organised a tournament in which strategies competed in a mixed population of different strate-
gies. Professional game theorists were invited to submit their strategies to the competition. In
the tournament each strategy played against every other strategy in a round-robin fashion. The
strategy scoring the highest average over all the rounds was declared the winner. It was found
that a strategy called Tit-for-Tat does very well.
A player playing the strategy Tit-for-Tat cooperates during the very first round, while during
subsequent rounds merely mirrors the opponent’s move during the previous round. If the oppo-
nent therefore cooperated during the preceding round, then the Tit-for-Tat strategy cooperates
during the current round, while a defection during the preceding round will be met with a de-
fection during the current round. Consider, as an example, two players in an IPD lasting five
rounds. Suppose one player adopts the Tit-for-Tat strategy and the other adopts a predeter-
mined strategy s = (D,C,C,D,C) of which the Tit-for-Tat player is not aware before the start
of the game. Table 3.5 shows the resulting game. The Tit-for-Tat player plays C during the
first. During the second round the Tit-for-Tat player plays the strategy played by s during the
first round. Similarly, Tit-for-Tat plays the move made by s during the second, third and fourth
round in the third, fourth and fifth rounds, respectively.
Round
Strategy 1 2 3 4 5
s D C C D C
TFT C D C C D
Table 3.5: A sequence of moves in the IPD demonstrating how a player adopting the Tit-for-Tat strategy
would react to another strategy, in this case called s.
Axelrod [2] calls a strategy collectively stable if the condition E(S, S) ≥ E(T, S) is satisfied.
This is a relaxation of Maynard Smith’s [28] requirements for a strategy to be an ESS. The
following theorem implies that in a large population of players playing only Tit-for-Tat, another
strategy will not be able to invade the population.
Theorem 3.1 Tit-for-Tat is a collectively stable strategy in the IPD provided that the proba-
bility, w, that the interaction between two players will continue to another round of the IPD
satisfies
w ≥ max
(
T −R
R− S ,
T −R
T − P
)
.
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3.3.4 The public goods game
The public goods game is played by a set of N players. Each player has the option to either
cooperate, denoted by C, or defect, denoted by D. Each cooperating player contributes a benefit
b to the public good, while incurring a cost c to himself. A defecting player contributes nothing
with no cost to himself. The total public wealth is the distributed equally among all the players
regardless of their strategy at the end of the game.
3.4 Chapter summary
Definitions and concepts in classical game theory and evolutionary game theory were reviewed
in this chapter.
Notions in classical game theory were reviewed in §3.1 together with a brief historical account
of important developments in the field. Two methods for representing games were considered,
namely, the matrix form representation and extensive form representation. The PD was con-
sidered as an example of a very well known game in game theory. Other topics in this section
included the classification of games according to their properties, solution concepts and solution
methods. The section concluded with a brief description of a number of successful applications
of game theory, while a description of Braess’ paradox illustrated how counter-intuitive results
may arise from game theory.
In §3.2 the extension of classical game theory to evolutionary game theory was described. Evo-
lutionary game theory has its origins in classical game theory and is inspired by evolution as
seen in nature. The connection between biology and evolutionary game theory was discussed.
The definition and components of an evolutionary game were reviewed. Structured evolution-
ary games were also discussed in this section. The section concluded with a brief discussion on
solution concepts in evolutionary game theory.
In the final section of the chapter, §3.3, a number of variations on the PD often encountered in
the literature on evolutionary game theory were presented.
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Nowak and May [37, 38] were the first to introduce a spatial element to the PD by placing each
player in a cell on a lattice. Each player plays a PD against the players in his neighbourhood.
Nowak and May [37] considered both the von Neumann and Moore neighbourhoods. Here a
similar game and game dynamics are considered with the extension that the underlying game
topology may be any graph structure (i.e. not necessarily a grid graph). A framework for
representing games on graphs is developed in this chapter.
4.1 The mathematical representation of a game
An evolutionary game may be denoted by a pair, Υ = (Π, G). In this notation Π = {T,R, S, P}
is the set of pay-off parameters taken from the two-player PD pay-off matrix,
[ C D
C R S
D T P
]
, (4.1)
which is used to calculate the score of a player. The variable G is a graph representing the
structure of the game and is called the underlying graph of the game1. Although the underlying
graph may also be a pseudograph, it is nevertheless referred to as a “graph” for the sake of
brevity and simplicity.
1In a more general setting two graphs, Gi and Gr, may be used to describe the structure of a game. In
particular, the graph Gi may be used to calculate the score of a player and is called the interaction graph [39].
The graph Gr may be used to determine the update neighbourhood of a player and is called the replacement
graph [39]. The investigation in this thesis is restricted to the case where these two graphs are equal and only
one graph is therefore sufficient to describe the structure of a game.
37
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In the remainder of this chapter the adjective evolutionary will be omitted when referring to
evolutionary games, since all games are considered within the evolutionary paradigm.
4.2 The state of a game
The state of a game is a distribution of the strategies of the various players, modelled by the
vertices of the underlying graph, during any particular round of the game. The state of a
game may be modelled by a (vertex) 2-colouring of the underlying graph. In a 2-colouring
f of a graph G one of two colours is associated with each vertex, that is a function of the
form f : V (G) 7→ {C,D}. Formally, the state s of a game is given by s = (G,χ), where
G = (V (G), E(G)) is the underlying graph of the game and where χ is a function according
to which a colour is assigned to each vertex of G (i.e. χ determines f). The two strategies
considered are the strategies of the single round PD, namely to cooperate (denoted by C) or to
defect (denoted by D). When representing the state of a game on the underlying graph, a player
playing strategy C is denoted by a solid vertex, while a player playing strategy D is denoted by
an open vertex. The weight w of a game state is the total number of vertices associated with
strategy C or equivalently the number of solid vertices in the corresponding 2-colouring of the
underlying graph.
Given a number of distinct game states and an integer labelling of the underlying graph, it
is possible to determine the lexicographical order of these states, as follows. The vertices are
considered in the order in which they are labelled. A solid vertex is assumed to be lexicograph-
ically smaller than an open vertex, that is the relationship C < D is assumed between the
strategies C and D. The smaller of the two states is the one with the smallest strategy (i.e. C)
corresponding to the first vertex of the underlying graph at which the states differ in strategy,
in the order in which the vertices of the underlying graph are labelled. That is, if the game
states are written as strings consisting of the characters C and D in the order in which the
vertices of the underlying graph are labelled, then the smallest state is the one corresponding
to the lexicographically smallest string. Examples of the lexicographical order of game states
are shown in Figure 4.1. Note that when comparing two states, a state with a smaller weight
may have a larger lexicographical ordering than a state with a large weight.
The shorthand notation 〈C〉i or 〈D〉i will be used to indicate i consecutive cooperators or
defectors in a state when considering players in the order that they are labelled. Therefore 〈C〉n
and 〈D〉n denote the all-cooperator and all-defector states, respectively, for a game played on a
graph of order n.
The underlying graph of a game is henceforth considered to be a labelled graph (or a labelled
pseudo-graph). Due to symmetry in the update rules of the game and symmetries which may
exist in the underlying graph, certain states may be considered equivalent. An automorphism
φ between two states s1 = (G,χ1) and s2 = (G,χ2) is a one-to-one mapping of the set of vertex
labels in V (G) onto itself such that adjacencies in and the colouring of the underlying graph
are preserved, that is uv ∈ E(G) if and only if φ(u)φ(v) ∈ E(G) and χ1(v) = χ2(φ(v)) for all
v ∈ V (G). Two states s1 and s2 are said to be automorphic if there exists an automorphism
between them. Examples of automorphic states are shown in Figure 4.2. The pair of game
states s1 and s2 in Figure 4.2(a) are automorphic. An automorphism between these states is
the permutation φ1 : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 7→ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} such that φ1(1) = 3, φ1(2) = 4, φ1(3) = 1,
φ1(4) = 2 and φ1(5) = 5.
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3
1 2
4
5
(a) G4.1
3
1 2
4
5 <
3
1 2
4
5
(b) Game states of the same weight.
3
1 2
4
5 <
3
1 2
4
5
(c) Game states with different weights.
Figure 4.1: (a) A vertex labelling of the underlying graph of the game Υ = (Π, G4.1) in which players
may play any one of two strategies, denoted by • or ◦. Examples of the lexicographical order of two
distinct game states with (b) the same weight and (c) different weights.
3
1 2
4
5s1 ⇔
3
1 2
4
5s2
(a) Two automorphic states, s1 and s2, of weight 4.
3
1 2
4
5s3 ⇔
3
1 2
4
5s4
(b) Two automorphic game states, s3 and s4, of weight 3.
Figure 4.2: Examples of automorphic game states for the underlying graph in Figure 4.1(a) and for a
game in which players may play any one of two strategies, denoted by • or ◦.
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An automorphism class of game states is a maximal set of automorphic game states. The
class representative of an automorphism class of game states is the state which has the smallest
lexicographical order in the class. The two states shown in Figure 4.2(a) form an automorphism
class and in this class the state on the left is the class representative. Table 4.1 contains all the
possible states for a game which has the underlying graph G4.1 in Figure 4.1(a), and in which
players may play one of the two strategies, • or ◦. The game may be in any one of 32 distinct
states. Of these states only twenty are considered non-equivalent, that is the game has twenty
state automorphism classes.
An automorphism between states has been defined in such a way that if two states are automor-
phic, then the states obtained after one round of two instances of the game, starting from these
states respectively, are again automorphic. Therefore, a description of the remaining states of a
game from one state in an automorphism class, would also describe the remaining states of the
game from all other states in the class.
4.3 Dynamic rules of a game
A game instance is initialised by assigning each player a strategy. Each round of the game
consists of two phases. During the first phase each player’s score is determined and during the
second phase each player updates his strategy. The rounds are repeated until the system reaches
a steady state, limit cycle or a pre-determined number of rounds have been played.
To determine the score of a player during a particular round, the player plays a PD against each
of his neighbours. A player’s score is taken to be the average pay-off value from all of these PDs.
Using the average pay-off value makes it possible to compare the successes of the strategies of
players with different numbers of neighbours in the underlying graph. Consider, for example, a
player p who has x neighbours playing strategy C and y neighbours playing strategy D. In this
case the score of player p is
pip =
{
1
x+y (xT + yP ) if p is playing D,
1
x+y (xR+ yS) if p is playing C.
As an example of how to calculate a player’s score, consider the game states shown in Figures
4.3(a) and 4.3(b), assuming the pay-off matrix
[ C D
C 3 0
D 5 1
]
.
The central player in Figure 4.3(a) plays strategy C, and has two neighbours playing strategy C
and four neighbours playing strategy D. He therefore achieves a score of (2× 3 + 4× 0)/6 = 1.
The central player in Figure 4.3(b) similarly achieves a score of 153 .
A player updates his strategy by adopting the strategy of the player with the largest score in
his closed neighbourhood. If the player’s own score is the largest in his neighbourhood, then
he will continue with his current strategy during the next round. In the event of a tie between
the highest scores achieved by a cooperator and a defector in the player’s neighbourhood, it is
assumed that he continues with his current strategy during the next round. This assumption
may be interpreted as the imposition of a small cost associated with the act of a player changing
his strategy. As an example of how the update rule is applied, consider the game state extract
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class 1
class 2 class 3 class 4
0
2
3
4
5
1
class 5 class 6 class 7
class 11 class 12 class 13
class 14 class 15 class 16
class 20
class 8 class 9 class 10
class 17 class 18 class 19
weight
Table 4.1: The twenty state automorphism classes of game states for the underlying graph G4.1 in
Figure 4.1(a) allowing for two strategies, denoted by • and ◦. In this example the automorphism classes
have either size 1 or size 2. In the case where an automorphism class contains two states, the class leader
is shown in black and the state automorphic to it is shown in grey.
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13
5
1 1
1 2
25
1
2 5
(a) (b) (c)
ps
Figure 4.3: Extracts from three game states used as examples to demonstrate how a player’s score is
calculated and how a player chooses a new strategy to play during the next round of the game.
shown in Figure 4.3(c) with the scores of each player as indicated. Player p receives a score of 1.
The player with the highest score in his neighbourhood is player s who is playing strategy D
and receives a score of 5. Player p therefore adopts strategy D for play during the next round.
During the update process the score attained by a player depends only on the number of
cooperators and defectors in his neighbourhood and on his own strategy. The positions of
these neighbours playing the various strategies are not important.
As an example of the update process, consider the game Υ1 = ({5, 3, 1, 0}, G4.1). The develop-
ment of a game instance from a given initial state is shown in Figure 4.4. In the initial state only
one player plays strategy D. This player also receives the highest score during that round; all
his neighbours therefore adopt strategy D during the second round. During the second round
only one player plays strategy C, which earns the lowest score during that round. The player
in question therefore adopts strategy D for play during the next round. During the third round
all players therefore play strategy D; there is no other strategy to consider and all players keep
on playing D indefinitely after the second round.
initial state after 1 round after 2 rounds
1
1 1
1
1
3
3
2
2
5
3
2
(a) (c)(b)
0
3
7
3
1
1
Figure 4.4: The state transitions of an instance of the game Υ1 = ({5, 3, 1, 0}, G4.1). The first row
shows the transitions of the states. The second row shows the score of each player, with arrows indicating
which strategy a player adopts. Here (a), (b) and (c) each represent a round of the game.
4.4 The state graph of a game
The state graph G of a game is a vertex weighted pseudodigraph in which each vertex corresponds
to a game state automorphism class. The state graph is a representation of the dynamics of
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the game and shows the transition between states as defined by the game dynamics. Given a
game Υ with associated state graph G, a vertex u of G is adjacent to vertex v if and only if the
state corresponding to vertex u in Υ transitions in one round to the state associated with v.
The weight of a vertex in a state graph is equal to the weight of the state associated with that
vertex. An example of a state graph for the game Υ1 = ({5, 3, 1, 0}, G4.1) is shown in Figure
4.5. The part of the graph in Figure 4.5 enclosed by the dashed curve contains the transitions
shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.5: The state graph for a game with the graph in Figure 4.1(a) as underlying graph, in which
players may play any of the two strategies, • or ◦. The part of the graph highlighted by means of a
closed dashed curve denotes the transition considered in Figure 4.4. The state graph comprises three
components.
A steady state is a state which is adjacent to itself in the state graph. It holds in general games
that those game states in which all players either play strategy C or all players play strategy D
are steady states. If a game has a pay-off parameter T which is sufficiently large, then the two
previously mentioned states are the only steady states of the game, as is shown next.
Theorem 4.1 Let G be any connected graph of order n with maximum degree ∆ and suppose
R ≤ 1. If T > ∆(1−P )+P , then the state graph of a game with underlying graph G has exactly
two components. Moreover, one of these components comprises the all-cooperator steady state
〈C〉n only, while the other component contains all other game states, including the all-defector
steady state 〈D〉n which attracts all states except 〈C〉n.
Proof: Let dt denote the number of defectors during round t ∈ N0 of the game. It is shown
that if T > ∆(1 − P ) + P and d0 > 0, then there exists a non-negative integer t∗ such that
dt+1 > dt for all t = 1, . . . , t
∗ − 1 and dt = n for all t ≥ t∗.
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To achieve this, it is first shown that no defector will change his strategy during subsequent
rounds of the game. Let u be a defector during round t. If all players in the open neighbourhood
of u also defect during round t, then u will certainly defect during round t+1. Therefore suppose
there are c > 0 cooperators in the open neighbourhood of u during round t. In order to determine
his strategy during round t+ 1, player u compares his pay-off value
piu =
(deg(u)− c)P + cT
deg(u)
≥ (deg(u)− 1)P + T
deg(u)
>
(deg(u)− 1)P + ∆(1− P ) + P
deg(u)
≥ (deg(u)− 1)P + deg(u)(1− P ) + P
deg(u)
= 1 (4.2)
to those of his cooperating neighbours during round t. But since a cooperator’s pay-off value
cannot exceed 1, player u will again defect during round t+ 1. This shows that
dt+1 ≥ dt for all t ∈ N0. (4.3)
Furthermore, it follows by (4.2) that a cooperator will necessary change his strategy during the
next round if there is at least one defector in his open neighbourhood. Because G is connected,
it therefore follows that, in fact, dt+1 > dt for all t not exceeding some finite value t
∗ − 1, and
that dt∗ = n, completing the proof in view of (4.3). 
4.5 Normalising the pay-off values of a game
By normalising the parameter values of a game it is possible to model the game dynamics
described in the previous sections of this chapter using only two parameters instead of four,
as in (4.1). This claim is demonstrated here for two games played on the same underlying
graph G, but with different sets of pay-off parameters. Denote the two games in question by
Υˆ = (Πˆ = {Tˆ , Rˆ, Pˆ , Sˆ}, G) and Υ = (Π = {T, 1, P, 0}, G), respectively. Recall that the process
of updating a player’s strategy occurs by selecting the highest scoring strategy from his closed
neighbourhood, essentially comparing the scores of the highest scoring cooperator with that of
the highest scoring defector in his neighbourhood.
Consider a player p participating in the game Υˆ. Suppose p has player c and player d in his
neighbourhood and assume that player c is the highest scoring cooperator in the neighbourhood
of player p, with a pay-off value of pˆic, and similarly that player d is the highest scoring defector
in the neighbourhood of player p, with a pay-off value of pˆid. The outcome of the strategy
updating process for player p is determined by the function
f(Πˆ, χ) =

C if pˆic > pˆid
D if pˆid > pˆic
χ(p) if pˆid = pˆic,
where χ is the current state of the game. Given an initial state χ0, the game dynamics is a
function of Tˆ , Rˆ, Sˆ and Pˆ . Let x be the proportion of players in the open neighbourhood
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of player c who are playing strategy C and let y be the proportion of players in the open
neighbourhood of player d who are playing strategy C. Assuming that pˆic > pˆid, it follows that
xRˆ+ (1− x)Sˆ > yTˆ + (1− y)Pˆ .
Subtracting Sˆ from both sides of the above inequality results in the inequality
xRˆ+ Sˆ − xSˆ − Sˆ > yTˆ + Pˆ − yPˆ − Sˆ.
Rewriting this inequality yields
x(Rˆ− Sˆ) + 0 > y(Tˆ − Sˆ) + (1− y)(Pˆ − Sˆ). (4.4)
After dividing both sides of (4.4) by the positive quantity Rˆ− S, it holds that
x+ 0 > y
Tˆ − Sˆ
Rˆ− Sˆ + (1− y)
Pˆ − Sˆ
Rˆ− Sˆ .
Finally, letting
T =
Tˆ − Sˆ
Rˆ− Sˆ and P =
Pˆ − Sˆ
Rˆ− Sˆ , (4.5)
it follows that
x+ 0 > yT + (1− y)P.
Therefore the requirement pˆic > pˆid implies the relationship pic > pid, where pic and pid are the
pay-off values of player c and player d, respectively, if the pay-off parameters Π are used to
calculate the scores of the players. It similarly follows that the requirement pˆic < pˆid implies
the relationship pic < pid and that the requirement pˆic = pˆid implies the relationship pic = pid.
Therefore the outcome of the games Υ and Υˆ are identical if (4.5) holds.
Thus, given a parameter set Πˆ = {Tˆ , Rˆ, Pˆ , Sˆ}, it is possible to rescale the parameters as in (4.5)
to form a new set of parameters Π = {T, 1, P, 0} without influencing the game dynamics. The
analysis in this thesis is therefore restricted, without loss of generality, to the case with only
two free parameters, that is, to the case where the parameter set is Π = {T, 1, P, 0} and where
it is assumed throughout that T > 1 and 0 < P < 1.
Note, therefore, that the restriction that R ≤ 1 in Theorem 4.1 is superfluous.
4.6 Chapter summary
This chapter contains a mathematical framework for describing spatially structured evolutionary
games. A game may be presented as an ordered pair consisting of the set of pay-off parameters
and an underlying graph which describes the spatial structure of the game.
Two important concepts were introduced, namely an automorphism class of game states and
the state graph of a game. If the number of state automorphism classes is small, then the state
graph is a useful tool for visually representing the game dynamics. It was also demonstrated in
this chapter that the use of the reduced set of pay-off parameters Π = {T, 1, S, 0} is sufficient
to describe game dynamics in general.
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In this chapter an analytical approach (i.e. avoiding the use of simulation) is adopted to inves-
tigate the dynamics of the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma (ESPD) played on a path
or cycle as underlying graph. The objective is to determine the likelihood of the emergence of
persistent cooperation. A key question is: How does the order of the underlying graph influence
the likelihood of persistent cooperation? Since the game state graph captures the complete
dynamics of a game, it is of interest to determine properties of the state graph without having
to simulate the entire game. A number of theorems are established in this regard, describing
the properties of the state graph of the ESPD with a path or cycle as underlying graph. The
ESPD on a path or a cycle admits two fundamentally different parameter regions which will be
referred to as small values of T and large values of T , respectively. Large values of T are not
capable of inducing persistent cooperation, while small values of T allow for the possibility of
persistence of cooperation.
5.1 States of the ESPD on a path or cycle
In this section it is assumed that the underlying graph G is a path of order n whose vertices
are labelled 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, or an n-cycle whose vertices are labelled 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, 0.
There are 2n different ways of assigning one of the two strategies, C or D, to each of the n
vertices in such a labelled underlying graph. There is only one possible automorphism when
47
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the underlying graph is a path, namely the function that reverses the order of the vertices.
Therefore all states which are not symmetric with respect to a mid section of the path belongs
to an automorphism class of size two; the two members of each of these automorphism classes
are the two states that are mirror images of one another. The game states for the case where
the underlying graph is a path of order 5 are shown in Table 5.1; there are 32 states of which
20 are considered non-equivalent.
Class leader Automorphic to
Class
2
1
size
Total: 32 = 25
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Total: 20
Table 5.1: The thirteen automorphism class leaders of game states (as well as their corresponding full
automorphism classes) for the case where the underlying graph is a path of order 5. The two strategies
C and D are represented by colouring the squares in a linear array black and white, respectively.
Counting the number of states for the EPSD with a path as underlying graph is similar to
other counting problems in the literature for which solutions are known. Related problems are
described as the number of ways of creating an n-bead black-and-white reversible string [23]
and the number of caterpillar graphs which can be constructed on n vertices [20]. It is known
that if the underlying graph of the ESPD is a path of order n, then there are
Λp(n) = 2
n−1 + 2dn/2e−1 (5.1)
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automorphism classes of game states [4]. The sequence {Λp(n)}∞n=1 is listed as Sloane’s sequence
A005418 [49] and is tabulated for 1 ≤ n ≤ 15 in Table 5.2.
n→ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Λp(n) 2 3 6 10 20 36 72 136 272 528 1056 2 080 4 160 8 256 16 512
Λc(n) 2 3 4 6 8 13 18 30 46 78 126 224 380 687 1 224
Table 5.2: The order of the state graph if the underlying graph is a path or a cycle of order n, for small
values of n. (Sloane’s sequences A005418 and A000029, respectively [49].)
However, there are a number of additional symmetries in the case where the underlying graph
of the ESPD is a cycle: The order of the vertices may be reversed or the positions of vertices
may be shifted clockwise up to n− 1 positions. The result is an increase in the average size of
an automorphism class of the ESPD on a cycle when compared to that on a path of a specific
order. The thirteen class leaders of the automorphism classes of game states (as well as the
full automorphism classes themselves) for the case where the underlying graph is a 6-cycle are
shown in Table 5.3.
Class leader Automorphic to
Class
6
6
6
6
6
1
3
2
12
3
1
6
Total: 64 = 26
size
6
Total: 13
Table 5.3: The thirteen automorphism class leaders of game states (as well as their corresponding
full automorphism classes) for the case where the underlying graph is a 6-cycle. The two strategies C
and D are represented by colouring the squares black and white, respectively, where each game state is
represented by a wrapping array of squares denoting the players.
If the underlying graph is a cycle of order n, then there are
Λc(n) =
{∑
d|n
φ(d)2n/d
2n + 2
n−1
2 if n is odd∑
d|n
φ(d)2n/d
2n + 2
n
2
−1 + 2
n
2
−2 if n is even
(5.2)
automorphism classes of game states [13], where φ(·) is the well-known Euler totient. The
sequence is listed as Sloane’s sequence A000029 [49] and the n-th entry of this sequence is
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described as the number of necklaces which can be created from a total of n black or white
beads allowing for turning over the necklaces. The numbers of automorphism classes for the
ESPD on an n-cycle are also shown in Table 5.2 for 1 ≤ n ≤ 15.
5.2 ESPD game dynamics for large values of T
The ESPD on a path or cycle admits two fundamentally different parameter regions, namely
T > 2 − P or 1 < T ≤ 2 − P 1. These two parameter regions induce different game dynamics.
It was established in Theorem 4.1 that in the case of large values of the temptation-to-defect
parameter, T , the strategy of defection is inherently more stable than that of cooperation on a
general underlying graph. Applying Theorem 4.1 to cycles and paths, it holds that if T > 2−P ,
then the state graph has only two components. The all-cooperator state is isolated, while the
other component contains the all-defector state and all other game states. Moreover, in the
latter component the all-defector state attracts all other game states. As examples, the state
graphs for the ESPD on a path of order 5 and for the ESPD on a 6-cycle are shown in Figure 5.1,
both for the case where T > 2 − P . Therefore persistent cooperation is not possible for the
ESPD on a path or cycle if T > 2−P , unless the strategy of cooperation is universally adopted
by all players initially.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: The state graph for the case where T > 2 − P and the underlying graph is (a) a path of
order 5 or (b) a 6-cycle. The strategy of cooperation (C) is denoted by a black square, while that of
defection (D) is denoted by a white square in each state which is represented in (a) by a linear array of
squares, and in (b) by a wrapping array of squares.
The following lemma states that defection is, in fact, inherently more stable than cooperation
for all values of T in the case where the underlying graph is a path or a cycle.
Lemma 5.1 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a path or a cycle and a player’s strategy
is that of defection during a specific round of the game, then his strategy remains the same for
all subsequent rounds.
1A player playing D can achieve one of five different scores, namely 2T , T + P , 2P , T and P , while a player
playing C can achieve one of three different scores, namely 2, 1 or 0. Changing the values of T and P may have
an influence on the dynamics of the game at the thresholds T +P = 2 and 2P = 1. The second threshold, 2P = 1,
does not influence the game dynamics; a player with a cooperator that has a score of 1 and a defector that has
a score of 2P in his neighbourhood is necessarily playing the underlined strategy in the configuration DDDCC.
The underlined player obtains a score of T + P > 1 and hence picks his own strategy during the next round.
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Proof: If a defector is flanked by two defectors during any round of the game, he will certainly
defect again during the next round, because there are only defectors in his neighbourhood.
Assume, therefore, that a defector is flanked by at least one cooperator during some round of
the game. Since the pay-off value received by that cooperator is at most 12 and the pay-off value
received by the defector is at least T+P2 >
1
2 , it follows that the defector will in this case also
defect during the next round of the game. 
Note that there is no result similar to that of Lemma 5.1 for the strategy of cooperation. The
lemma may be used to establish the structure of the state graph of the ESPD for the case where
the underlying graph is a path or a cycle.
Theorem 5.1 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a path or cycle of order n, then each
component of the state graph is a rooted pseudo-tree in which the root is a steady state of the
game. Moreover, the all-cooperator steady state 〈C〉n forms a component on its own in the state
graph.
Proof: It follows by the deterministic nature of the ESPD that every vertex in the state graph
has out-degree 1 (given any game state during a round of the game, there is a unique game state
during the following round). It also follows by the finiteness of the state space (as a result of
the finiteness of the number of players) that every component of the state graph must contain
at least one steady state (a vertex with a loop from itself to itself) or a limit cycle (a directed
cycle of length at least 2). But since defectors persist with their strategies as the state of the
game progresses in the case where the underlying graph is a path or a cycle, by Lemma 5.1, it
follows that the state graph cannot have any cycles of length at least 2. Therefore each of the
state graph components is a rooted pseudo-tree containing a single steady state which attracts
all states in that component. The steady state 〈C〉n is clearly an isolated vertex in the state
graph. 
For large values of the temptation-to-defect parameter, T , the asymptotic behaviour of states
in the game follows as a direct consequence of Theorems 4.1 and 5.1, as made more precise in
the following result.
Corollary 5.1 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a path or cycle of order n, and if T >
2−P , then the state graph is a rooted pseudo-tree comprising exactly two components. Moreover,
one of these components consists of the steady state 〈C〉n only. In the other component 〈D〉n is
the steady state attracting all the remaining states of the game.
The result of Corollary 5.1 may be verified in Figure 5.2 for the case where the underlying graph
is a path of order 3 ≤ n ≤ 6 and in Figure 5.3 for the case where the underlying graph is cycle
of order 5 ≤ n ≤ 8, where T > 2− P in each case.
5.3 The ESPD on a path for small values of T
In this section the focus shifts to the dynamics of the ESPD on a path of order n for small values
of T . In particular, the steady states of the ESPD on paths are characterised. This is followed
by a full description of the game dynamics for the case where T ≤ 2−P . Finally the probability
of randomly generating an initial state which leads to persistent cooperation is determined.
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(a) n = 3 (b) n = 4
(c) n = 5
(d) n = 6
Figure 5.2: The state graph of the ESPD for the case where T > 2− P and the underlying graph is a
path of order n. The strategy of cooperation (C) is denoted by a black square, while that of defection
(D) is denoted by a white square in each state, which is represented by a linear array of squares.
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(a) n = 5 (b) n = 6
(c) n = 7 (d) n = 8
Figure 5.3: The state graph of the ESPD for the case where T > 2 − P and the underlying graph is
an n-cycle. The strategy of cooperation (C) is denoted by a black square, while that of defection (D) is
denoted by a white square in each state, which is represented by a wrapping array of squares.
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5.3.1 Characterisation of steady states for small values of T
The two trivial steady states of the ESPD, 〈C〉n and 〈D〉n, are always present in the state graph
regardless of the parameter value and/or the underlying graph. According to Corollary 5.1 no
form of cooperation can persist in the long run for large values of T , except in the singular case
where all players initially already cooperate. For large values of T the two trivial steady states
are the only steady states. In this section the focus shifts to a characterisation of the steady
states of the ESPD on a path in the more interesting case where
1 < T ≤ 2− P. (5.3)
It is first shown that cooperation runs of length 1 or 2 cannot persist, while a cooperation run
of length at least three can indeed persist, but only if flanked by two non-isolated defectors.
Lemma 5.2 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a path and (5.3) holds, then
(a) no cooperation run of length 1 can persist to the next round of the game,
(b) no cooperation run of length 2 can persist to the next round, except if the cooperation run
occurs at an endpoint of the path and is adjacent to a defection run of length at least 2,
(c) a cooperation run of length at least 3 persists to the next round if and only if it is flanked
by two defection runs, each of length at least 2, or if the cooperation run occurs at an
endpoint of the path and is adjacent to a defection run of length at least 2.
Proof: (a) It follows by Lemma 5.1 that the two defectors in the substate DCD of a game
state during round t retain their strategies during round t+1. Furthermore, the pay-off value of
the cooperator during round t in such a substate is 0, whilst the pay-off value of each defector
during round t is at least T+P2 >
1
2 . Hence the cooperator will change his strategy to that of
defection during round t+ 1. Similarly the substate2 [CD evolves to [DD.
(b) Again it follows by Lemma 5.1 that the two defectors in the substate DCCD of a game
state during round t retain their strategies during round t+1. Furthermore, the pay-off value of
each cooperator during round t in such a substate is 12 , whilst the pay-off value of each defector
during round t is at least T+P2 >
1
2 . Hence the two cooperators will change their strategy to
that of defection during round t+ 1.
Similarly, the pay-off value of the left-most cooperator and the second-to-left cooperator in
the substate [CCDC are 1 and 12 , respectively, whilst the pay-off value of the defector in this
substate is T > 1. Hence the second-to-left cooperator in the substate [CCDC will change his
strategy to that of defection during round t+1, resulting in the substate [CD considered above.
However, the pay-off value of the left-most cooperator and the second-to-left cooperator in the
substate [CCDD are 1 and 12 , respectively, whilst the pay-off value of the left-most defector in
this substate is T+P2 ≤ 1 by (5.3). Hence neither cooperator in the substate [CCDD will change
his strategy to that of defection during round t+ 1, resulting in the persistence of the substate
[CCDD.
(c) It follows by Lemma 5.1 that the defectors in the substate DD〈C〉iDD or [〈C〉iDD of a game
state during round t retain their strategies during round t + 1. Furthermore, all cooperators
other than the two outer cooperators trivially retain their strategies during round t + 1, each
2The symbols [ and ] are used to denote the ends of the path.
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receiving a pay-off value of 1 during round t. Finally, since the pay-off value of each outer
cooperator is 12 and the pay-off value of each inner defector is
T+P
2 ≤ 1 during round t, each
outer cooperator during round t also retains his strategy during round t + 1. This establishes
the persistence of the two substates.
For the converse, consider the pay-off values of the players in the substate DD〈C〉iDC or
[〈C〉iDC of a game state during round t, as shown in Table 5.4. The table shows that in both
cases the third player from the right will change his strategy from cooperation to defection
during round t+ 1 and hence that the cooperation run 〈C〉i will not survive intact from round
t to round t+ 1. 
The substate DD〈C〉iDC
Player 1 2 3 4 to i+ 1 i+ 2 i+ 3 i+ 4
Strategy D D C 〈C〉i−2 C D C
Pay-off ≥ T+P2 T+P2 ≤ 1 12 1 each 12 T > 1 ≤ 12
The substate [〈C〉iDC
Player 1 to i− 1 i i+ 1 i+ 2
Strategy 〈C〉i−1 i i+ 1 i+ 2
Pay-off 1 each 12 T > 1 ≥ 0
Table 5.4: Pay-off values of the players in the two substates considered in the proof of Lemma 5.2(c).
In order to be able to determine the structure of the state graph, a well-known fact in combi-
natorial analysis is required. The number of ways of distributing m indistinguishable objects
among n distinguishable containers is equivalent to the number of unique strings which can be
constructed from n − 1 indistinguishable characters, denoted by “|”, and m indistinguishable
characters, denoted by “•”. The characters denoted by “|” may be seen as dividing the charac-
ters denoted by “•” (or objects) into the distinguishable containers: those •’s occurring before
the first | are placed in the first container, the •’s between the first and the second | represent
objects placed into the second container, and so forth. As an example, the string | • • | • •
represents placing no objects in the first container, two objects in the second container and two
objects in the third container. Note that the number of dividers (i.e. |’s) is one fewer than the
number of containers. The number of ways of forming strings from m+n−1 distinct characters
is (m + n − 1)!. Dividing this total by m! (i.e. discounting the number ways of arranging the
•’s) and by (n− 1)! (i.e. discounting the number of ways of arranging the |’s), gives the number
of distinct strings which can be formed by n− 1 |’s and m •’s, that is
(m+ n− 1)!
m!(n− 1)! .
This argument establishes the following standard enumeration result.
Lemma 5.3 There are
(
m+n−1
n−1
)
distinct ways of distributing m indistinguishable objects among
n distinguishable containers.
It is now possible to characterise the steady states of the ESPD when the underlying graph is
a path of order n, under the condition (5.3).
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Theorem 5.2 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a path of order n and (5.3) holds, then
the number of components, Ξp(n), of the state graph is given by
1 +
bn+15 c∑
i=1
(
n−3i
2i−1
)
+ 12
bn+45 c∑
i=1
[(
n−3i+2
2i−2
)
+
(bn−5i+42 c+i−1
i−1
)]
+ 12
bn−25 c∑
i=1
[(
n−3i−2
2i
)
+
(bn−5i−22 c+i
i
)]
. (5.4)
Moreover, the steady states of the game are 〈C〉n, 〈D〉n and all those states in which each
cooperation run has length at least 3 (or which occur at an endpoint and has length at least 2)
and in which each defection run has length at least 2.
Proof: It follows by Lemma 5.2(a) and Lemma 5.2(b) that no steady state of the game can
contain a cooperation run of length 1 or 2, except in the latter case if the run occurs at an
endpoint and is flanked a run of defectors of length at least two. However, by Lemma 5.2(c)
all steady states other than the states 〈C〉n and 〈D〉n contain cooperation runs of length 3 or
more, each flanked by defection runs of length at least 2 (except if the cooperation run occurs
at an endpoint of the path, in which case it may have length 2). Therefore no steady state can
contain isolated defectors.
Let Qi denote the number of states comprising i cooperation runs, starting with a run of
cooperators and ending with a run of defectors, that is steady states of the form
CC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 3
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 4
CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 5
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 6
· · · CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i−1
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i
, (5.5)
where each run has been populated above with the smallest number of cooperators and defectors,
respectively, in order to ensure persistence of the cooperators according to Lemma 5.2. This
partial state contains 5i−1 symbols, leaving a total of n−5i+1 remaining symbols to distribute
amongst the 2i distinguishable runs. Note that since the ordering of the cooperation and
defection runs has already been fixed, these n−5i+1 symbols can be considered indistinguishable
(that is, the symbols merely serve as place holders).
It follows by Lemma 5.3 that the number of game states of the form (5.5) is
Qi =
(
n− 3i
2i− 1
)
. (5.6)
However, the number of runs that a game state of this form can contain is constrained by the
inequality 5i− 1 ≤ n. Therefore (5.6) is only valid for i ≤ ⌊n+15 ⌋. Since each state of the form
(5.5) forms an automorphism class on its own, the total number of steady states of this form is
Q =
bn+15 c∑
i=1
Qi =
bn+15 c∑
i=1
(
n− 3i
2i− 1
)
.
Let Ri denote the number of steady states comprising i cooperation runs, both starting and
ending in cooperation runs, that is states of the form
CC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 3
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 4
· · · CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i−3
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i−2
CC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i−1
(5.7)
where each run has again been populated above with the smallest number of cooperators and
defectors, respectively, in order to ensure persistence of the cooperators according to Lemma 5.2.
The partial state (5.7) contains 5i − 4 symbols, leaving n − 5i + 4 remaining symbols to be
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distributed amongst the 2i − 1 runs. It follows by Lemma 5.3 that the steady state (5.7) may
be completed in R˜i =
(
n−5i+4+2i−1−1
2i−1−1
)
=
(
n−3i+2
2i−2
)
distinct ways. However, every non-symmetric
state of the form (5.7) is a member of an automorphism class of cardinality 2. Hence every
non-symmetric state of the form (5.7) has essentially been counted twice, while each symmetric
state of the form (5.7) is the only member of its automorphism class and has been counted
once. To remedy this situation the number of symmetric states of the form (5.7) is counted and
added to the expression for R˜i before dividing the sum by two to obtain an expression for Ri.
The symmetric states may be formed by distributing half of the remaining n− 5i+ 4 symbols
amongst half of the 2i − 1 runs. If the number of symbols is odd, then one symbol must be
placed in the central run; hence there are bn−5i+42 c remaining symbols to be distributed. It
follows by Lemma 5.3 that the steady state (5.7) may be completed symmetrically in
R¯i =
(bn−5i+42 c+ i− 1
i− 1
)
distinct ways. The only restriction on i in (5.7) is that 5i − 4 ≤ n. Hence the total number of
steady states starting with a cooperation run and ending in a defection run is
R =
bn+45 c∑
i=1
Ri =
1
2
bn+45 c∑
i=1
[R˜i + R¯i] =
1
2
bn+45 c∑
i=1
[(
n− 3i+ 2
2i− 2
)
+
(⌊n−5i+4
2
⌋
+ i− 1
i− 1
)]
.
The number, S, of steady states of the form
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 3
CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 4
· · · DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i−1
CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i+1
can be counted in a similar fashion as in the case above. The result is
S =
bn−2
5
c∑
n=1
Si =
1
2
bn−25 c∑
i=1
[S˜i + S¯i] =
1
2
bn−25 c∑
i=1
[(
n− 3i− 2
2i
)
+
(⌊n−5i−2
2
⌋
+ i
i
)]
,
where the symbols S, Si, S˜i and S¯i have meanings similar to those of R, Ri, R˜i and R¯i,
respectively. Taking into account the all-defector state, which has not been counted above, the
total number of steady states is the quantity 1 +Q+R+ S in (5.4). Since every component of
the state graph contains exactly one steady state by Theorem 5.1, the quantity in (5.4) is also
the number of components of the state graph. 
Table 5.5 contains the number of steady states of the ESPD on a path of order 1 ≤ n ≤ 15
under the condition (5.3).
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Ξp(n) 2 2 2 3 4 6 9 13 19 28 42 63 95 143 216
Table 5.5: The number of steady states, Ξp(n), of the ESPD on a path of order 1 ≤ n ≤ 15 under the
condition (5.3). These values were computed via (5.4).
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5.3.2 The game dynamics for small values of T
Those states of the ESPD on a path that are not attracted by the all-defector state, 〈D〉n, under
the condition (5.3) are characterised in the following result.
Theorem 5.3 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a path of order n and (5.3) holds, then
the game states that are not attracted by the all-defector steady-state 〈D〉n are exactly those
states containing at least one of the substates 〈C〉5, DD〈C〉3DD, DD〈C〉4D, [CCDD or [〈C〉3
(or their reverses).
Proof: First it is shown that it is sufficient for a game state St during round t to contain one
of the five substates mentioned above in order for cooperation to persist. To achieve this, it
is shown that either St or St+1 necessarily contains the substate DD〈C〉iDD for some integer
i ≥ 3; the result then follows by Lemma 5.2(c).
If 〈C〉5 ⊆ St, then there exists an integer i ≥ 5 such that a = DD〈C〉iDD, b = CD〈C〉iDD,
c = CD〈C〉iDC or d = DD〈C〉iDC is a substate of St. If a ⊆ St, then cooperation persists
by Lemma 5.2(c). If b ⊆ St or d ⊆ St, then 〈D〉3〈C〉i−1DD ⊆ St or DD〈C〉i−1〈D〉3 ⊆
St+1, respectively, and so cooperation persists by Lemma 5.2(c). Finally, if c ⊆ St, then the
cooperators in the underlined substates of c = CDC〈C〉i−2CDC become defectors during round
t + 1, in which case DD〈C〉i−2DD ⊆ St+1 and so cooperation persists by Lemma 5.2(c). In
all four cases it therefore follows that the states St and St+1 are not in the component that
contains the all-defector state.
If DD〈C〉3DD ⊆ St, then it follows directly by Lemma 5.2(c) that cooperation persists and
hence the state St is not in in the same component as the all-defector steady state.
If DD〈C〉4D ⊆ St, then either DD〈C〉4DD ⊆ St, DD〈C〉4DC ⊆ St or DD〈C〉4D] ⊆ St. In
the first case cooperation persists by Lemma 5.2(c) and hence St is not in the component that
contains the all-defector steady state. In the second case each cooperator in the underlined
substate of DD〈C〉3CDC becomes a defector during round t+ 1, so that DD〈C〉3DD ⊆ St+1.
In the third case the underlined cooperator in the substate DD〈C〉3CD] becomes a defector
during round t+ 1, so that DD〈C〉DD ⊆ St+1. Therefore cooperation also persists in this case
by Lemma 5.2(c) and so the states St and St+1 are not in the component that contains the
all-defector steady state.
If [CCDD ⊆ St, then this substate persists to round t+ 1 by Lemma 5.2(b).
If [〈C〉i ⊆ St for some integer i ≥ 3, then either St = [〈C〉i], or St = [〈C〉iD, which evolves to
[〈C〉i−1DD during round t + 1, a substate which persists to round t + 2 by Lemma 5.2(b), or
else St contains one of the substates e = [〈C〉iDD or f = [〈C〉iDC. The substate e persists to
round t + 1 by Lemma 5.2(c), while the substate f evolves to [〈C〉i−1DDD, which persists to
round t+ 2 by Lemma 5.2(b)–(c).
For the converse it is shown that it is necessary for a game state to contain one of the five
stated substates in order for cooperation to persist. There are three possible ways in which a
game state can contain an endpoint cooperation run of length at most 2 during round t, namely
[CD, [CCDD or [CCDC. The first and last of these substates evolve during round t + 1 to
[DD or [CDDD, respectively. Therefore [CCDD is the only endpoint substate containing a
cooperation run of length at most 2 which allows for the persistence of cooperation (by Lemma
5.2(b)). Any endpoint substate containing a cooperation run of length at least 3 persists to the
next round, as shown above.
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It follows from Lemma 5.2(b)–(c) that an interior cooperation run of length at least 3 is required
for the persistence of cooperation.
The four possible substates containing a run of three cooperators are DD〈C〉3DD, CD〈C〉3DC,
CD〈C〉3DD and DD〈C〉3DC, but only the first of these substates allows for the persistence
of cooperation by Lemma 5.2(c), since the other three substates lead to the progressions
CD〈C〉3DC → 〈D〉3C〈D〉3, CD〈C〉3DD → 〈D〉3CCDD and DD〈C〉3DC → DDCC〈D〉3 dur-
ing the following round of the game.
Two game substates containing a cooperation run of length 3 that have not yet been considered
are those in which the run is adjacent to an endpoint defector, namely [D〈C〉3DD, [D〈C〉3DC
and [D〈C〉3D]. These three substates evolve to [DDCCDD, [DDC〈D〉3 and [DDCDD], re-
spectively. Therefore DD〈C〉3DD is the only substate in which an internal cooperation run
persists.
There are only three cases in which a cooperation run of length 4 is not flanked on at least
one end by a defection run of length at least 2, namely CD〈C〉4DC, [D〈C〉4D] or [D〈C〉4DC.
Since these substates evolve to 〈D〉3CC〈D〉3, [DDCCDD] and [DDCC〈D〉3 within one round,
respectively, the only case in which an internal cooperation run of length 4 can persist is if it is
flanked on at least one end by two defectors.
Finally, every possible substate containing a run of length at least five cooperators leads to
persistent cooperation, as shown above. 
The state graphs for the ESPD on a path of order n is shown in Figure 5.4 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 6.
Note that the state graphs in the figure are pseudo-forests and that the number of cooperators
is non-increasing from round to round. The results of Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 may be verified for
3 ≤ n ≤ 6 in the figure.
5.3.3 The probability of persistent cooperation for small values of T
In this section the probability, Pp(n), that some form of cooperation will persist from a randomly
generated initial state of the ESPD on a path of order n is determined. Denote by Sn the set con-
taining all binary strings of length n that do not contain any of the substrings s1 = DDCCCDD,
s2 = DCCCCDD, s3 = DDCCCCD, s4 = CCCCC, s5 = [CCDD, s6 = DDCC], s7 = [CCC
or s8 = CCC] as listed in Table 5.6(a). The symbols ‘[’ and ‘]’ again indicate that the substring
occurs on a left or right endpoint of the path. Furthermore, let an be the number of strings
contained in the set Sn. Then the number of initial states leading to some form of persistence
of cooperation is ψp(n) = 2
n − an by Theorem 5.3.
Let zn be the number of binary strings contained in Sn starting with [D. Similarly, let un,
wn and vn be the number of binary strings contained in Sn starting with [C, [DD and [DC,
respectively. A summary of the variables introduced in this section and their definitions is given
in Table 5.6(b).
It follows directly from the definitions of an, zn and un that
an = zn + un and (5.8)
zn = wn + vn. (5.9)
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(a) n = 3 (b) n = 4
(c) n = 5
(d) n = 6
Figure 5.4: The ESPD state graph for the case where T ≤ 2 − P and the underlying graph is a path
of order n. The strategy of cooperation (C) is denoted by a black square, while that of defection (D) is
denoted by a white square in each state which is represented by a linear array of squares.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.3. The ESPD on a path for small values of T 61
Substring
s1 = DDCCCDD
s2 = DCCCCDD
s3 = DDCCCCD
s4 = CCCCC
s5 = [CCDD
s6 = DDCC]
s7 = [CCC
s8 = CCC]
(a)
Variable Value
an |Sn|
un |{s ∈ Sn|s = C...}|
vn |{s ∈ Sn|s = DC...}|
wn |{s ∈ Sn|s = DD...}|
zn |{s ∈ Sn|s = D...}|
(b)
Table 5.6: (a) Persistence of cooperation is possible on paths of order 3 or more if and only if one
of these substrings are present, according to Theorem 5.3. (b) A summary of the variables used to
enumerate the initial game states leading to some form of persistent cooperation and their definitions.
Each variable represents the size of a subset of Sn.
The value un, representing the number of binary strings contained in Sn starting with [C, is
given by
un = an−1 − x+ y,
where x is the number of strings that are in Sn−1, but would not be in Sn if ‘C’ is joined to the
front of the strings and y is the number of strings that are not in Sn−1, but would be in Sn if
‘C’ is joined to the front of the strings. Here y = 0 since all the strings containing one or more
of the substrings listed in Table 5.6(a) would still contain those substrings after joining C to the
front of the binary string. To determine the value of x, note that only the substrings s5 or s7
can be created by joining a ‘C’ to the front of a string contained in Sn−1. For these substrings
to be introduced, the string of length n− 1 must be of either the form [CDD . . . or [CCDC . . .
A binary string of the form [CDD . . . contained in Sn−1 becomes [CCDD . . ., which is not in
Sn and a binary string of the form [CCDC . . . in Sn−1 becomes [CCCDC . . ., which is not in
Sn. The number of strings of the form [CDD . . . not in Sn−1 is wn−2 and the number of strings
of the form [CCDC . . . not in Sn−1 is vn−3. Therefore,
un = an−1 − vn−3 − wn−2. (5.10)
The number of binary strings zn is given by
zn = an−1 − x′ + y′,
where x′ is the number of strings that are in Sn−1 but would not be in Sn if a ‘D’ is joined to
the front of the strings and y′ is the number of strings that are not in Sn−1 but would be in Sn
if ‘D’ is joined to the front of the strings.
The substrings that can be introduced by joining a ‘D’ to the front of a string contained in Sn−1
are s1, s2 and s3. For these substrings to be introduced, the string of length n−1 must be of the
form [DCCCDD . . ., [CCCCDD . . . or [DCCCCD . . . Note that no string of length n−1 of the
form [CCCCDD . . . or [DCCCCDD . . . is in Sn−1 since it already contains substring s7 and s2
respectively. The number of strings in Sn−1 of the form [DCCCDD . . . and [DCCCCDC . . .
are wn−5 and vn−6, respectively. Therefore x′ = wn−5 + vn−6.
The variable y′ counts those strings which contain only one of the substrings at an endpoint that
would ‘break’ if a ‘D’ is joined to the front of the string. The strings that have this property are
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those that contain one of the endpoint substrings s5 or s7, while containing none of the other
substrings s1, s2, s3, s4 or s6. That is, strings of length n−1 of the form [CCDD . . ., [CCCD . . . ,
[CCCCDC . . . and [CCCCDD . . ., which become [DCCDD . . ., [DCCCD . . ., [DCCCCDC . . .
and [DCCCCDD . . ., respectively. All of these binary strings, except the last, is in Sn. The
number of binary strings of length n − 1 of the form [CCDD . . . not containing any of the
substrings, except s5, is wn−3. The number of strings of the forms [CCCD . . . and [CCCCDC . . .
are zn−4 and vn−5, respectively. Therefore y′ = wn−3 + zn−4 + vn−5, and so
zn = an−1 − (wn−5 + vn−6) + (wn−3 + zn−4 + vn−5)
= an−1 + vn−5 − vn−6 + wn−3 − wn−5 + zn−4. (5.11)
An expression for vn in terms of un, vn, wn and zn can be found by using a similar approach to
that used to derive (5.11), with the result that
vn = un−1 + vn−5 + wn−3 + zn−4. (5.12)
Substituting (5.9) and (5.10) into (5.8) and rewriting the result, yields
an − an−1 = wn − wn−2 + vn − vn−3. (5.13)
Replacing zn and zn−4 in (5.11) using (5.9) and rewriting the equation to make an−1 the subject
yields
an−1 = vn − vn−4 − vn−5 + vn−6 + wn − wn−3 − wn−4 + wn−5. (5.14)
Substituting (5.9) into (5.12) and rewriting to make un the subject of the equation yields
un−1 = vn − vn−4 − vn−5 − wn−3 − wn−4. (5.15)
The equation (5.10) can be written as
un−1 = an−2 − vn−4 − wn−3,
and substituting this into (5.15) yields
wn−4 = −an−2 + vn − vn−5.
Using this equation to substitute the expressions for wn in (5.13) and (5.14) yields the system
of equations
an+2 − an−1 = vn+4 − vn+2 + vn − vn−1, (5.16)
an+2 − an−2 + an − 3 = vn+4 − vn+1. (5.17)
It follows from (5.16) and (5.17) themselves, as well as from appropriate left and right shifts of
their indices, that the linear system
an+2 − an−1 = vn+4 − vn+2 + vn − vn−1,
an+2 − an−2 + an−3 = vn+4 − vn+1,
an+3 − an = vn+5 − vn+3 + vn+1 − vn,
an+3 − an−1 + an−2 = vn+5 − vn+2,
an+1 − an−2 = vn+3 − vn+1 + vn−1 − vn−2,
an−1 − an−5 + an−6 = vn+1 − vn−2
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must be satisfied. The aim is to find a combination of these equations such that all the v-
variables add to zero, leaving a single equation containing only the a-variable, in other words,
to find values for Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4 and Z5 such that
vn+4 − vn+2 + vn − vn−1 = Z1(vn+4 − vn+1) + Z2(vn+5 − vn+3 + vn+1 − vn)
+ Z3(vn+5 − vn+2) + Z4(vn+3 − vn+1 + vn−1 − vn−2) + Z5(vn+1 − vn−2). (5.18)
Solving the over-specified system
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 0 0
−1 1 0 −1 1
0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 −1


Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
 =

0
1
0
−1
0
1
−1
0

,
which results from collecting similar terms in (5.18), yields the values Z1 = 1, Z2 = −1, Z3 = 1,
Z4 = −1 and Z5 = 1, which, in turn, results in the recursive expression
an = an−1 + an−2 + an−3 + an−4 − an−6 + an−7. (5.19)
The values required to seed (5.19) are listed in Table 5.7 and were determined by brute force
counting. The arguments of this section lead to the following result.
Theorem 5.4 The probability that a randomly generated initial state of the ESPD on a path of
order n will lead to some form of persistent cooperation is given by
Pp(n) = 1− an
2n
,
where an satisfies (5.19) with seed values as specified in Table 5.7.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
1 3 7 11 21 42 81
Table 5.7: The values required to seed the recurrence relation for an in (5.19).
The values of an are given in Table 5.8 for small values of n and the probability that cooperation
will persist for a randomly generated initial state is shown in Figure 5.5.
In order to study the asymptotic behaviour of Pp(n) as n→∞ the following intermediate result
is required.
Lemma 5.4 The terms in the sequence (a1, a2, a3, . . .) are positive and strictly increasing.
Proof: By the strong form of induction. It follows directly from the observed values in Table 5.7
that the result of the lemma holds for 1 ≤ n ≤ 7. This establishes the base case. Assume, as
induction hypothesis, that an > an−1 > 0 for all n ≤ k. Substituting k + 1 for n in (5.19) gives
ak+1 = ak + ak−1 + ak−2 + ak−3 − ak−5 + ak−6.
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n→ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
an 1 3 7 11 21 42 81 153 293 565 1 082 2 072 3 973
2n 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1 024 2 048 4 096 8 192
n→ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
an 7 620 14 607 28 000 53 683 102 920 197 309 378 265 725 190 1 390 291
2n 16 384 32 768 65 536 131 072 262 144 524 288 1 048 576 2 097 152 4 194 304
Table 5.8: Information for computing the probability of randomly generating a state of the ESPD on a
path of order n which is not attracted by the all-defector steady state 〈D〉n. The probability is 1−an/2n
according to Theorem 5.4.
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Path order (n)
T ≤ 2− P , seed values
T ≤ 2− P , recursive values
T > 2− P , Pp(n) = 2−n
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Figure 5.5: The probability of randomly generating a game state for the ESPD on a path of order n
which is not attracted by the all-defector steady state.
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Since ak−3 > ak−5 by the induction hypothesis and all the other terms in the above equation
are positive, it follows that ak+1 > ak > 0. 
The result above may be used to establish the limiting behaviour of the probability Pp(n) as
n→∞.
Theorem 5.5 Let Pp(n) denote the probability that a randomly generated initial state of the
ESPD on a path of order n is not attracted by the all-defector steady state, 〈D〉n. Then
lim
n→∞Pp(n) = 1.
Proof: Let Rn = an−2 + an−3 + an−4 − an−6 + an−7. Then it follows by (5.19) that
an = an−1 +Rn. (5.20)
Shifting the indices in (5.19) yields
an−1 = an−2 + an−3 + an−4 + an−5 − an−7 + an−8.
Taking the difference between an−1 and Rn gives
an−1 −Rn = an−5 + an−6 − an−7 + an−8,
and since an > an−1 by Lemma 5.4, the right-hand side of the above expression is positive,
which implies that Rn < an−1. Hence it follows by (5.20) that 0 < an < 2an−1. Dividing by 2n
yields
0 <
an
2n
<
an−1
2n−1
.
and therefore the sequence a12 ,
a2
22
, a3
23
, . . . is monotonically decreasing and strictly positive. It
thus follows by [1, Theorem 8.6] that the sequence (an/2
n)∞n=1 converges. Assume that the value
to which the sequence converges is L, that is
lim
n→∞
an
2n
= L. (5.21)
From (5.19) the left-hand side of (5.21) can be written as
lim
n→∞
an
2n
= lim
n→∞
an−1 + an−2 + an−3 + an−4 − an−6 + an−7
2n
= lim
n→∞
( an−1
2 · 2n−1 +
an−2
22 · 2n−2 +
an−3
23 · 2n−3 +
an−4
24 · 2n−4 −
an−6
26 · 2n−6 +
an−7
27 · 2n−7
)
.
Rewriting and taking the limits therefore yields
lim
n→∞
an
2n
=
1
2
lim
n→∞
an−1
2n−1
+
1
22
lim
n→∞
an−2
2n−2
+
1
23
lim
n→∞
an−3
2n−3
+
1
24
lim
n→∞
an−4
2n−4
− 1
26
lim
n→∞
an−6
2n−6
+
1
27
lim
n→∞
an−7
2n−7
= L ·
(
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
23
+
1
24
− 1
26
+
1
27
)
.
It follows by (5.21) that
L ·
(
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
23
+
1
24
− 1
26
+
1
27
)
= L,
which implies L = 0. 
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5.4 The ESPD on a cycle for small values of T
In this section the focus is on the dynamics of the ESPD on a cycle of order n. The same
approached is followed as for the ESPD on a path and the corresponding proofs are similar to
some extent. The steady states of the ESPD on a cycle are characterised, and this is followed
by a description of the game dynamics in the case where T ≤ 2 − P . Finally, the probability
of randomly generating an initial state which leads to some form of persistent cooperation is
determined.
5.4.1 Characterisation of steady states for small values of T
According to Corollary 5.1 no form of cooperation can persist in the long run for large values
of T , except in the singular case where all players initially already cooperate. For large values
of T the two trivial steady states, 〈C〉n and 〈D〉n, are the only steady states. It is shown next
that, as for the case of the ESPD on a path, cooperation runs of length 1 or 2 cannot persist in
the ESPD on a cycle, while a cooperation run of length at least three can indeed persist, but
only if flanked by two non-isolated defectors.
Lemma 5.5 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a cycle and (5.3) holds, then
(a) no cooperation run of length 1 can persist to the next round of the game,
(b) no cooperation run of length 2 can persist to the next round of the game,
(c) a cooperation run of length at least 3 persists to the next round of the game if and only if
it is flanked by two defection runs, each of length at least 2.
The proof of Lemma 5.5 is similar to that of Lemma 5.2. Using Lemma 5.5 it is possible to
characterise the steady states of the ESPD on a cycle. Note that again the number of steady
states, up to automorphism, is the same as the number of components contained in the state
graph.
Theorem 5.6 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a cycle of order n and (5.3) holds, then
the number of components, Ξc(n), of the state graph is given by
2 +
bn
5
c∑
i=1
1
2i
(n−3i−1
2i−1
)
+
∑
j∈S
((n−3i) gcd(i,j)/i−1
2 gcd(i,j)−1
)
+ i
bn−5i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 5i− 2k + 1)(k+i−2i−2 )
 , (5.22)
where S = {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}. Moreover, the steady states of the game
are 〈C〉n, 〈D〉n and all those states in which each cooperation run has length at least 3 and each
defection run has length at least 2.
Proof: Let Qi denote the number of states, up to automorphism, comprising i defection runs
starting with a run of cooperators and ending with a run of defectors, that is, steady states of
the form
CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 3
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 4
· · · CCC · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i−1
DD · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i
, (5.23)
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where each run has been populated above with the smallest number of cooperators and defec-
tors, respectively, in order to ensure the persistence of cooperators and defectors according to
Lemma 5.5.
The partial state (5.23) contains 5i symbols, leaving a total of n− 5i indistinguishable symbols
to distribute amongst the 2i distinguishable runs. Since the underlying graph is a cycle, the
endpoints in the representation (5.23) are chosen arbitrarily. Therefore, all steady states or their
mirror images can be represented by (5.23), except the all-defector and all-cooperator steady
states. The total number of steady states is given by
2 +
bn
5
c∑
i=1
Qi
which, by Theorem 5.1, is the same as the number of components in the state graph.
The value of Qi for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bn5 c} may be determined using the Cauchy-Frobenius lemma
(see Theorem 2.1). Let X be the set of all states of the form (5.23), let ι be the identity
permutation on the sequence of runs of a state s ∈ X , let ρj be the permutation which modular
shifts each run 2j positions to the right, and let δ be the operation which reverses the order of
the runs such that the first run remains in its original position, followed by run 2i, 2i − 1 and
so on. It can be shown that the set {ι, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρi−1, δ, δρ1, δρ2, . . . , δρi−1} forms a
group, G, of order 2i, under the binary operator of the composition of functions. According to
Theorem 2.1, the number of equivalence classes into which X is partitioned by G is
Qi =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|, (5.24)
where |Fg| is the number of states in X that remain invariant under g.
The identity operator ι leaves all elements of X unchanged. Therefore |Fι| = |X |, which is the
number of ways of distributing the remaining n− 5i indistinguishable symbols amongst the 2i
distinguishable runs, that is
|Fι| =
(
n− 3i− 1
2i− 1
)
. (5.25)
Applying ρ1 to a state s ∈ X maps run i of s to run i + 2; the number of symbols in runs 1
and 2 determine the number of symbols in runs 3 and 4 which, in turn, determine the number
of symbols in runs 5 and 6, and so on. The result of applying the operator ρ1 to a state is
illustrated in Figure 5.6. In order for the a state to remain invariant under ρ1 each pair of runs
must contain the same number of symbols. Therefore, distributing (n − 5i) 22i symbols among
the first two runs determines the structure of the entire state. There are
|Fρ1 | =
(n−5i
i + 1
1
)
=
n− 5i
i
+ 1
ways of distributing n−5ii indistinguishable symbols among two distinguishable runs.
In general, if the shift ρj is applied to a state s, fixing at most the first j pairs of runs would
determine all the subsequent runs. The operation may be seen as modular shifting the pairs
of cooperator-defector runs in blocks of length j. If j divides i, then exactly the first j pairs
of runs determines the remaining 2(i− j) runs. Otherwise the number of runs that need to be
fixed is determined by the greatest common denominator d = gcd(i, j). Fixing the first d pairs
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1 2 3 · · · 2i2i− 1s
piρ1(s) 2i2i− 1 1 2 3
4 5
· · · 2i− 22i− 3
Figure 5.6: Applying the permutation ρ1 to the labels of a state s. The highlighted runs are those that
determine the remaining runs in order to leave the state s invariant under ρ1.
of runs determines the remaining states. Therefore, (n − 5i)2d2i symbols need to be distributed
among the first 2d runs, which can be done in
|Fρj | =
(
(n− 5i)d/i+ 2d− 1
2d− 1
)
=
(
(n− 3i)d/i− 1
2d− 1
)
distinct ways. However, if ndi is not an integer, then there are not enough symbols available to
complete the pattern of runs in the state that would be invariant under ρj with the result that
|Fρj | = 0. Therefore
|Fρj | =
{((n−3i) gcd(i,j)/i−1
2 gcd(i,j)−1
)
if i | n gcd(i, j),
0 otherwise.
(5.26)
The result of applying the permutation δ to the runs in a state s is shown in Figure 5.7. The
runs labelled 1 to i+ 1 determine the number of symbols in the runs labelled i+ 2 to 2i. Two
of the runs, 1 and i+ 1, are projected onto themselves under the permutation δ.
1 2 3 2i− 1 2i
231 2i 2i− 1
i i+ 1
i+ 2 i+ 1
i+ 2
i
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
s
piδ(s)
Figure 5.7: Applying the permutation δ to the labels of a state s. The highlighted runs are those that
determine the remaining runs in order to leave the state s invariant under δ.
For a state to be invariant under the permutation δ, the state must contain an equal number of
players in each run and the run’s equivalent under the permutation. Therefore, distributing k
indistinguishable symbols among the i−1 distinguishable runs that do not map onto themselves
under the permutation δ determines the placement of 2k symbols. This can be done in
(
k+i−2
i−2
)
different ways. Note that 0 ≤ 2k ≤ n − 5i. The remaining n − 5i − 2k symbols must then be
distributed among the two runs that do map onto themselves under δ. There are
(
n−5i−2k+1
1
)
=
n − 5i − 2k + 1 different ways of doing this. There are thus (n − 5i − 2k + 1)(k+i−2i−2 ) different
ways of distributing the symbols among the runs such that the state remains invariant under
the permutation δ and a total of k symbols are distributed among runs 2 to i + 1. Summing
over the possible values of k gives the total number of states that remain invariant under δ, that
is
|Fδ| =
bn−5i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 5i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)
.
1 2 3
23 1
i+ 1
i+ 2
i+ 2· · ·
· · · i+ 3
i+ 3
i+ 1
· · ·
· · · 5 4
2i2i− 1s
piδρ1(s)
Figure 5.8: Applying the permutation δρ1 to the labels of a state. The highlighted runs are those that
determine the remaining runs in order to leave the state s invariant under δρ1.
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Figure 5.8 shows the result of applying the permutation δρ1 to the labels of the runs of a game
state s. Note that the runs labelled 2 and i+ 2 are mapped to themselves, while runs 3 to i+ 1
map to runs i+ 3 to 1, considering the labels in a modular fashion. The result of applying δρ2
is shown in Figure 5.9. In general, it holds for the permutation which reverses the order of the
runs and then shifts the runs j positions to the left, δρj , that runs j+ 1 and i+ j+ 1 map onto
themselves, while runs j + 2 through i+ j are mapped to runs i+ j + 1 through j. Therefore,
distributing k symbols among the runs that do not map to themselves determines the placement
of 2k symbols, leaving n − 5i − k symbols to be distributed among runs j + 1 and i + j + 1.
Hence there are
|Fδρj | =
bn−5i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 5i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)
(5.27)
states that remain invariant under δρj .
1 2 3 · · · · · · 2i2i− 1
5 4 3 · · · i+ 3i+ 4 i+ 2 · · · 7 6
i+ 2 i+ 4i+ 3s
piδρ2(s)
Figure 5.9: Applying the permutation δρ2 to the labels of a state. The highlighted runs are those that
determine the remaining runs in order to leave the state s invariant under δρ2.
Substituting (5.25), (5.26) and (5.27) into (5.24) gives
Qi =
1
2i
(n−3i−1
2i−1
)
+
∑
j∈S
((n−3i) gcd(i,j)/i−1
2 gcd(i,j)−1
)
+ i
bn−5i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 5i− 2k + 1)(k+i−2i−2 )
 ,
where S = {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}, which completes the proof. 
The number of steady states, or components, in the state graph of the ESPD on a cycle of order
n are tabulated in Table 5.5 for small values of n.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Ξc(n) 2 2 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 11 15 19 26 34 46 61 85 115 162
Table 5.9: The number of steady states, Ξc(n), of the ESPD on a cycle of order 1 ≤ n ≤ 20 under the
condition (5.3). These values were computed via (5.22).
5.4.2 The game dynamics for small values of T
The following theorem characterises those initial game states of the ESPD on a cycle which lead
to some form of persistent cooperation for small values of the parameter T .
Theorem 5.7 If the underlying graph of the ESPD is a cycle and (5.3) holds, then any state
containing at least one of the substates 〈C〉5, DD〈C〉3DD or DD〈C〉4D (or its reverse substate
D〈C〉4DD) is not in the component of the state graph which contains the all-defector steady
state.
The proof of Theorem 5.7 is similar to that of Theorem 5.3.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 Chapter 5. Analysing game dynamics by analytical means
The state graphs for the ESPD on an n-cycle are shown in Figure 5.10 for 5 ≤ n ≤ 8. Note that
the state graph graphs are pseudo-forests and that the number of cooperators is non-increasing
from round to round.
5.4.3 The probability of persistent cooperation for small values of T
In this section the probability, Pc(n), that some form of cooperation will persist from a ran-
domly generated intial state of the ESPD on an n-cycle is determined. Let bn be the total num-
ber of words of length n containing none of the forbidden substrings CCCCC, DCCCCDD,
DDCCCCD or DDCCCDD mentioned in Theorem 5.7, but containing at least one D. The
value of bn for n ≥ 7 may be determined using the transfer matrix method described in §2.3.
A similar approach as the one used to derive (5.19) was attempted, but yielded a large set of
interdependent variables which were difficult to determine. The transfer matrix method, on the
other hand, proved to be a much simpler and a more direct approach when the underlying graph
is a cycle.
A string is said to be a legal string if it contains none of the substrings mentioned in Theorem 5.7.
Let D6 be the digraph of order 64 in which each vertex represents one of the 64 binary strings
of length six. A vertex vi, representing the string s1s2s3s4s5s6, is incident to a vertex vj ,
representing string s2s3s4s5s6s7 in D6 if and only if s1s2s3s4s5s6s7 is a legal string. The graph
D6 is shown in Figure 5.12. Counting the number of strings, bn, for values of n ≥ 7 is equivalent
to counting the number of closed directed walks of length n in D6. Note that every legal string
of length n ≥ 7 has a corresponding closed directed walk in D6. Consider, as an example, the
closed walk associated with the string DCDDDCDD in Figure 5.11.
Let A be the adjacency matrix of the digraph D6, as shown in Table 5.13. Then det(I−xA) =
1− x− x2 − x3 − x4 + x6 − x7, and it follows by Lemma 2.2 that
∞∑
n=1
bnx
n = −x
(−1− 2x− 3x2 − 4x3 + 6x5 − 7x6)
1− x− x2 − x3 − x4 + x6 − x7 . (5.28)
It therefore follows by Lemma 2.1 that bn may be calculated recursively by means of the rela-
tionship
bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 − bn−6 + bn−7, (5.29)
The seed values for (5.29) may be found by taking the McClaurin expansion of (5.28), that is
−x
(−1− 2x− 3x2 − 4x3 + 6x5 − 7x6)
1− x− x2 − x3 − x4 + x6 − x7 = x+ 3x
2 + 7x3 + 15x4 + 26x5 + 45x6 + 99x7 + · · · .
These seed values are the coefficients of the expansion above, and are listed in Table 5.10. The
values b∗1, . . . , b∗6 mereley serve to seed (5.29) and are not equivalent to b1, . . . , b6.
b∗1 b∗2 b∗3 b∗4 b∗5 b∗6 b7
1 3 7 15 26 45 99
Table 5.10: The values required to seed the recurrence equation for bn in (5.29).
The arguments of this section lead to the following result.
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(a) n = 5 (b) n = 6
(c) n = 7
(d) n = 8
Figure 5.10: The state graph of the ESPD on an n-cycle, for 5 ≤ n ≤ 8, for the case where T ≤ 2−P .
The strategy of cooperation (C) is denoted by a black square, while that of defection (D) is denoted by
a white square in each state which is represented by a wrapping array of squares.
DDCDDD DCDDDC CDDDCD DDDCDD
DDCDDDDCDDDCCDDDCDDDDCDD
Figure 5.11: The closed directed walk in the digraph D6 associated with the string DCDDDCDD.
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DDDDDDDDDDDC
DDDDCD
DDDDCC
DDDCDD
DDDCDC
DDDCCC
DDDCCD
DDCDDC
DDCDDD
DDCDCD
DDCDCC
DDCCDD
DDCCDC
DDCCCD
DDCCCC
DCDDDDDCDDDC
DCDDCD
DCDDCC
DCDCDD
DCDCDC
DCDCCD
DCDCCC
DCCDDD
DCCDDC
DCCDCD
DCCDCC
DCCCDC
CDDDDDCDDDDC
CDDDCD
CDDDCC
CDDCDDCDDCDC
CDDCCD
CDDCCC
CDCDDD
CDCDDC
CDCDCD
CDCDCC
CDCCDD
CDCCDC
CDCCCD
CDCCCC
CCDDDD
CCDDDC
CCDDCD
CCDDCC
CCDCDD
CCDCDC
CCDCCD
CCDCCC
DCCCDD
CCCDDD
CCCDDC
CCCDCD
CCCDCC
DCCCCD
CCCCDC
CCCCDD
Figure 5.12: The digraph D6 used to calculate the number of words of length n which do not contain
any of the substrings listed in Theorem 5.7.
1 20 40 61
1
20
40
61
1 20 40 61
1
20
40
61
Figure 5.13: A visual representation of the adjacency matrix A of the digraph D6. Black squares
indicate entries of the matrix equal to 1; the remaining entries are all 0.
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Cycle order (n)
T ≤ 2− P
T > 2− P
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Figure 5.14: The probability of randomly generating an initial state for the ESPD on a cycle of order
n which is not attracted by the all-defector steady state.
Theorem 5.8 The probability that a randomly generated initial state of the ESPD on a cycle
of order n ≥ 7 will lead to persistent cooperation is given by
Pc(n) = 1− bn
2n
,
where bn satisfies (5.29) with seed values as specified in Table 5.10.
The values of bn for small values of n are listed in Table 5.11 and the probability that some form
of cooperation will persist from a randomly generated initial game state is shown graphically
in Figure 5.14. The asymptotic behaviour of Pc(n) as n → ∞ is described in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.9 Let Pc(n) denote the probability that a randomly generated intial state of the
ESPD on a cycle of order n is not attracted by the all-defector steady state, 〈D〉n. Then
lim
n →∞Pc(n) = 1.
The proof of Theorem 5.9 is similar to that of Theorem 5.5.
5.5 Chapter summary
Analytical means were employed in this chapter to analyse the game dynamics of the ESPD on
a path or cycle. It was found that the number of states in the ESPD on a path or a cycle of
order n increases exponentially as the order n of the underlying graph increases. This number
of components is shown graphically in Figure 5.15 as a function of the underlying graph order.
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n→ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
bn 1 3 7 15 31 57 99 183 349 668 1 288 2 469 4 720
2n 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1 024 2 048 4 096 8 192
n→ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
bn 9 061 17 372 33 303 63 836 122 391 234 651 449 840 862 407 1 653 358
2n 16 384 32 768 65 536 131 072 262 144 524 288 1 048 576 2 097 152 4 194 304
Table 5.11: Information for computing the probability of randomly generating an initial state of the
ESPD on a cycle of order n which is not attracted by the all-defector steady state 〈D〉n. This probability
is 1− bn/2n according to Theorem 5.8.
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Underlying graph order (n)
Path
Cycle
5 10 15 20
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
4 000
4 500
Figure 5.15: The number of components of the state graph for the ESPD where the underlying graph
is either a path of order n or an n-cycle.
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Underlying graph order (n)
Path, T ≤ 2− P
Cycle, T ≤ 2− P
Both cases, T > 2− P
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Figure 5.16: The probability of randomly generating an initial state for the ESPD on a path of order
n or an n-cycle which is not attracted by the all-defector steady state.
It was shown that for large values of T (i.e. for T > 2− P ), cooperation is only possible if the
initial game state contains cooperators only. However, it is possible for cooperation to persist in
the case were T ≤ 2− P even if the initial state does not contain cooperators only. The initial
states which lead to persistent cooperation were characterised for the ESPD on a path or cycle.
If the underlying graph is a path or a cycle of order n > 7, then the number of states which do
not lead to persistent cooperation may be calculated by means of the recursive relationship
fn = fn−1 + fn−2 + fn−3 + fn−4 − fn−6 + fn−7.
The values used to seed the above relationship depends on whether the underlying graph is a
path or a cycle. If the underlying graph is a path, then the values used to seed the relationship
are f1 = 1, f2 = 3, f3 = 7, f4 = 11, f5 = 21, f6 = 42, and f7 = 81. However, if the underlying
graph is a cycle, then the values used to seed the relationship are f1 = 1, f2 = 3, f3 = 7,
f4 = 15, f5 = 26, f6 = 45 and f7 = 99. The probability of randomly generating an initial game
state that will lead to some form of persistent cooperation may be computed using the formula
P (n) = 1 − fn/2n. It was found that the likelihood of cooperation increases towards certainty
as the order of the underlying graph increases; this is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.16.
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CHAPTER 6
The ESPD on a grid graph
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In this chapter the dynamics of the ESPD is investigated with a grid graph as underlying graph.
A grid graph has a number of symmetries which give rise to more interesting game state auto-
morphism classes than in the case with paths and cycles as underlying graphs. These symmetries
on square and rectangular grids are determined and the corresponding automorphism classes
are enumerated.
The P -T phase plane is constructed for both grids with and without wrapping. It is possible to
visualise the complete game dynamics for the EPSD on small grids by drawing the state graphs
of the game. State graphs are constructed for the ESPD on grid graphs of dimensions 2 × 2,
3 × 3, 2 × 3 and 2 × 4 for each region in the phase plane. However, as the dimensions of the
underlying graph increases the number of state automorphism classes increases exponentially
and a complete analysis of the game is no longer possible if the underlying graph is sufficiently
large.
6.1 Automorphism classes of game states
There are 2nm ways of assigning one of the strategies C or D to the players in the ESPD on
a grid graph of dimensions m × n. Due to the symmetries in the underlying graph, a number
of these states may be considered equivalent. The game states of the ESPD with the cartesian
product C3 × C3 as the underlying graph are shown as an example in Table 6.1, where Cn
77
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denotes a cycle of order n, as in Chapter 5. Although there are 29 = 512 distinct game states,
these states organise themselves into 26 automorphism classes, as indicated in the table.
6.1.1 Game state automorphism classes for grids without wrapping
Counting the number of game state automorphism classes for the ESPD on a grid graph is
equivalent to counting the number of ways that a checkerboard can be coloured using two
colours; this may be achieved using the Cauchy-Frobenius lemma, as discussed by Martin [27].
Martin [27] applied this enumeration method to square checkerboards, whereas the method is
presented here for counting the number of state automorphism classes for square grid graphs
without wrapping and is then extended to include rectangular grid graphs as well.
The dimensions of the graph influence the number of symmetries present in the graph and hence
also the automorphisms that need to be considered. The underlying graph may be a square grid
with odd or even dimensions, or a rectangular grid with none, one or both of its dimensions
odd.
Consider first the square Cartesian product Pn × Pn as underlying graph of the ESPD, where
Pn again denotes a path of order n. There are eight transformations that may be applied to
the graph G which preserves the adjacencies of the graph; these are exactly the elements of the
dihedral group D4, namely: identity (ι), rotation through 90◦ (ρ), rotation through 180◦ (ρ2),
rotation through −90◦ (ρ3), the two reflections about the diagonals (σp and σm), and the two
reflections about the perpendicular bisector of the sides (σv and σh). The axes of symmetry for
grids of odd and even dimensions are shown in Figure 6.1(a) and (b), respectively. Note that
in the case where the grid has odd dimensions, the axes of symmetry intersect at the centre
point of the centre cell, whereas if the dimensions are even, the axes of symmetry intersect at
the common corner of the four centre cells.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.1: Square grids of (a) even and (b) odd dimensions, with the axes of symmetry indicated by
means of black dashed and solid lines.
Let X be the set of all the states of the ESPD with G = Pn × Pn as the underlying graph and
let G = {ι, ρ, ρ2, ρ3, σv, σh, σp, σm} be the symmetry group explained above. Then, according to
Theorem 2.1, the number of equivalence classes into which X is partitioned by G is
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|, (6.1)
where |Fg| is the number of states in X that are invariant under g. In order to count the number
of states which remain unchanged under an isometry g, the two cases where n is even or odd
need to be considered separately.
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(a) ρ, ρ3 (b) ρ, ρ3
(c) σp (d) ρ
2
Figure 6.2: Shaded cells indicate those players which, once assigned strategies, determine the strategies
of the remaining players in order for a state to remain unchanged under the relevant transformations.
When n is even, the centre of the grid, as well as the axis of rotation, is at the common corner
of the four centre cells. The grid can be divided into four disjoint quadrants each containing n
2
4
players. When considering ρ, the transformation which rotates the grid through 90◦, assigning
strategies to the players in the first quadrant fixes the strategies of the players in the second
quadrant, the second fixes the third and the third the fourth. There are 2n
2/4 ways of assigning
strategies to the players in the first quadrant, indicated by the shaded cells in Figure 6.2(a),
and hence the number of states that are invariant under ρ is given by |Fρ| = 2n2/4. Similarly,
|Fρ3 | = 2n2/4. Next consider the transformation ρ2, which represents a rotation through 180◦.
Assigning strategies to the top half of the players fixes the strategies of the bottom half, and so
|Fρ2 | = 2n2/2. In order for a state to remain unchanged upon reflection about the vertical axis,
the assignment of strategies to the players has to be symmetric with respect to the vertical axis;
again 2n
2/2 assignments of strategies have this property. Reflection about the diagonal calls
for the assignment of strategies under the diagonal to be a mirror image of the assignment of
strategies above it. Assigning strategies to the 1 + 2 + 3 + . . .+ n = (n2 + n)/2 players on and
above the diagonal, indicated by the shaded cells in Figure 6.2(c), and repeating the pattern
below the diagonal would result in a game state which is symmetric with respect to a diagonal;
hence |Fσp | = |Fσm | = 2(n2+n)/2.
When n is odd, the centre of the grid coincides with the midpoint of the centre cell and each
quadrant shares a number of cells with the neighbouring quadrant. For each transformation
g ∈ G the centre player is mapped to itself and can therefore be assigned a strategy independently
of those of the other players. Assigning strategies to the shaded players in Figure 6.2(b) fixes
the strategies of all the players when the transformation ρ or ρ3 is applied. Assigning strategies
to the
(
n−1
2
)2
players in the first quadrant which are not on the axis of symmetry and to the
(n + 1)/2 players on the boundary between two quadrants, including the centre cell, fixes the
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strategies of the remaining players under the transformations ρ and ρ3. Therefore,
|Fρ| = |Fρ3 | = 2
(
(n+1)2
4
+n+1
1
)
= 2(n
2+3)/4.
Assigning strategies to half of the players, including the centre player as indicated by the shaded
cells in Figure 6.2(d), determines the strategies of the remaining players in order for the state
to remain invariant under ρ3. Therefore, |Fρ3 | = 2(n2+1)/2. It may similarly be shown that
|Fσm | = |Fσp | = 2(n2+n)/2.
A summary of the values of |Fg| for g ∈ G are tabulated in Table 6.3. It follows by (6.1) that
the number of game state automorphism classes for an n×n grid without wrapping is given by
Λs(n) =

1
8
(
2n
2
+ 2 · 2n2/4 + 3 · 2n2/2 + 2 · 2(n2+n)/2
)
if n is even,
1
8
(
2n
2
+ 2 · 2(n2+3)/4 + 2(n2+1)/2 + 4 · 2(n2+n)/2
)
if n is odd.
The sequence {Λs(n)}7n=1 is listed along the diagonal of Table 6.2 and is Sloane’s sequence
A054247 [49].
HHHHHHm
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 6 10 20 36 72
2 6 24 76 288 1 072 4 224
3 102 1 120 8 640 66 816 529 920
4 8 548 263 680 4 197 376 67 133 440
5 4 211 744 268 517 376 8 590 786 560
6 8 590 557 312 1 099 516 870 656
7 70 368 882 591 744
Table 6.2: The number of game state automorphism classes for the ESPD with the grid graph Pn×Pm
as underlying graph. The complete state graphs corresponding to the entries in boldface may be found
in Chapter 5, later in this chapter and in Appendix B.
Consider next the ESPD with the rectangular Cartesian product Pn×Pm as underlying graph,
where n 6= m. In this case the automorphism classes may be counted in a similar fashion as
in the case of a square grid. The symmetries which have to be considered are the identity
operation (ι), rotation through 180◦ (ρ2), reflection along the horizontal axis of symmetry (σh)
and reflection along the vertical axis of symmetry (σv). The group acting on the set of states is
Gr = {ι, ρ2, σh, σv}. As an example, the shaded cells in Figure 6.3 indicate those players which,
once assigned strategies, would determine the strategies of the remaining players in order for
the state to remain invariant under the transformation ρ2. A summary of the values of |Fg| for
g ∈ Gr is given in Table 6.4.
ι ρ ρ2 ρ3 σv σh σp σm
n even 2n
2
2n
2/4 2n
2/2 2n
2/4 2n
2/2 2n
2/2 2
n2+n
2 2
n2+n
2
n odd 2n
2
2(n
2+3)/4 2(n
2+1)/2 2(n
2+3)/4 2(n
2+n)/2 2(n
2+n)/2 2(n
2+n)/2 2(n
2+n)/2
Table 6.3: The number of states invariant under the transformations belonging to the dihedral group
D4.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.3: The axes of symmetry (shown in black) for rectangular lattice. The grey shaded cells
are those which determine the identical states under a 180 degree rotation for (a) a lattice with even
dimensions, (b) one of the dimensions odd and (c) both dimensions odd.
|Fι| |Fρ2 | |Fσv | |Fσh |
m,n both even 2nm 2mn/2 2mn/2 2mn/2
m even, n odd 2nm 2mn/2 2(mn+m)/2 2mn/2
m odd, n even 2nm 2mn/2 2mn/2 2(mn+n)/2
m,n both odd 2nm 2(nm+1)/2 2(mn+m)/2 2(mn+n)/2
Table 6.4: The values of |Fg|, the number of game states fixed by the isometry g ∈ Gr.
It follows by (6.1) that the number of game state automorphism classes for an m×n grid without
wrapping is given by
Λr(n,m) =

1
4
(
2nm + 3 · 2mn/2) if both m and n are even,
1
4
(
2nm + 2 · 2mn/2 + 2m(n+1)/2) if m is even and n is odd,
1
4
(
2nm + 2 · 2mn/2 + 2n(m+1)/2) if m is odd and n is even,
1
4
(
2nm + 2(nm+1)/2 + 2n(m+1)/2 + 2m(n+1)/2
)
if both m and n are odd.
The values of Λr(n,m) are tabulated off the diagonal in Table 6.2 for 1 ≤ n < m ≤ 7.
6.1.2 Game state automorphism classes for grids with wrapping
The Cauchy Frobenius Lemma (Theorem 2.1) may again be employed to enumerate the game
state automorphism classes Λt(m,n) of the ESPD with the toroidal grid graph Cm × Cn as
underlying graph. To make use of the Cauchy Frobenius lemma, the relevant symmetry groups
and the value of |Fg| for the appropriate isometries g are discussed in this section. A description
of the symmetry groups of the toroidal grid graphs C2×Cn for n > 2 and Cm×Cn for 3 ≤ m < n
follow below.
The symmetry group Gt of the game states of the ESPD with Cm × Cn as underlying graph,
where 3 ≤ m < n, is equivalent to the wallpaper group pmm. The group Gt contains the
following members: the identity ι; rotation through 180◦ (ρ2); reflection about the vertical (σv)
and horizontal (σh) axes of symmetry; the vertical translation of rows by i positions (δ
i
u);
the horizontal translation of columns by j positions (δjr); the combination of the vertical and
horizontal translation isometries (δiuδ
j
r = δi,j); and the glide reflections σvδ
i,j , σhδ
i,j and ρ2vδ
i,j
for values 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. That is
Gt = {ι, σv, σh, ρ2, δiu, δjr , δi,j , σvδiu, σhδiu, ρ2δiu, σvδjr , σhδjr , ρ2δjr , σvδi,j , σhδi,j , ρ2δi,j}
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1.
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The symmetry group Gs of a square n× n torus are the members of the wallpaper group p4m.
The group of symmetries G2×n of the ESPD with the grid graph C2 × Cn as underlying graph,
is a subgroup of Gt. The isometries σh and δ1u are equivalent; therefore G2×n contains only one
of these two isommetries. The symmetry group is
G2×n = {ι, σv, σh, ρ2, δ1r , . . . , δn−1r , σvδ1r , . . . , σvδn−1r , σhδ1r , . . . , σhδn−1r , ρ2δ1r , . . . , ρ2δn−1r }.
Enumerating |Fg| for the simple case where the relevant group is G2×n is considered here as
an example. Let |Fg| be the the number of states fixed by g ∈ G2×n. The values of |Fι|,
|Fρ2 |, |Fσv | and |Fσh | have been computed previously and may be found in Table 6.4, that is
|Fι| = 2mn = 22n, |Fρ2 | = 2
mn
2 = 2n and |Fσh | = 2mn/2 = 2n. Furthermore, |Fσv | = 2mn/2 = 2n
in the case where n is even and |Fσv | = 2(mn+n)/2 = 2n+1 when n is odd.
Derivation of the values of |F
δjr
|, |Fσhδir |, |Fσhδir | and |Fρ2δjr | may be performed similarly, as
described in Lemmas A.1–A.4 in Appendix A. A summary of the values of |Fg| for each isometry
g ∈ G2×n is provided in Table 6.5. It follows from the table and the Cauchy-Frobenius Lemma
(Lemma 2.1) that
Λt(2, n) =
1
|Gn×2|
∑
g∈G2×n
|Fg|
=
1
4n
(
22n +
n−1∑
i=1
[22 gcd(n,i) + 2gcd(2i,n)] +
{
(72n+ 1)2
n if n is even
(3n+ 1)2n if n is odd
)
.
Isometry (g) |Fg| (even n) |Fg| (odd n) isometries
ι 22n 22n 1
σv 2
n 2n+1 1
σh 2
n 2n 1
ρ2 2n 2n 1
δjr 22 gcd(n,j) 22 gcd(n,j) n− 1
σvδ
j
r
{
2n if j is even
2n+2 otherwise
2n+1 n− 1
σhδ
i
r 2
gcd(2j,n) 2gcd(2j,n) n− 1
ρ2δjr 2n 2n n− 1
Total: 4n
Table 6.5: The number of game states fixed by each g ∈ Gn×2, where Gn×2 is the group of isommetries
belonging to the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal grid graph C2 × Cn as underlying graph.
The inequality chain 1 ≤ j < n is assumed to hold in the table.
The enumeration of |Fg| for isometries in Gt not yet considered above is rather technical. The
derivations may be found in Lemmas A.5–A.10 in Appendix A. A summary of the values of |Fg|
for each isometry g ∈ Gt may be found in Table 6.6.
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It follows by Lemma 2.1 and Table 6.6 in the case when m and n are both even, that
Λt(m,n) =
1
4mn
2mn + 3 2mn2 + m−1∑
i=1
2n gcd(m,i) +
n−1∑
j=1
2m gcd(n,j) +
(n
2
2
mn
2
+m +
(n
2
− 1
)
2
mn
2
)
+
(m
2
2
mn
2
+n +
(m
2
− 1
)
2n(
m
2 )
)
+
n−1∑
i=1
2
1
2
m gcd(2i,n) +
m−1∑
i=1
2
1
2
n gcd(2i,m)
+ (m+ n− 2)2mn2 +
n−1∑
j=1
m−1∑
i=1
2gcd(n gcd(i,m),m gcd(j,n))
+
(
7mn
4
−m− n+ 1
)
2
mn
2 +
(n
2
− 1
)m−1∑
i=1
2
1
2
n gcd(2i,m)
+
1
2
n
m−1∑
i=1
2(
n
2
−1) gcd(2i,m)+2 gcd(m,i) +
(m
2
− 1
) n−1∑
j=1
2
1
2
m gcd(2j,n)
+
1
2
m
n−1∑
j=1
2(
m
2
−1) gcd(2j,n)+2 gcd(n,j)
 .
The values of Λt(m,n) are tabulated off the diagonal in Table 6.7 for 1 ≤ n < m ≤ 6. The
values of Λt(n, n) are tabulated along the diagonal of the Table 6.7 for 1 ≤ n ≤ 6 and are listed
as Sloane’s sequence A093466 [49]. Finally, Λt(6, 6) is the sum the of the members in Sloane’s
sequence A093469 [49].
HHHHHHm
n
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 6 8 13
2 6 13 34 78 237
3 26 158 708 4 236
4 805 14 676 184 854
5 172 112 8 999 762
6 239 114 084
Table 6.7: The number of game state automorphism classes for the ESPD with the toroidal grid graph
Cn × Cm as underlying graph. The complete state graphs of the entries in boldface may be found in
Chapter 5, later in this chapter and in Appendix B. The value for m = 6 and n = 6 may be found
in Sloane’s database as a result of sequence A093469 [49], the remaining entries on the diagonal were
confirmed via brute force enumeration using Mathematica.
6.2 The phase plane
Varying the values of T and P may result in a change in the dynamics of the game. Such a
change in game dynamics may occur if a change in the parameter values influences the outcome
of the update process of one or more players in the game and is called a phase transition. As
witnessed in the previous chapters, the ESPD on a path or a cycle has only one phase transition
at T = 2 − P , which results in two parameter regions. A phase plane may be constructed by
plotting the values of T and P where phase transitions occur. The lines in the phase plane
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associated with phase transitions are called isoclines. The isoclines divide the phase plane
into disjoint parameter regions. Two pairs of values of T and P in the same region of the
phase plane result in equivalent game dynamics. Schweitzer et al. [46] applied phase plane
analysis to investigate the behaviour of the ESPD on grid graphs with wrapping. In their work
the authors considered the ESPD on a large (essentially infinite) underlying grid graph with
periodic boundary conditions (i.e. wrapping boundaries) and constructed a single phase plane.
Here their work is extended by constructing the phase planes for the ESPD with a grid graph
without wrapping as underlying graph. Furthermore, the effect of the size of the underlying
graph on the phase plane is investigated.
During the update process a player compares the values of the pay-off of the highest scoring
cooperator and the highest scoring defector in his closed neighbourhood. Let the pay-off to player
v with i cooperators and j defectors in his open neighbourhood be denoted by ci,j if player v is
a cooperator, or by di,j if player v is a defector. The values of ci,j and di,j are functions of T
and P . The potential transitions in the P -T phase plane are found by determining the values
of T and P such that ci,j = dk,` for fixed values of i, j, k and `. Since the pay-off a player
achieves is the average of his interaction with all of his neighbours, an important quantity in the
analysis of phase plane transitions is the proportion of cooperators (or defectors) in a player’s
closed neighbourhood. It follows by the definitions of the variables that ci,0 = cj,0, di,0 = dj,0,
ci,i = cj,j and di,i = dj,j for all i, j ∈ N0. There are no isoclines associated with the value of d0,i
as proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 The value of d0,i does not affect the game dynamics of the ESPD with Pm × Pn
or Cm × Cn as underlying graph.
Proof: If, during round t of the ESPD a player v has a neighbour achieving a pay-off of d0,i = P
in his closed neighbourhood, then player v is a defector. If player v does not have a cooperator
in his neighbourhood, he will adopt the strategy of defection during the following round of the
game; this decision is made independent of the values of T and P . If player v has a cooperator
in his neighbourhood, then, since T > P , player v achieves a pay-off pi ≥ P . 
The following Lemma may be used in the construction of a phase plane.
Lemma 6.2 If i+ j 6= 0, k + ` 6= 0 and ii+j ≥ kk+` , then di,j > ck,`.
Proof: Suppose i, j, k, ` ∈ N0 with i+ j 6= 0 and k+ ` 6= 0 such that ii+j ≥ kk+` . Then it follows
by the requirements T > 1 and P > 0 that
di,j =
1
i+ j
(iT + jP ) >
i
i+ j
T >
i
i+ j
≥ k
k + `
= ck,`. 
The above lemma states that a defector with a larger proportion of cooperators in his neigh-
bourhood achieves a higher pay-off than a cooperator with an equivalent or smaller proportion
of cooperators in his neighbourhood. Thus, when considering the ESPD on any graph, values
of T and P may only satisfy di, j = ck,` if
i
i+j <
k
k+` .
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6.2.1 Grids without wrapping
Consider the ESPD with the Cartesian product Pn × Pm as underlying graph. The size of a
player’s neighbourhood is determined by his position in the grid; each of the four corner players
have two neighbours, players along the edges of the grid each has three neighbours and the
remaining players each has four neighbours. The pay-off values that a cooperator may receive
are c2,0, c1,1, c0,2, c3,0, c2,1, c1,2, c0,3, c4,0, c3,1, c2,2, c1,3 and c0,4. The pay-off values that a
defector may receive are d2,0, d1,1, d0,2, d3,0, d2,1, d1,2, d0,3, d4,0, d3,1, d2,2, d1,3 and d0,4. The
scoring possibilities that need to be considered when constructing the phase plane for a grid
graph without wrapping are therefore as tabulated in Table 6.8.
C D
c0,i —
c1,3 d1,3
c1,2 d1,2
ci,i di,i
c2,1 d2,1
c3,1 d3,1
ci,0 di,0
(a)
C D
0 —
1
4
1
4T +
3
4P
1
3
1
3T +
2
3P
1
2
1
2T +
1
2P
2
3
2
3T +
1
3P
3
4
3
4T +
1
4P
1 T
(b)
Table 6.8: Different pay-off values for players playing strategies C and D. (a) Adjacency possibilities
for cooperators, ci,j , and defectors, di,j , where i and j are the number of cooperators and defectors,
respectively, in the player’s neighbourhood. (b) The possible pay-off values in the ESPD on a grid
without wrapping and with parameter values pi = (T, 1, P, 0).
It follows by Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 that the isoclines in the phase plane are given by the fifteen
equations
d1,3 = c1,2 ⇒ T = 43 − 3P, d1,3 = ci,i ⇒ T = 2− 3P,
d1,3 = c2,1 ⇒ T = 83 − 3P, d1,3 = c3,1 ⇒ T = 3− 3P,
d1,3 = ci,0 ⇒ T = 4− 3P, d1,2 = ci,i ⇒ T = 32 − 2P,
d1,2 = c2,1 ⇒ T = 63 − 2P, d1,2 = c3,1 ⇒ T = 94 − 2P,
d1,2 = ci,0 ⇒ T = 3− 2P, di,i = c2,1 ⇒ T = 43 − P,
di,i = c3,1 ⇒ T = 32 − P, di,i = ci,0 ⇒ T = 2− P,
d2,1 = c3,1 ⇒ T = 98 − 12P, d2,1 = ci,0 ⇒ T = 32 − 12P and
d3,1 = ci,0 ⇒ T = 43 − 13P.
The phase plane of the ESPD with the graph Pn×Pm as underlying graph is shown in Figure 6.4.
Not all of the phase transitions in the phase plane may be realised for small grids as certain
combinations of neighbourhoods are not possible. As an example, rectangular grid graphs of
dimension 2× n do not contain any players with neighbourhoods of size four.
6.2.2 Grids with wrapping
Next the ESPD with the Cartesian product Cn × Cm as the underlying graph is considered.
The graph is 4-regular (i.e. each player has four other players in his open neighbourhood). In
this case, the pay-off to a player with i cooperators in his neighbourhood is simply denoted ci
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d1,3 = ci,0
d1,2 = ci,0
d1,3 = c3,1
d1,3 = c1,2
d1,3 = ci,i
d1,3 = c2,1
d1,2 = ci,i
d1,2 = c2,1
di,i = c3,1
d2,1 = c3,1
d3,1 = ci,0
d1,2 = c3,1
di,i = c2,1
di,i = ci,0
d2,1 = ci,0
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(b) m = 2, n = 3
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(c) m = 2, n = 4
Figure 6.4: The P -T phase plane for the ESPD with the grid graph Pn × Pm as underlying graph.
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or di. If the number of cooperators is known, the number of defectors j may be calculated as
j = i− 4. The different pay-off values that a player may achieve are listed in Table 6.9.
C D
c0 d0
c1 d1
c2 d2
c3 d3
c4 d4
(a)
C D
0 P
1
4 +
3
4S T +
3
4P
1
2
1
2T +
1
2P
3
4
3
4T + P
1 T
(b)
Table 6.9: Different pay-off values for players playing strategies C and D. (a) Adjacency possibilities for
cooperators, ci, and defectors, di, where i is the number of cooperators in the player’s neighbourhood.
(b) The possible pay-off values in the ESPD on a grid with wrapping and with parameter values pi =
(T, 1, P, 0).
Again it is true that di > cj for values of i and j satisfying i ≥ j and that the pay-off value d0
does not play a role when determining how a player will update his strategy. Furthermore, it
holds that di > dj for all values of i and j satisfying the inequality i ≥ j. It thus follows that
the transitions in the phase plane are given by the six equations
c4 = d3 ⇒ 4 = 3T + P,
c4 = d2 ⇒ 4 = 2T + 2P,
c4 = d1 ⇒ 4 = T + 3P,
c3 = d2 ⇒ 3 = 2T + 2P,
c3 = d1 ⇒ 3 = T + 3P, and
c2 = d1 ⇒ 2 = T + 3P.
These critical lines in the phase plane separate eleven distinct areas which potentially result in
different game dynamics. The phase plane for the ESPD on a grid with wrapping is shown in
Figure 6.5.
6.3 State graphs of the ESPD on grid graphs
In this section the state graphs for grids with and without wrapping are constructed for games
which have 102 or fewer state automorphism classes. The number of state automorphism classes
for given dimensions of the underlying graphs is tabaluted in Tables 6.2 and 6.7.
6.3.1 Grids with wrapping
The state graphs of the ESPD on toroidal grid graphs Cn × Cm are considered in this section.
State graphs of the ESPD with C2 × C2 as underlying graph
The EPSD with the graph C2 × C2 as underlying graph has six automorphism classes of game
states. The six class leaders of each automorphism class, together with the pay-off that each
player achieves in each game state, is shown is shown in Figure 6.6. Since di > cj if i ≥ j, it
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P
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(b) m = 2, n = 3
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Figure 6.5: The P -T phase plane for the ESPD with Cn × Cm as underlying graph. The eleven
parameter regions are labelled A through K. The phase plane for the ESPD with C3 ×C3 as underlying
graph is shown in Figure 6.10(d).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
6.3. State graphs of the ESPD on grid graphs 91
follows that the outcome of every player’s update decision is unaffected by the the values of
T and P . The single state graph of the ESPD with C2 × C2 as underlying graph is shown in
Figure 6.7.
c3 c2c4c4
c4 c4
c4
c3 d4
c2
d2 d2
d4c4
d4 c4
d2c0
d2 d0
d0d0
d0 d0
Figure 6.6: The class leaders of the six automorphism classes of games states for the ESPD with the
graph C2 × C2 as underlying graph, with the pay-off achieved by each player indicated.
Figure 6.7: The state graph for the ESPD with C2 ×C2 or P2 ×P2 as underlying graph. The outcome
of the game is independent of the values of T and P .
State graphs of the ESPD with C3 × C3 as underlying graph.
The phase plane of the ESPD with the graph C3 × C3 as underlying graph has fewer isoclines
than in the general case where the underlying graph is Cn × Cm (n,m > 3). If a cooperator
achieving a score c4 is present in the game, then the lowest score a defector can achieve is d2.
The minimum number of cooperators in the game is four, as illustrated in Figure 6.8(a), and
each defector in the game achieves a score of d2. Note that a player achieving a pay-off of c4
or d1 cannot be present in the game during the same round; therefore the isocline on the phase
plane which is given by d1 = c4 is absent.
d2 d2
d2 d2
c4
u
(a)
c3
d2d1
u
v
(b)
Figure 6.8: (a) A game state of the ESPD with C3 × C3 as underlying graph containing a cooperator
with a pay-off of c4. The lowest score a defector can achieve if a cooperator scoring c4 is present, is d2.
(b) A game state containing players achieving pay-offs c3 and d1, respectively.
A player having to choose between adopting the strategies of a player with pay-off c3 and a
players achieving a pay-off of d1, is considered next. The game states containing both a player
achieving a pay-off of c3 and a player achieving a pay-off of d1 is shown in Figure 6.8(b).
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The player indicated by the grey shaded cell may be playing either cooperate or defect. There
are two players, the players labelled u and v, in the game state with a player scoring c3 and a
player scoring d1 in their neighbourhoods. Player u achieves a pay-off of d2 > d1; therefore the
value of d1 does not affect the outcome of players u’s update decisions. Player v has a player
achieving d2 in his neighbourhood, and again, the value of d1 does not affect his update process.
Hence there is no isocline in the phase plane associated with the values of T and P satisfying
c3 = d1.
The phase plane of the ESPD with C3 ×C3 as the underlying graph is shown in Figure 6.10(d)
and the state graphs are shown in Figures 6.9(a)–(d) and 6.10(a)–(c). A summary of the
properties of the state graphs may be found in Table 6.10.
(a) Parameter region A (b) Parameter region B
(c) Parameter region C (d) Parameter region D
Figure 6.9: The state graphs of the ESPD with C3×C3 as underlying graph for the different parameter
regions in the T -P phase plane. The phase plane is shown in Figure 6.10(d).
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(a) Parameter region E/F/G (b) Parameter region H
(c) Parameter region I/J
P
T
c4 = d3
c4 = d2c3 = d2
c2 = d1
E/F/G
I/J
C
D/K
A
H
B
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
(d) The phase plane of the ESPD with C3×C3 as under-
lying graph. Regions are labelled A through J. Regions
with multiple labels are those that correspond to more
than one region of the phase plane in Figure 6.5(a).
Figure 6.10: The state graphs of the ESPD with underlying graph C3×C3 for the different parameter
regions in the T -P phase plane.
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Region Components
Probability of
persistent
cooperation
Max
path
length
Average
path
length
A 4 0.219 2 1
B 3 0.113 2 1.115
C 3 0.031 2 1.038
D/K 3 0.020 2 1.038
E/F/G 2 0.002 2 1.115
H 4 0.207 2 1
I/J 4 0.125 2 0.923
Table 6.10: Analytical results for the properties of the state graph of the ESPD with C3 × C3 as
underlying graph.
State graphs of the ESPD with C2 × C3 as underlying graph
As the size of the underlying graph decreases, the possible combinations of neighbourhoods
decreases. The number of isoclines thus also decreases as the dimensions of the underlying
graph decreases. The phase plane of the ESPD with C2 × C3 as underlying graph contains a
subset of the isoclines of the phase plane of the ESPD with C3 × C3 as underlying graph. A
game state containing a player achieving a pay-off value of c4 is shown in Figure 6.11; it is
not possible for a player to achieve a pay-off of d2 if a player acheiving c4 is present in the
game state. Therefore the isocline c4 = d2 is absent from the P -T phase plane. The phase plane
of the ESPD with the underlying graph C2 ×C3 is shown in Figure 6.5(b). The state graphs of
the ESPD with C2 × C3 as underlying graph may be found in Appendix B (section B.4).
d3 d3
c4
Figure 6.11: A game state of the ESPD with C2×C3 as underlying graph containing a player achieving
a pay-off of c4.
State graphs for the ESPD with C2 × C4 as underlying graph
A game state containing a player achieving a pay-off of c4 is shown in Figure 6.12(a), where
grey shaded cells indicate those players whose strategies do not affect the pay-off of the player
achieving a pay-off of c4. All except one of the grey shaded cells are adjacent to two or more
defectors. The top left-most cell is the only one which can contain a defector achieving a pay-off
of d1. The two possible game states containing both a player achieving a pay-off of d1 and a
player achieving a pay-off of c4 are shown in Figure 6.12(b). Therefore, a player cannot have
both a neighbouring player achieving a pay-off of c4 and a neighbouring player achieving a
pay-off of d1; the isocline associated with c4 = d1 is absent from the phase plane. The P -T
phase plane of the ESPD with C2×C4 as underlying graph is shown in Figure 6.5(c). The state
graphs of the ESPD with C2 × C4 as underlying graph may be found in Appendix B (section
B.5).
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d3c4
(a)
c4
d3
d1
c4
d3
d1
c4
(b)
Figure 6.12: Game states of the ESPD with C2 × C4 as underlying graph containing (a) a player
achieving a pay-off of c4 and (b) players achieving pay-offs of d1 and c4. The grey shaded shells in (a)
indicate cells which do not affect the pay-off of the player acheiving a pay-off of c4.
6.3.2 Grids without wrapping
The phase planes of the ESPD with the graph Pn × Pm as underlying may be constructed in
a similar fashion as in the case with wrapping. On underlying graphs of smaller dimension,
once again, there may be equivalent game dynamics across regions. As the dimensions of the
underlying graph decreases, more and more of the regions in the phase plane, shown in Figure
6.4, result in identical state graphs. The single state graph of the ESPD with P2 × P2 as
underlying graph is shown in Figure 6.7. The state graphs of the the ESPD with P2 × P3,
P2 × P4 or P3 × P3 as underlying graph may be found in Appendix B (sections B.1–B.3).
6.4 Chapter summary
The ESPD with a grid graph as the underlying graph was considered in this chapter. Both
grids with and without wrapping boundary conditions were investigated. The automorphism
classes of game states for the cases where Cn ×Cm or Pn × Pm are the underlying graph of the
ESPD where enumerated. The number of automorphism classes of game states is equivalent to
the number of distinct binary matrices or two-colourings of lattices under the wallpaper groups
pmm and p4m.
The P -T phase planes were constructed for the ESPD on the various grid graphs as underlying
graphs. It was shown that the game dynamics become more complex as the dimensions of the
underlying graph increases. Grids without wrapping have a larger number of regions in the P -T
phase plane, each region resulting in different game dynamics, whereas the the ESPD on a grid
with wrapping has at most eleven parameter regions in the P -T phase plane.
The entire state graphs were constructed for the ESPD with C2 ×C2 or C3 ×C3 as underlying
graph. The state graphs of the ESPD for the cases where P2 × P3, P2 × P4, P3 × P3, C2 × C3,
C2 × C4 or C2 × C5 is the underlying graph may be found in Appendix B.
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This chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of the work contained therein, an appraisal
of the contributions of the thesis as well as a discussion on possibilities for future work.
7.1 Thesis summary
Various basic mathematical concepts were reviewed in Chapter 2. Some basic concepts from
graph theory, including basic terminology in graph theory, various types of graphs and a number
of operations on graphs. A brief introduction to some basic concepts from group theory follows.
The Frobenius-Cauchy lemma, in particular, proved to be a very useful result and was used
extensively throughout the thesis. The concept of a generating function was introduced in the
final section of the chapter. A generating function was used to enumerate the number of walks
of a certain length in a digraph.
Definitions and concepts in classical game theory and evolutionary game theory were reviewed in
Chapter 3 (in fulfilment of Thesis Objective I). Notions in classical game theory were reviewed
in §3.1 together with a brief historical account of important developments in the field. Two
methods for representing games were considered, namely, the matrix form representation and
extensive form representation. The PD was considered as an example of a very well known
game in game theory. Other topics in this section included the classification of games according
to their properties, solution concepts and solution methods. The section concluded with a
brief description of a number of successful applications of game theory, while a description of
Braess’ paradox illustrated how counter-intuitive results may arise from game theory. In §3.2
the extension of classical game theory to evolutionary game theory was described. Evolutionary
97
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game theory has its origins in classical game theory and is inspired by evolution as seen in nature.
The connection between biology and evolutionary game theory was discussed. The definition
and components of an evolutionary game were reviewed. Structured evolutionary games were
also discussed in this section. The section concluded with a brief discussion on solution concepts
in evolutionary game theory. In the final section of the chapter, §3.3, a number of variations on
the PD often encountered in the literature on evolutionary game theory were presented.
Chapter 4 contains a mathematical framework for describing spatially structured evolutionary
games (in fulfilment of Thesis Objective II). A game may be presented as an ordered pair
consisting of the set of pay-off parameters and an underlying graph which describes the spatial
structure of the game. Two important concepts were introduced, namely an automorphism class
of game states and the state graph of a game. If the number of state automorphism classes
is small, then the state graph is a useful tool for visually representing the game dynamics.
It was also demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the use of the reduced set of pay-off parameters
Π = {T, 1, S, 0} is sufficient to describe game dynamics in general.
Analytical means were employed in Chapter 5 to analyse the game dynamics of the ESPD on a
path or cycle. It was found that the number of states in the ESPD on a path or a cycle of order
n increases exponentially as the order n of the underlying graph increases (in partial fulfilment
of Thesis Objective III). It was shown that for large values of T (i.e. for T > 2−P ), cooperation
is only possible if the initial game state contains cooperators only. However, it is possible for
cooperation to persist in the case were T ≤ 2 − P even if the initial state does not contain
cooperators only. The initial states which lead to persistent cooperation were characterised for
the ESPD on a path or cycle. If the underlying graph is a path or a cycle of order n > 7, then
the number of states which do not lead to persistent cooperation may be calculated by means
of the recursive relationship
fn = fn−1 + fn−2 + fn−3 + fn−4 − fn−6 + fn−7.
The values used to seed the above relationship depends on whether the underlying graph is a
path or a cycle. If the underlying graph is a path, then the values used to seed the relationship
are f1 = 1, f2 = 3, f3 = 7, f4 = 11, f5 = 21, f6 = 42 and f7 = 81. However, if the underlying
graph is a cycle, then the values used to seed the relationship are f1 = 1, f2 = 3, f3 = 7,
f4 = 15, f5 = 26, f6 = 45 and f7 = 99. The probability of randomly generating an initial game
state that will lead to some form of persistent cooperation may be computed using the formula
P (n) = 1 − fn/2n. It was found that the likelihood of cooperation increases towards certainty
as the order of the underlying graph increases (in fulfilment of Thesis Objective IV).
The ESPD with a grid graph as the underlying graph was considered in Chapter 6. Both grids
with and without wrapping boundary conditions were investigated. The automorphism classes
of game states for the cases where Cn×Cm and Pn×Pm are the underlying graph of the ESPD
where enumerated (in fulfilment of Thesis Objective III). The number of automorphism classes
of game states is equivalent to the number of distinct binary matrices or two-colourings of lattices
under the wallpaper groups pmm and p4m. The P -T phase planes were constructed for the
ESPD on the various grid graphs as underlying graphs (in fulfilment of Thesis Objective V). It
was shown that the game dynamics become more complex as the dimensions of the underlying
graph increases. Grids without wrapping result in a larger number of regions in the P -T
phase plane, each region inducing different game dynamics, whereas the ESPD on a grid with
wrapping exhibits at most eleven parameter regions in the P -T phase plane (in fulfilment of
Thesis Objective V). Entire state graphs were constructed for the ESPD with C2×C2, C3×C3,
C2 × C3, C2 × C4, C2 × C5, P2 × P2, P3 × P3, P2 × P3 or P2 × P4 as underlying graph.
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7.2 Appraisal of the work contained in this thesis
The four main contributions of this thesis towards the fields of evolutionary games on graphs
are summarised in this section.
Contribution 1 Pay-off normalisation of the ESPD.
A method was introduced to normalise the pay-off values without influencing the game dynamics.
The weak parameterisation and the cost-benefit parameterisation are often encountered in the
literature. These parameterisations explore only a subset of the full parameter space. The
results in this thesis present a case for using the normalised pay-off to investigate games on
graphs.
Contribution 2 The asymptotic analysis of the ESPD on paths and cycles.
The steady states were characterised for the cases where the underlying graph of the EPSD is
a path or a cycle. The structures of those initial states that lead to the emergence of persistent
cooperation were characterised. An analytical (i.e. without using simulation) method was used
to compute the probability that the game states will evolve from a randomly generated initial
state towards a steady state which accommodates some form of persistent cooperation. These
contributions were published in [7] for the case where the underlying graph is a cycle, and in [8]
for the case where the underlying graph is a path.
Contribution 3 Phase plane and state graph construction of the ESPD on a grid graph.
The phase planes were constructed for the ESPD where the underlying graph is a grid with
or without wrapping. Furthermore, the influence of the size of the underlying graph on the
isoclines present in the phase plane was also determined. The complete sets of state graphs
were constructed for the underlying graphs C2 × C2, C2 × C3, C2 × C4, C2 × C5, C3 × C3,
P2 × P2, P2 × P3, P2 × P4 and P3 × P3.
Contribution 4 The enumeration of the ESPD state space with Pn × Pm or Cn × Cm as
underlying graph.
The size of the automorphism classes of ESPD game states were enumerated for the ESPD with
Pn × Pm or Cn × Cm (excluding the case where m = n) as underlying graph.
7.3 Ideas for further work
A number of ideas for further work related to the ESPD are highlighted in this section.
7.3.1 Enumeration of the automorphism classes of the ESPD on Cn × Cn
A closed formula was determined in this thesis for Λt(m,n) for all m,n satisfying 1 ≤ n < m.
This formula, however, does not include the case of Λt(n, n). Note that Λt(n, n) corresponds
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to the number two-colourings of a lattice or the number of a binary matrices, in both cases up
to isomorphism involving modular shift of rows and columns, reflection about the horizontal
and vertical axis, reflection through main diagonal and combinations of these operations (i.e.
corresponding to the symmetry group p4m).
The Cauchy-Frobenius Lemma may also be applied to this enumeration problem. The members
of the relevant symmetry group must first be determined. All the symmetries of the a rectangular
lattice apply to a square lattice. However, the symmetry group of the square lattice has the
additional symmetries σm and σp, as well as the combination of these, and the symmetries in
Gr to ensure the closure of the group. The next step involves calculating the number of states
fixed by each element in the symmetry group of the ESPD with Cn × Cn as underlying graph.
7.3.2 The global shipping network and the spread of invasive species
Invasive species bear an economic cost to the countries were they establish themselves. The
spread of these invasive species is often facilitated by the movement of freight ships as they
travel from port to port. Kaluza et al. [24] investigated the structure of the international
shipping network and the number of vessels along each route. The authors also considered the
implications of this network structure on bioinvasion. The global shipping network is shown in
Figure 7.1.
<10 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 > 5000
journeys
Figure 7.1: The global shipping network. The routes travelled by large cargo ships (larger than 10 000
GT) during 2007. The colour scaling indicates the number of ships travelling along each route [24].
Managing biological invasive species exhibits characteristics similar to those of the ESPD on the
graph in Figure 7.1. A cost is associated with preventing the spread of invasive species, such
as when a port’s authorities have to inspect and clean the hulls of the ships before they leave
the port, a cost would be incurred. The cost of this screening process is thus to the exporter,
but the benefit gained by such screening practices is to the importers. This scenario may be
translated into a cost-benefit parameterisation of the ESPD with the global shipping network
as underlying graph.
The following research question naturally arises: Is it possible for a sustainable, efficient invasive
biological control programme to emerge among a cluster of countries in the form of persistent
cooperation?
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7.3.3 Determining the fraction of cooperators present in a steady state
Another quantity of interest when it comes to the persistence of cooperation, is the fraction of
cooperators present in a steady state. A natural extension of the work carried out in Chapter 5
would be to derive an expression for the average fraction of cooperators present in the steady
state of the ESPD with Cn or Pn as underlying graph. In Chapter 5, the probability that
cooperation will persist in the ESPD with a path or a cycle as underlying graph was determined.
It was found that the probability of persistent cooperation tends to certainty as the underlying
graph size increases. This, however, does not indicate what the final proportion of cooperators
in the steady state will be.
7.3.4 The ESPD on trees, grid graphs and small-world networks
It would be interesting to conduct asymptotic analyses for the ESPD on trees, larger grid
graphs, circulant graphs and small-world networks. However, such analyses are expected to be
considerably more difficult due to an increase in symmetry involved in the underlying graphs
and since the state graph will no longer be a rooted pseudo-forest. Much more complex (in fact,
seemingly chaotic) structures of persistent cooperation are expected to emerge in these cases.
For example, the limit cycle containing “persistent” behaviour in Figure 7.2 emerges for the
ESPD with C12 × C12 as underlying graph.
Figure 7.2: A limit cycle of length 26 for the ESPD with C12 × C12 as underlying graph for values of
T and P corresponding to parameter region D in the P -T phase plane shown in Figure 6.5.
7.3.5 Variations on the ESPD
Many variations on the ESPD may be imagined. As an example, Ohtsuki et al. [39] considered
two separate graphs, the so-called interaction graph and the replacement graph, to define the
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structure of the ESPD. The interaction between players may also not necessarily be static
from round to round; the co-evolution of strategies and networks are investigated in [41, 61].
These are just two examples of potential variations on the ESPD. Though many variations
have been studied in the literature, these studies are by no means exhaustive with respect to
all the potential variations under every condition. Investigating these variations may lead to a
comprehensive theoretical understanding of the conditions necessary to promote (or discourage)
the evolution of cooperation.
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APPENDIX A
Enumeration lemmas for the
toroidal grid graph
A number of lemmas and a corollary, which are required to enumerate the automorphism classes
of the ESPD on toroidal grid graphs, are provided in this appendix. The isometry δir is considered
first.
Lemma A.1 Let X be the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m× n grid
graph as underlying graph. Then the number of game states in X fixed by δir is |Fδir | = 2m gcd(i,n).
Proof: Applying the isometry δi to a game state modulo shifts each column i positions to the
right. Let d = lcm(i, n) = ingcd(i,n) . Applying δi to a state
d
i times maps a column to its original
position, as illustrated in Figure A.1. Therefore, assigning strategies to a single column fixes
the strategies of the players in di other columns. It therefore follows that assigning strategies
to the players in the first n id = gcd(i, n) columns fixes all the remaining strategies of the state
under the isometry δir. Since each of the m players can be assigned one of two strategies, it
follows that |Fδir | = 2m gcd(i,n). 
︸︷︷︸
i
︸︷︷︸
i
δi δi
Figure A.1: An illustration of applying the isometry δi to a toroidal grid graph. The translation of a
single column is demonstrated; the position of the column before each application of the isometry δi is
indicated in grey.
The isometry σvδ
i
r is considered next.
Lemma A.2 Let X be the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m× n grid
graph as underlying graph. Then the number of game states in X fixed by σvδir is
|Fσvδir | =

2
m(n+1)
2 if n is odd
2
mn
2 if both n and i are even
2m(
n
2
+1) if n is even and i is odd.
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Proof: The isometry σvδ
i
r shifts each column i positions to the right and then mirrors the
column about the vertical axis of symmetry.
The case where i is even and i ≤ n2 , illustrated in Figure A.2, is considered first. There is a
one-to-one mapping between the columns in similarly coloured regions of the two game states in
Figure A.2. The columns in the grey area in the top game state map to the columns in the grey
area in the bottom game state, but in reverse order from left to right. Assigning strategies to
the players located in the coloured areas therefore fixes the strategies of the remaining players
under the isometry σvδ
i
r. There are
n
2 − i+ 2 i2 = n2 columns in the coloured areas and therefore
mn
2 players in the coloured areas. Since each player can be assigned one of two strategies, it
follows that |Fσvδir | = 2
mn
2 states are fixed by σvδ
i
r. The case where i >
n
2 may be considered as
a shift to the left by n/2− i positions; it then follows by a similar argument that |Fσvδir | = 2
mn
2
when i > n2 .
︷ ︸︸ ︷n2 − i ︷ ︸︸ ︷i2 ︷ ︸︸ ︷i2
σvδ
i
r σvδ
i
r
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
Figure A.2: Assigning strategies to the players in the shaded areas determines the strategies of the
remaining players under the isometry σvδ
i
r in the case where both n and i are even.
The case where i is odd is similar to the case where i is even, with the exception that two columns
in the game state (those coloured yellow in Figure A.3) map onto their original positions.
Therefore, assigning strategies to the players in the coloured regions in Figure A.3 fixes the
strategies of the remaining players under the isometry σvδ
i
r. There are
n
2 − i+ 2 i−12 + 2 = n2 + 1
columns in the coloured regions and hence |Fσvδir | = 2m(
n
2
+1).
Finally, the case where n is odd is considered. The isometry σvδ
i
r acting on a game state
is illustrated in Figures A.4 and A.5. Note that the centre column is positioned on top of
the vertical axis of symmetry. Again there is a one-to-one mapping between players in the
coloured areas in the top game state and the regions of same colour in the bottom game state.
The number of columns that need to be assigned strategies in the case where i is even is
n−1
2 − i+ i2−1+ i2 +2 = n+12 and the case where i is odd is n−12 − i+2 · i−12 +2 = n+12 . Therefore
it follows that |Fσvδir | = 2
m(n+1)
2 for odd values of n. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
109
︷ ︸︸ ︷n2 − i ︷ ︸︸ ︷i−12 ︷ ︸︸ ︷i−12
σvδ
i
rσvδ
i
r
︷ ︸︸ ︷i−12 ︷ ︸︸ ︷i−12
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
Figure A.3: Assigning strategies to the players in the shaded areas determine the strategies of the
remaining players under the isometry σvδ
i
r in the case where n is even and i is odd.
︷ ︸︸ ︷n−12 − i ︷︸︸︷i2 − 1 ︷ ︸︸ ︷i2
σvδ
i
r σvδ
i
r
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
Figure A.4: Assigning strategies to the players in the shaded areas determine the strategies of the
remaining players under the isometry σvδ
i
r in the case where n is odd and i is even.
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︷ ︸︸ ︷n−12 − i ︷︸︸︷i−12 ︷ ︸︸ ︷i−12
σvδ
i
r σvδ
i
r
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
Figure A.5: Assigning strategies to the players in the shaded areas determine the strategies of the
remaining players under the isometry σvδ
i
r in the case where both n and i are odd.
The following corollary is a direct result of the previous lemma.
Corollary A.1 If |Fσvδir | is the number of game states in X fixed by σvδir, where X is the set
containing all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m × n grid graph as underlying
graph, then
n−1∑
i=1
|Fσvδir | =
{
(n− 1)2m(n+1)2 if n is even
(n2 − 1) · 2
mn
2 + n2 · 2m(
n
2
+1) if n is odd.
The isometry σhδ
i
r is considered next.
Lemma A.3 Let X be the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m× n grid
graph as underlying graph. Then the number of game states in X fixed by σhδir is
|Fσhδir | =
{
2
m
2
gcd(2i,n) if m is even
2
m−1
2
gcd(2i,n)+gcd(i,n) if m is odd.
Proof: Assigning strategies to half of the players in the first column, shaded in black in
Figure A.6, determines the strategies of the players in the grey shaded columns under the
isometry σhδ
i
r. If m is even, then assigning strategies to
m
2 gcd(2i, n) players fixes the remaining
strategies.
If m is odd, then players in the middle row are mapped to the same row, but shifted to the
right by i positions. Therefore, assigning strategies to gcd(i, n) players in the middle row
fixes the strategies of the players in that row under the isometry σhδ
i
r. Assigning strategies to
m−1
2 gcd(2i, n) + gcd(i, n) players in the case where m is odd therefore determines the strategies
of the remaining players under the isometry σhδ
i
r. 
The isometry ρ2δir is considered next.
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︸ ︷︷ ︸
gcd(2i, n)
(a) m is even
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gcd(2i, n)
(b) m is odd
Figure A.6: The grey shaded players are those players whose strategies are fixed under the isometry
σhδ
i
r by assigning strategies to half of the players in the first column, shaded in black.
Lemma A.4 Let X be the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m× n grid
graph as underlying graph. Then the number of game states in X fixed by ρ2δir is
|Fρ2δir | =

2
mn
2 if m is even
2
mn
2
+ 1
2 if m and n are both odd
2
mn
2 if m is odd, n and i are both even
2
mn
2
+1 if m is odd, n is even and i is odd.
Proof: It can be shown that ρ2δir ◦ ρ2δir = ι. Therefore, assigning a strategy to a player that
does not map to itself, fixes the strategy of exactly one other player. Assigning strategies to the
players in the area shaded in grey in Figure A.7(a), fixes the strategies of the remaining players
under the isometry ρ2δir in the case where m is even.
In the case where m is odd, the players in the centre row have the potential to map onto their
original positions under the isometry ρ2δir. Consider a player in row k and column `. The
isometry δh is equivalent to applying the function fh(`) = m−1−` to the index `. A player will
therefore remain in the same row after applying the isometry δh if ` = m−1− `, or equivalently
when ` = m−12 . Note that the equality can only be satisfied for odd values of m.
(a) (b)
Figure A.7: Assigning strategies to the players in the shaded areas determine the remaining strategies
in order for a game state to be fixed by ρ2δir in the case (a) m is even and (b) m is odd.
Assigning strategies to the (m−1)n2 players in the shaded region in Figure A.7(b) determines the
strategy of mn−n players under the isometry ρ2δir, that is all the players excluding those in the
centre row. The isometry ρ2 is a composition of the isometries σv and σh. The position of the
players in the centre row are invariant under the isometry δh. The effect of σvδ
i
r on the centre
row is considered next. It follows by Lemma A.2 that assigning strategies to n+12 players if n is
odd, or n2 players if n and i are both even, or
n
2 + 1 players if n is even and i is odd, determines
the strategies of the n players in the centre row under the isometry ρ2δir. 
The isometry δi,j is considered next.
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Lemma A.5 Let X be the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m× n grid
graph as underlying graph. Then the number of game states in X fixed by δi,j is
|Fδi,j | = 2gcd[n gcd(i,m),m gcd(j,n)].
Proof: Applying the isometry δiu a minimum of b =
m
gcd(i,m) times will map each column to its
original position. Similarly applying the isometry δjr a minimum of a =
n
gcd(j,n) times will map
each row to its original position. Therefore, in order to map each player to its original position,
the isometry δi,j must be applied at least lcm(a, b) times.
It therefore follows that assigning a strategy to a single player determines the strategies of
lcm(a, b)− 1 other players. Hence fixing the strategies of x = mnlcm(a,b) players determines the
strategies of the remaining players under the isometry δi,j . It follows by the identity lcm(a, b) =
ab
gcd(a,b) that
x =
mn gcd(a, b)
ab
= gcd(a, b) gcd(i,m) gcd(j, n)
= gcd
(
m
gcd(i,m)
,
n
gcd(j, n)
)
gcd(i,m) gcd(j, n)
= gcd[m gcd(j, n), n gcd(i,m)].
Each of the gcd[m gcd(j, n), n gcd(i,m)] players can be assigned one of two strategies and so
|Fδi,j | = 2gcd[n gcd(i,m),m gcd(j,n)]. 
The proof of the following Lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma A.3; the proof is therefore
omitted.
Lemma A.6 Let X be the set of all game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m×n grid graph
as underlying graph. Then the number of games states in X fixed by σvδiu is
|Fσvδiu | =
{
2
n
2
gcd(2i,m) if n is even
2
n−1
2
gcd(2i,m)+gcd(i,m) if n is odd.
The following lemma may proved in a similar fashion to Lemma A.4.
Lemma A.7 Let X be the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m× n grid
graph as underlying graph. Then the number of game states in X fixed by ρ2δiu is
|Fρ2δiu | =

2
mn
2 if n is even
2
mn
2
+ 1
2 if n and m are both odd
2
mn
2 if n is odd, m is odd and i is even
2
mn
2
+1 if n, m and i are odd.
The isometry ρ2δi,j is considered next.
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Lemma A.8 If X is the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m × n grid
graph as the underlying graph and |Fρ2δi,j | is the number of game states in X fixed by ρ2δi,j,
then
n−1∑
i=1
m−1∑
j=1
|Fρ2δi,j | =

(74mn−m− n+ 1)2
mn
2 if m and n are both even
(32mn− 32m− n+ 1)2
mn
2 if m is even and n is odd
(32mn−m− 32n+ 1)2
mn
2 if m is odd and n is even
(m− 1)(n− 1)2mn+12 if both m and n are odd.
Proof: It can be shown that ρ2δi,j ◦ ρ2δi,j = ι. Suppose, without loss of generality, that δi,j is
the isometry that modular shifts each player’s location i positions downwards and j positions
to right.
Modular shifting the players in row `, i positions downward, will relocate these players to
row k + i (mod m). Following this shift by reflection of the grid along the horizontal axis of
symmetry will result in row ` mapping to row −(`+ i+ 1) (mod m). Therefore, a row maps
to its original position under ρ2δi,j if the congruence −(k + i+ 1) ≡ k (mod m) is satisfied, or
equivalently if
2k ≡ −(j + 1) (mod m). (A.1)
If both m and i are even, then there are no values of k satisfying (A.1). If m is even and i is
odd, then exactly two values of k satisfy (A.1), namely k = m−i−12 or k =
2m−i−1
2 .
It therefore follows that in the case where both m and i are even, no player maps to its original
position under the isometry ρ2δi,j . Assigning strategies to half of the players, fixes the strategies
of the remaining players under the isometry ρ2δi,j . If i is odd, as shown previously, then players
in exactly two rows are mapped to their original rows under the isometry ρ2δi,j . Assigning
strategies to (m−2)n2 =
mn
2 − n of the players not in these rows, fixes the strategies of the
mn− 2n players not contained in the aforementioned two rows.
The isometry ρ2δi,j applied to the players in the rows mapping to their original positions under
the isometry ρ2δi,j is equivalent to applying the isometry δvδ
j
r to the players in question. It
follows by Lemma A.2 that strategies must be assigned to n+12 players if n is odd,
n
2 players if
n is even and j is even, or n2 + 1 players if n is even and j is odd in order to fix the strategy of
the players in these rows under the isometry δvδ
j
r .
Hence in the case where m and n are both even,
|Fρ2δi,j | =
{
2
mn
2
+2 if i and j are both odd
2
mn
2 otherwise.
In the case where m is even, i takes on m2 odd values and
m
2 − 1 even values in the double
summation. Similarly if n is even, j takes on n2 odd values and
n
2 − 1 even values in the double
summation. Therefore,
n−1∑
i=1
m−1∑
j=1
|Fρ2δi,j | = m2 n2 2
mn
2
+2 +
(
(m− 1)(n− 1)− m2 n2
)
2
mn
2
= mn4 2
22
mn
2 + (34mn−m− n+ 1)2
mn
2
= (74mn−m− n+ 1)2
mn
2 .
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It follows by a similar argument as above that
|Fρ2δi,j | =
{
2
mn
2 if j is even
2
mn
2
+1 if j is odd
in the case were m is even and n is odd, and so
m−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
|Fρ2δi,j | = (m2 − 1)(n− 1)2
mn
2 + m2 (n− 1)2
mn
2
+1
=
(
3
2mn− 32m− n+ 1
)
2
mn
2 .
In the case where m is odd and n is even,
|Fρ2δi,j | =
{
2
mn
2 if j is even
2
mn
2
+1 if j is odd
and hence
n−1∑
i=1
m−1∑
j=1
|Fρ2δi,j | = (m− 1)n2 2
mn
2
+1 + (m− 1)(n2 − 1)2
mn
2
= (32mn−m− 32n+ 1)2
mn
2 .
In the case where both m and n are odd, |Fρ2δi,j | = 2
mn+1
2 and therefore
n−1∑
i=1
m−1∑
j=1
|Fρ2δi,j | = (m− 1)(n− 1)2
mn+1
2 . 
The proof of the following two lemmas are similar to those of the relevant lemmas above.
Lemma A.9 Let X be the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m× n grid
graph as underlying graph. Then the number of game states in X fixed by σvδi,j is
|Fσvδi,j | =

2
n
2
gcd(2i,m) if n is even and j is even
2(
n
2
−1) gcd(2i,m)+2 gcd(m,i) if n is even and j is odd
2
n−1
2
gcd(2i,m)+gcd(m,i) if n is odd.
Lemma A.10 Let X be the set of all the game states of the ESPD with the toroidal m×n grid
graph as underlying graph. Then the number of game states in X fixed by σhδi,j is
|Fσhδi,j | =

2
m
2
gcd(2j,n) if m is even and i is even
2(
m
2
−1) gcd(2j,n)+2 gcd(n,j) if m is even and i is odd
2
n−1
2
gcd(2j,n)+gcd(n,j) if m is odd.
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This appendix contains the state graphs of the ESPD on various grids graphs (with and without
wrapping) as underlying graph.
B.1 P2 × P3
The ESPD with P2 × P3 as underlying graph exhibits fundamentally different game dynamics
across the six disjoint parameter regions in the P -T phase plane. The phase plane and the
parameter regions are shown in Figure B.1. The six state graphs, one for each parameter
region, are shown on pp. 116–117.
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Figure B.1: Phase plane of the ESPD with P2 × Pn as underlying graph containing seven regions
labelled A through G.
P2 × P3: Parameter region A P2 × P3: Parameter region B
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B.1. P2 × P3 117
P2 × P3: Parameter region C P2 × P3: Parameter region D
P2 × P3: Parameter region E/F P2 × P3: Parameter region G
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B.2 P2 × P4
The ESPD with P2 × P4 as underlying graph exhibits fundamentally different game dynamics
across the seven disjoint parameter regions in the P -T phase plane. The phase plane and the
parameter regions are shown in Figure B.1. The seven state graphs, one for each parameter
region, are shown below and on pp. 119–122.
P2 × P4: Parameter region A
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
B.2. P2 × P4 119
P2 × P4: Parameter region B
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P2 × P4: Parameter region C
P2 × P4: Parameter region D
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P2 × P4: Parameter region E
P2 × P4: Parameter region F
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P2 × P4: Parameter region G
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B.3 P3 × P3
The ESPD with P3 × P3 as underlying has twenty three disjoint parameter regions in the P -T
parameter space, each with a unique state graph. The phase plane indicating the aforementioned
parameter regions is shown in Figure B.2. The twenty three state graphs, one for each parameter
region, of the EPSD with P3 × P3 as underlying graph are shown on pp. 124–146.
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3
Figure B.2: Phase plane of the ESPD with P3 × P3 as underlying graph containing twenty three
parameter regions labelled A through X.
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P3 × P3: Paramter region A
P3 × P3: Paramter region B
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P3 × P3: Paramter region C
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P3 × P3: Parameter region D
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P3 × P3: Parameter region E
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P3 × P3: Parameter region F
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P3 × P3: Parameter region G
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P3 × P3: Parameter region H
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P3 × P3: Parameter region I
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P3 × P3: Parameter region J
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
B.3. P3 × P3 133
P3 × P3: Parameter region K
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P3 × P3: Parameter region L
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P3 × P3: Parameter region M
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P3 × P3: Parameter region N
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P3 × P3: Parameter region O
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P3 × P3: Parameter region P
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P3 × P3: Parameter region Q
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P3 × P3: Parameter region R
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P3 × P3: Parameter region S
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P3 × P3: Parameter region T
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
B.3. P3 × P3 143
P3 × P3: Parameter region U
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P3 × P3: Parameter region V
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P3 × P3: Parameter region W
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P3 × P3: Parameter region X
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B.4 C2 × C3
The ESPD with the underlying graph Cn × Cm, for values m,n ≥ 3, admits eleven parameter
regions in the P -T parameter space. The phase plane indicating the eleven parameter regions
is shown in Figure B.3. The ESPD on smaller grid graphs exhibits equivalent game dynamics
across some of the eleven parameter regions, a detailed explanation of the parameter space may
be found in §6.3.1. The state graphs of the ESPD with C2 ×C3 as underlying graph are shown
on p. 148.
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4
Figure B.3: The P -T phase plane for the ESPD with Cn × Cm as the underlying graph. The eleven
parameter regions are labelled A through K.
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C2 × C3: Parameter region A C2 × C3: Parameter region B
C2 × C3: Parameter region C C2×C3: Parameter regions D, E,
F, G and K
C2 × C3: Parameter region H C2 × C3: Parameter regions I and J
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B.5 C2 × C4
The ESPD with C2 × C4 as underlying graph exhibits fundamentally different game dynamics
across ten disjoint parameter regions in the P -T phase plane. The phase plane indicating the
parameter regions is shown in Figure B.3. The ten state graphs, one for each parameter region,
are shown below and on pp. 150–151.
C2 × C4: Parameter region A C2 × C4: Parameter region B
C2 × C4: Parameter region C C2 × C4: Parameter region D
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C2 × C4: Parameter region E C2 × C4: Parameter regions F and G
C2 × C4: Parameter region H C2 × C4: Parameter region I
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C2 × C4: Parameter region J
C2 × C4: Parameter region K
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B.6 C2 × C5
The ESPD with C2 × C5 as underlying graph exhibits fundamentally different game dynamics
across eleven disjoint parameter regions in the P -T phase plane. The phase plane indicating
the parameter regions is shown in Figure B.3. The eleven state graphs, one for each parameter
region, are shown below and on 153–158.
C2 × C5: Parameter region A
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C2 × C5:Parameter region B
C2 × C5: Parameter region C
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C2 × C5: Parameter region D
C2 × C5: Parameter region E
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C2 × C5: Parameter region F
C2 × C5: Parameter region G
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C2 × C5: Parameter region H
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C2 × C5: Parameter region I
C2 × C5: Parameter region J
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C2 × C5: Parameter region K
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